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1977

Introduction

Th is Guide was prepared as a reference source for legal opinions and court cases
related to the Subdivision Law. It has been designed in loose-leaf format so that as
new opinions and court cases emerge, they can be inserted in a logical sequence. This
Guide contains 7 sections as follows:
1.

Subject guide to legal opinions and court cases. This is a subject guide to topics
discussed in the opinions and court cases which fo llo w . It is expected that this
Guide w ill be periodically updated as new cases and opinions are added.

2.

Attorney General's O pinions. Th is section contains opinions, informal and otherwise,
issued by the Attorney General's O ffic e , that appear to be relevant to the in te r
pretation and administration of the Subdivision Law. Excluded from this collection
are statements from the Attorney General's O ffice which decline to answer specific
inquiries.

3.

Maine Municipal Association O pinions. Th is section has been reproduced from the
legal opinions section of the Maine Townsman. Editorial notes have been added
where clarification was deemed appropriate.

4.

SPO Memorandums. This section contains memorandums issued by the State Planning
O ffice relative to the Subdivision Law.

5.

Maine Supreme Court Cases. Th is section includes Maine Supreme Court cases which
appear to be relevant to the Subdivision Law. Marginal notes have been e d ito ria lly
added to highlight certain paragraphs.

6.

Superior Court Cases. Th is section has been included for Superior Court opinions,
although a search o f courthouse records has not been made to uncover cases which
may e xist. A t the present tim e, only 1 case has been included in this section.

7.

Subdivision Law. This section contains the existing Subdivision Law , as well as
previous versions o f the Law, which are often helpful in researching whether a sub
division was created at a particular point in time.

Credits: The Penobscot Valley Regional Planning Commission assembled opinions from
the Attorney General's O ffic e and the Maine Municipal Association. The State Planning
O ffic e assembled the court cases, and arranged and edited this G uide.

Subject Guide to Legal Opinions and Court Cases

Subject Guide to Legal Opinions and Court Cases

Th is Guide was prepared as a summary of topics contained in the opinions and court
cases which fo llo w . Each topic contains one or more abbreviated references which are
explained below:
A G - 1 , A G -2 , A G - 3 , e tc ., refers to opinions issued by the Attorney General's
O ffic e . These are numbered chronologically by date, so that new ones can
be added according to a logical sequence as time goes by. Individual pages
are also numbered in some of the longer opinions. Several opinions relative
to the Site Location Act are also included because they contain discussion
that would be relevant for the Subdivision Law .
M M A -1 , M M A -2 , M M A -3 , e tc ., refers to opinions prepared by the Maine M u n icipal Association. These opinions are numbered chronologically as they appear
ed in various issues of the Maine Townsmen. As new opinions appear, they can
be added to this sequence.
S P O -1 , S P O - 2 , e tc .,re fe rs to memorandums issued by the State Planning O ffic e .
These are also numbered in chronological order according to date of issuance.
M S C -1 , M SC -2 (page 54), M SC -3 (page 750), e tc ., refers to Maine Court cases
which are arranged chronologically according to date. Since these opinions
were copied directly from the A tla n tic Reporter, page numbers from that source
are also included, are used for reference purposes. Several cases related to the
Site Location Act are included because they contain general discussions that
would be relevant to the Subdivision Law .
sc-1, etc. This section is designed to include court case opinions from Superior C o urt.
A t this p o int, only the Phippsburg case has been included.

Subject Guide to Legal Opinions and Court Cases

Abuttor
Transfer of an interest in land to an abuttor is not a subdivision.
A G -8 (pp 2-3) and M M A -6 .

See discussion in

Adoption of Regulations
For procedure to fo llo w , see M M A -1 .
Appeal Procedure
Appeal to decisions made under the Subdivision Law may be taken to Superior Court
in accordance w ith Rule 8 0 - B , Maine Rules of C iv il Procedures. See AG-1 (p. 4 ).
See sc-1 for a copy of Rule 8 0 -B .
Applicants for Subdivision Approval
Applicants for subdivision approval must have title , rig h t, or interest in a parcel of
land for which subdivision approval is sought in order to have "standing" (the right
to apply) before the municipal reviewing authority. This principle was established
in an opinion which dealt w ith the Site Location A c t. The opinion further stated
that mere oral representation regarding the existence o f an option or contract is in 
su ffic ie nt to establish standing. See A G -4 .
Specific requirements for establishing t itle , rig ht or intere st, and particular problems
relating to standing, are discussed in A G -5 .
Approval of Plat
For a discussion of who should sign, see S P O - 1 .
Comprehensive Plan
It is not a requirement that a comprehensive plan be adopted prior to the adoption of
subdivision control regulations. See A G - 2 .
Conditions
C ity Planning Board, in passing on p la t, acts in an administrative capacity, and is
w ithout authority to impose conditions beyond compliance w ith municipal ordinance
and general reasonableness. See M SC -2 (pp 53 -54).
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Constitutional tty o f Law
One recent court case concerning the Site Location Act contains an excellent dis
cussion of Constitutional questions and the basis for police power regulations. The
basic principles which are discussed apply to the Subdivision Law as w e ll. See
M S C -3 . (see especially pp. 746-748).
Contiguous Parcels
Adjacent parcels of land are considered as one parcel of land for purposes of the
Subdivision Law. See M M A -4 .
D e fin itio n of What Constitutes a Subdivision
A subdivision is created when land is divided in a functional manner. Thus, cluster
housing, shopping centers, mobile home parks, and apartment, condominium, or
cooperative housing w ith m ultiple building units are subdivisions. See A G -1 (esp.
p. 3).
For a discussion of high rise condominiums, see A G -3 .
For a discussion of subdivision under the Site Location A c t, see A G - 7 .
A municipality may, by ordinance, but not by regulation adopted by the municipal
reviewing authority, define subdivision more restric tively or all inclusive than it is
defined in State Law . See A G - 9 .
The sale of land to a water company is not exempt as a lo t.

See M M A -8 .

In determining whether a subdivision was created at a particular point in time, the
determination must be based on the law at that point in tim e. See AG -1 (p. 4),
and M S C -1 .
DEP Jurisdiction
The fact that a particular subdivision is subject to review under the Site Location Act
does not eliminate the requirement for local review and approval. This principle is
discussed in an opinion to the DEP relative to the Site Location A c t. See A G - 6 .
Enforcement
The Attorney General's O ffic e regards enforcement of the Subdivision Law as a local
responsibility except under extraordinary circumstances. See AG -1 (page 4 ).
G ifts
G ifts are exempt as a lo t.

See M M A -3 .
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Grandfathering
A previously approved subdivision is not exempt from the requirements of a sub
sequently enacted zoning ordinance. A proposed use does not constitute a nonconforming use. See M M A -9 .
A m unicipality is not required to take steps to protect unwary buyers who purchase
undersized lots which should have been combined w ith adjoining land, but such
action would avoid many problems and appeals. See M M A -9 .
Interpretation o f the Law
The legislative intent is o f prime importance in the construction or interpretation
of Statutes. Th is is a genera! principle o f Law which was discussed in a recent
court case. See M SC -3 (page 741).
Judicial Procedure
In one recent court case, the Maine Supreme Court discussed the doctrine o f primary
ju risd ic tio n , which is essentially a judicial policy stating that the court w ill generally
not decide an issue concerning which an administrative agency has decision making
capacity u n til after the agency has considered the issue. This is sim ilar to the con
cept o f exhaustion ofn^e^PremeSfes^ by which a court can refuse to decide on a
case on the basis that an administrative action has not yet been deemed complete.
W h ile the case dealt w ith the Board of Environmental Protection, these doctrines
would probably apply in action involving the decisions of a municipal reviewing
a u tho rity. See M SC -4 (p. 207).
Ju stific a tio n for Subdivision Regulation
One recent court case contains a good discussion o f the need for subdivision regulation.
Even though the discussion refers to the Site Location A ct, the language is su ffic ie n tly
broad so as to apply to the Subdivision Law . See M SC -3 (page 750).
L ia b ility
A Planning Board member may not be held individually liable to individual suits as
a result o f decisions made in the discharge o f the Planning Board's duties. See sc-2
(pages 8 -1 0 ).
Municipal Regulation
Prio r to 1971, the Subdivision Law was simply an enabling act, and did not require
local review and approval. See M SC -4 (page 203).
Numerical Standards
The Spring Valley case discussed a rationale for determining and setting a specific
numerical standard. See M SC -3 (page 752),
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Parcel Retained by Subdivider
Land retained by the subdivider for his own use as a single fam ily dwelling is not
counted as a lot under certain conditions. See M M A -7 .
Plantation Review Powers
A Plantation does not have the authority to review and approve subdivisions.
M M A -5 .

See

Police Power
Subdivision regulation is a valid exercise o f the police power. There is a general
discussion o f this principle in the Spring Valley case. See M SC -3 (page 746).
Request for Legal Interpretations or Opinions
The procedure for local Planning Boards to follow in requesting legal interpretations
of the Subdivision Law was outlined in an opinion from the Attorney General's O ffic e .
See A G - 3 .
Retroactive Application o f the Subdivision Law
For a general discussion of th is, see AG-1 (page 4 ).

See also M S C -1 .

Review Considerations
Costs. It is public policy that the cost of development shall include those measures
necessary to the protection of the environment o f this State and this has already been
determined by our Courts to be w ith in proper lim its o f the police power. See sc-2
(page 6).
Discretion . The Legislature intended that there be room for discretion on the part
of Planning Boards. See M S C -2 , and sc-2 (pages 5-7) .
Planning Board status.
See S P O -3 .

Planning Board status may affect subdivision review powers.

Reasonableness. Actions and deliberations of Planning Boards must meet a general
reasonableness te st. N ot everything w ill be spelled out by statute or ordinance,
and it is expected that Planning Boards w ill exercise a general reasonableness. See
M SC -2 (pp. 5 6 -5 7 ), and sc-2 (page 7 ).
Tentative Approval does not compel final approval. The Planning Board does not have
authority to make a prior commitment to approving a subdivision. See M SC -2
(pp. 54 and 56).
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(Review Considerations) continued
Two-step approval. The basis for requiring preliminary and final plat approval
must rest w ith specific statutes or regulations authorized thereunder. See M SC -2
(pp. 55 -56).
Water Supply.

For procedures to fo llo w , see S P O -2 .

Shore land Zoning
Lot siz e , frontage, and setback requirements would apply to a previously approved
subdivision, even i f it means that unsold lots have to be combined. See M M A -9 .
Signing o f Plat
For a discussion of who should sign, see SPO-1 .
Soils
The requirement that development not be b u ilt on soil types which are unsuitable
to the nature o f the undertaking is a reasonable one. W hile discussion of this
point is contained in a case involving the Site Location A c t, the language is broad
enough to apply to the Subdivision Law . See M SC -3 (page 750).
Street Acceptance
A road shown on a plat prior to creation o f the Planning Board is not subject to the
Planning Board's jurisd ic tio n. See M M A -2 .
Tentative Approval of Plat
The Planning Board does not have authority to give tentative approval of a p la t, or
commit itse lf in advance to approving a particular subdivision proposal. See M SC -2
(page 54).
Transfer to an Abuttor
Transfer o f land to an abuttor is exempt as a lo t.

See A G - 8 .

Water Supply
For a discussion of review considerations, see S P O -2 .

A ttorney General's Opinions

Reproduced from a jo int opinion issued by the Attorney General's O ffic e and the Maine
Municipal Association.
March 2 , 1972

TO:
FROM:
RE:

I.

ALL CONCERNED MUNICIPALITIES
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT AND THE MAINE
MUNICIPAL ASSOCIATION
SUBDIVISION STATUTE - TITLE 30 MAINE REVISED
STATUTES,
SECTION 4956 AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 454
OF THE PUBLIC LAWS OF 1971

INTRODUCTION

Since the passage of the above act, both the Attorney
General and the Maine Municipal Association have had numerous
requests for guidance in the interpretation of the above
law. Municipal officers and planning boards have requested
official "Opinions" of the Attorney General regarding numerour provisions of the statute.
The Law prohibits the Attorney General from rendering
opinions for other than State agencies or officials on matters
dealing with State Law (as opposed to municipal ordinances or
the legal relationships between private parties). In this
case, however, it was decided that this unique statute required
an advisory memorandum from the Attorney General.
Though the
cited statute is administered by municipalities, it may,
according to its own terms, be enforced by the Attorney Gen
eral.
There is, therefore, a substantial connection with a
State agency which would support an advisory memorandum.
Moreover, because of the nature of the act, both the Attor
ney General and the Maine Municipal Association believe it
is desirable to establish some uniform guidelines for the
interpretation of the subdivision Law.
Developers and muni
cipal officers have an interest in uniform enforcement.
If
the Attorney General is to enforce the law, it is obvious
that he must establish guidelines for his own use.
There
fore, the Attorney General has determined that it is in the
public interest to issue this memorandum.
It must be empha
sized that this memorandum is not an "Opinion" in the tra
ditional sense, but rather only an informal interpretation
of the referenced law. This has been prepared by the Depart
ment of the Attorney General after extensive consultation
and discussion with the Maine Municipal Association.
We
strongly advise all planning boards and municipalities to
consult their own counsel on any issue discussed herein or
which may otherwise arise
II.

SUBDIVISION

The most frequently asked category of questions usually
requests further interpretation of the definition of "sub
division".
It is obvious that an infinite variety of situations
may arise under this law.
It would be impossible to deal

AG - 1
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with every conceivable fact situation.
Therefore, in further
defining "subdivision” we have attempted to establish a con
ceptual framework and to apply such framework to a variety
of fact situations.
The term "subdivision", as contained in the statute, is
defined as:
"The division of a tract or parcel of land
into 3 or more lots for the purpose of
sale, development or building."
Based on this definition, it is apparent that there are
two elements to the definition:
(1) The division of land,
and (2) the purpose for which the division occurs.
Of these
two elements, the first is probably the more important and
also more complicated.
If we determine that there has been
a division of land, it is a relatively simple matter to
identify the purpose for which the division takes place
(e.g., plainly a shopping center constitutes a "development."
Query whether it is a division of land.)
It is also important to keep in mind the public policy
implicit in this statute and the harm which it was designed
to prevent.
This statute enables municipalities to protect
themselves against unplanned growth.
The twelve criteria
in § 4956(3) set forth the specific items with which the
Legislature and municipalities were concerned.
It should be
apparent that these questions can be applied to a variety of
developments, and are not just limited to residential sub
divisions .
As we have noted above, the critical question is to
determine whether in each case there has been a "division"
of land into "lots".
The term "lot" may be defined in two
ways:
either (1) according to its legal characteristics
(e.g., a parcel of land identified on a plat or set out by
metes and bounds), or (2) according to its character and
function (e.g., a piece of land measured and set apart for
private use and occupancy). See Words and Phrases and
Black’s Law Dictionary for further examples of "lot".
Of
the two definitions, the latter is the more helpful since
it describes a more functional approach; that is, it is
concerned not with legal form but rather with actual use.
It is this functional approach which we have chosen to uti
lize in interpreting "subdivision", since we believe it
is consistent with the purpose of the law.
Having thus
attempted to establish the conceptual framework of our ana
lysis, it is now necessary to apply it to a few hypothetical
fact situations.

AG - 1
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The subdivision of land is usually accomplished by
marking such divisions on a plat, a plan or by simply con
veying the parcels.
Clearly an outright sale of a portion
of a parcel of land is a division.
However, a "division”
under this act may also be accomplished by other than sell
ing lots.
If the language of the statute only permitted
division to be achieved by sale, then clearly dividing a
parcel by leasing lots would not be a "division" as envi
sioned by the act.
But the statute speaks of division for
the purpose of sale and also for "development or building".
Such development or building could occur withput a sale of
lots.
Note also the language in § 4956(4) which prohibits
"conveyances". A conveyance is a transfer of an estate or
interest in real property, including a sale, gift, lease
or mortgage.
We conclude, therefore, that a division may
occur when an interest in land is sold, leased or otherwise
conveyed.
It is also conceivable that developments other than
residential ones may be "subdivisions".
Though the conclu
sion in any case depends on the particular facts, it is our
opinion that cluster housing, shopping centers, mobile home
parks, and apartment, condominium or cooperative housing
with multiple building units may be deemed "subdivisions".
The test again is the actual substance and not the legal
form of the "development".
It is obvious that if a developer
built commercial units on adjacent parcels of land, and sold
such units, there would be a subdivision. A different legal
situation but similar practical effect is created when a
developer connects the units (e.g., a shopping center).
If
the buildings are connected and the premises merely leased,
we again have a situation which is similar in substance to
the first example.
The only real difference in each case is
the legal relationship between the developer and the tenants
of the units. _ We conclude that using our functional defini
tion of "lots" (parcels of land identified and set aside for
private use and occupancy) and keeping in mind the harm to
be regulated, there is a subdivision.
This same analysis
may also be applied to various kinds of housing developments.
Multiple unit housing would be a subdivision, but a highrise
apartment, condominium or similar housing structure probably
would not since there is no division of the land in the ma n 
ner discussed above.
In general, we believe the above method of analysis can
be applied to most situations.
Though the list of examples
is not exhaustive, it should aid municipalities and developers
in determining the applicability of the law to a particular
case.

AG - 1
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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

The second category of questions concerns the retro
active effect of the law and its application to divisions
which occurred before the effective date of the law.
The
prohibition language of the statute refers to sales or con
veyances.
Clearly such prohibition could not be retroactive
in effect since that would make sales in unapproved subdivi
sions, whenever made, illegal.
Such a result would be
extremely onerous and would be in effect making illegal
those transactions which were at the time legal.
Retro
active application of statutes is generally not approved.
Furthermore, such an interpretation would make the statute
apply ex post facto and such application is clearly prohi
bited.
See &2 C.J.S., Statutes, § § 412-419.
Sales or
conveyances which occurred prior to the enactment of this
law and which were in compliance with existing statutes are
thus not affected by the passage of this act. The law
applies only to sales occurring since its effective date.
However, sales of lots after the effective date of this act,
whether in a subdivision which was approved under prior law
or not, are subject to this act.
If the lots have not been
sold and they are within a subdivision, those remaining
unsold lots are subject to municipal approval.
As a prac
tical matter, this may mean that municipalities will give
rather cursory review to a previously approved subdivision.
Nevertheless, such review is required.
IV.

APPEAL AND ENFORCEMENT

Finally, there have been questions as to appeal p r o 
cedure and enforcement.
Though the statute is silent on the
right to appeal, such appeals may be taken pursuant to Rule
80B, Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.
Enforcement will be
the responsibility of the municipality.
It would be an
onerous burden on the Attorney General and a virtual impos
sibility to enforce the law on behalf of every city and town
in the entire State.
Municipalities have the power to en
force the law and the responsibility must rest with them.
If they lack sufficient interest to do so, it seems incon
sistent that they should demand action from the State.
The
Attorney General will act to enforce the law only under
extraordinary circumstances, and then, when possible, in
conjunction with the municipality.
Casual sales by landowners, that is, selling of a lot
or two every few years as opposed to planned and conscious
development, is likely to be a major enforcement problem.
Such persons are likely to be ignorant of the law or use
such casual sales as a means of side-stepping the require
ment of municipal review.
Municipalities thus may wish to
establish a procedure to be used in cases where they have

AG - 1

Ed ito r's Note: Th is portion o f the opinion would appear
to be modified by the current Exemption clause in the
Subdivision Law.

III.
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discovered a landowner who has or is about to come within the
purview of the law.
Such a procedure could include a notice
to the landowner of the alleged violation and an opportunity
for a hearing to determine whether the landowner is or has
created a subdivision.
The results of such hearing would
then provide the basis for further legal proceedings by
the planning board or municipal officers.
V.

GENERAL

Questions regarding the form and substance of proposed
municipal regulations and procedure should be referred to
local counsel.
Guidance is also available from the Maine
Municipal Association.

AG - 1

cxcerpr rrom: mTormai Mirorney oenerqi s upmion concerning rne manaarory onoreiana
Zoning A c t.
Editor's N o te : The following excerpts deals prim arily w ith municipal requirements for the
Mandatory Shore land Zoning A c t, but does contain a statement to the effect that the Sub
division Law permits the adoption of subdivision control regulation w ithout the necessity of
a comprehensive plan.

STATE OF MAINE
Inter-Departmental Memorandum
‘Henry Warren

Dept..

From B.' Stephen Murray, Assistant

Subiect

Dept.

September 7, 1972

Environmental Protection
Attorney General

Mandatory Zoning and Subdivision Control, 12 M.R.S.A. § 4811-4814
(P.L. 1971, c. 535)

You have asked for my opinion as to the following five
issues all involving P.L. 1971, c. 535.
1.
Must communities which adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances pursuant to the requirements of this lav/ base such
ordinances on a comprehensive plan?
My informal opinions are as follows:
1.
Yes. While the first sentence of 12 M.R.S.A. § 4812 is
merely a declaration of the law, i.e., that "municipal units of
government pursuant to presently existing enabling legislation
are authorized to plan, zone and control the subdivision of land",
its inclusion in 12 M.R.S.A. § 4812 must be read as a directive to
municipal units of government to zone shoreland areas pursuant to
this "presently existing enabling legislation". To read the
sentence otherwise would be to reduce it to mere surplusage,
and when construing a statute, effect should be given to every
word, phrase and clause contained in the statute. Camp Walden v.
Johnson, 156 Me. 160, 163 A.2d 356 (1960).
"presently existing
Enabling legislation" is set forth in 30 M.R.S.A. §§ 4961-4964.
3 0 M.R.S.A. § 4962 provides that any zoning ordinance "or pro
vision thereof" shall be "pursuant to and consistent with a
comprehensive plan".
Thus, in order to adopt zoning for
shoreland areas, a municipal unit of government must first
develop a comprehensive plan. it should be noted, however,
that municipal units of government may adopt subdivision
control ordinances for shoreland areas without first having
developed a comprehensive plan for the reason that 30 M.R.S.A.
§ 4956 permits the adoption of subdivision control regulations
(ordinances) without the necessity of a comprehensive plan.

AG - 2
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STATE OF MAINE
Interdepartmental Memorandum r w
To

Fourtin Powell

From

J ° h n M.R. Paterson

Subject

TP

___

January 2, 1974

Dgbt. State Planning_____________
Dept. Attorney General

Municipal Subdivision Statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956

Your memorandum of October 31, 1973 commenting on the above
statute and the informal memorandum issued by this office in 1972 was
forwarded to me. I apologize for not having responded earlier to
your comments, but, as I am sure you can appreciate, we have had
a number of urgent matters to which we have been required to respond.
In any event, I appreciate your comments and suggestions.
In general, I agree with your remarks regarding the interpretation
of the definition of the term "subdivision" as found in §4956, I
don't believe it was the intent of our Advisory Memorandum to exclude
high-rise condominiums from the definition of subdivision,, I am sure
you can appreciate, however,that the interpretation given to that
statute by this office is a rather broad interpretation and there is,
of course, no guarantee that we are right. Indeed, there is a sub
stantial segment of the Bar in Maine that disagrees with the views of
this office. We have considered your suggestion of updating and
revising our 1972 Advisory Memorandum and I would anticipate that at
some time in the future we will do just that. In the meantime, we
have tried to establish a procedure for answering the numerous inquiries
which are directed to this office regarding interpretation of that sta
tute. We have nearly finalized an agreement with the Maine Municipal
Association along the following lines. Any inquiry from a land owner
or an attorney requesting an interpretation of the subdivision statute
would first be referred to the local planning board. The purpose of
this step is to insure that the local planning board is aware that a
question exists regarding some development in their community and to
insure that the answer which we render is based on all the facts, in
cluding those thaf. the developer chooses to advise us of and those of
which the planning board is aware but which would otherwise not come
to our attention,, In the event that the planning board is unable to
answer the question from the developer or attorney, the planning board
may refer that question to the Maine Municipal Association. This second
step is taken out of recognition of the fact that the Maine Municipal
Association provides legal assistance to all 495 communities in the
State and that the Attorney General is not the attorney for each muni
cipality in the State. In addition, the Attorney General’s office and
Maine Municipal Association have worked closely in the past in formu
lating interpretation to the subdivision statute and we think it is
only sensible that they continue to play a significant role in the
future. In the event that a question arises which the Maine Municipal
Association deems significant enough to refer to our office, the MMA
would direct the question to us for an answer. We would,in turn, answer
the question for the Maine Municipal Association. Once the details of
this arrangement have been finalized it is our intention to advise all
the municipalities of this agreement and the State and County Bar
Associations, In addition, we would hope that the Maine Municipal
Art _ 7
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Association would keep all municipalities in the State aware of the
interpretation issued in regard to the subdivision statute.
While this may seem like a rather cumbersome structure, it has
the advantage of replacing what has, to date, been no system at all
and has resulted in substantial state-wide confusion regarding inter
pretation of the subdivision statute and how a citizen goes about
obtaining an answer to his question. Using the system outlined above,
all parties conceivably interested in a particular question will be
advised of the State's position.
I hope this answers your memorandum of the 31st. We would cer
tainly appreciate receiving any other suggestions which you might
have regarding this problem.
Thanks again for your interest.

AG - 3

Ed ito r's N ote: The following opinion does not deal directly w ith the Subdivision Law . How
ever, it would appear to have a direct bearing on the administration of the Subdivision Law
because it deals w ith the question of when an applicant has standing before a Planning Board.
On the basis of this opinion, and the recent court case cited (Walsh v. C ity of Brewer, M e .),
Planning Boards should be advised to require than an applicant demonstrate proof of t it le ,
rig h t, or interest in a parcel o f land for which subdivision approval is sought.

Interdepartmental Memorandum

To
fs

V'v )

rrcrrx

Subject

Date__*'iarch 26, 1974
William R. Adams, Jr., Commissioner _
Environmental Protection
____________________________ Dept.___________________________ _
Attorney General
Jon A. Lund, Attorney General
Dept.,

Pittston Company

SYLLABUS:
A person applying to the Board of Environmental Protection
for a permit to build a development under the Site Location Act,
38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488, must demonstrate to the Board sufficient
“title, right or interest" in the land for which the development
is proposed to entitle him to status as an applicant before, the
Board.
FACTS r
The pittston Company has applied to the Board of Environmental
Protection for a permit to build an oil refinery and marine terminal
in Eastport, Maine, pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488. At a late
stage in the hearings before the Board at which such application
was under consideration, a question was raised regarding Pittston's
legal interest in the land proposed to be developed. According to'
your memorandum of March 18, 1974: “The record is clear that several
significant parcels, including land necessary for the VLCC pier, are
not under applicant's [pittston's] control. . . . ”
QUESTION:
May the Board act upon the application of The Pittston
Company and either approve or disapprove the proposal?
ANSWER:

_

!

*

In order for the Board to have jurisdiction in this or any
other case under the Site Law, it must find as a matter of fact that
the applicantr has sufficient "title, right or interest" in the
property proposed for development.
REASONING:
We base our conclusion on the recent decision of Walsh v.
City of Brewer, Me., — A.2d— (Law Docket No. 73-3, February 5,
1974).
In that case, Mr. Walsh applied to the Brewer Planning
Board pursuant to a mobile home ordinance to use a parcel of
land, owned by his wife and mother, as a mobile home park.
As a result of the actions of the Brewer City Council and
inaction of the Brewer Planning Board, Mr. Walsh filed suit
for Declaratory Judgment.
On appeal from a decision of the

•
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Superior Court in favor of Walsh, the Law Court inquired into
Walsh's relationship to the land in question to determine whether
he had standing before the Brewer Planning Board as an applicant
for a mobile home park. The Court questioned Walsh's standing
despite the fact that the land was owned jointly by his wife and
mother and that Mr. Walsh and the City of Brewer had stipulated
in the Superior Court that
"At all times the Plaintiff [Mr. Walsh]. . . had
authority from . . . [the legal owners] to propose
and develop and operate a mobile home park on that
site, with all related utilities and appurtenances."
The Law Court said that in order to have "standing" before the
*
Planning Board the applicant would have to demonstrate that his •;
relationship to the site of the proposed project was germane to
the scope of the law regulating the use of such land. The Court
concluded that the factual record was insufficient to establish ■
Walsh's "standing" to be an applicant before the Brewer Planning
Board and remanded the case to the Superior Court for further
factual findings. The jurisdictional requirement of "standing"
recognized by the Court was deemed by the Court to be:
i
"reasonable and highly desirable, policy-wise,
to ensure that, absent clear and unquestionable
legislative expression manifesting a different
legislative attitude, governmental officials
and agencies should not be required to dissipate
their time and energies in dealing with persons
who are 'strangers' to the particular governmental
regulation and control being undertaken."
The law and facts at issue in Walsh are substantially similar
to those involved in the instant question. The Brewer mobile home
park ordinance V a s not a zoning ordinance, but a general land use
ordinance, similar in form and purpose to the Site Law. As in the
Brewer ordinance, we find in the Site Law no evidence of any
"clear and unquestionable legislative a t t i t u d e t h a t "title,
right or interest" is not a prerequisite to standing as an
"applicant" before the Board. The public policy on which the
Walsh decision’was premised is equally applicable to the Site
Law. Indeed we can anticipate a variety of problems which might
arise under the Site Lav/ absent a requirement that an applicant have
"title, right or interest" in the land for which a development i;
proposed. We can cite several examples. First,
or k o re
applicants could apply to develop the same sit», making it
impossible for the Board to determine to whom approval ought
to be given. Second, absent some Indication that an applicant
could implement a project, consideration of such application
would require the Board members to "dissipate their time and
energies" in dealing with hypothetical projects. Third, just
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as a landowner should not find his property rezoned at the
behest of a stranger, so a landowner should not find his land
approved for an oil refinery at the request of a stranger. In
short, we believe that all the public policy reasons underlying
the Walsh decision apply with equal force to the question we
confront here. We believe that "title, right or interest" is a
necessary jurisdictional prerequisite to any decision by the
Board in this or any other case.
The Court in Walsh did not clearly establish the type or
extent of a "title, right or interest" which an applicant must
demonstrate. However, based on our understanding of the rationale
in Walsh and the cases cited by the Court therein, we can estab
lish some general criteria for the Board to use. In order to
establish such interest, an applicant must demonstrate to the *
finder of fact that it has control over the site and that the
site can be developed by the applicant as proposed within a
reasonable period of time. Sufficient control would include not
only ownership in fee, but also some lesser interest, including
a contract or option to purchase or other contractual agreement
to acquire a right to develop the land, which right is enforce
able by way of specific performance. Since contracts or options
to purchase land may vary widely, the details of such contract,
option or agreement are of critical importance. There are an
infinite variety of such contracts and the applicant must demon
strate that the contract or option empowers it tp develop the
site within a reasonable period of time. A mere oral representa
tion regarding the exixtence of an option or contract is.insuffi
cient to establish standing. Tripp v. Zoning Board of Review,
123 A . 2d 144 (R.I., 1956), Rathkopf, The Law of Planning and
Zoning, § 55.5(1956).
A willingness to negotiate for or seek
sufficient interest in the future is no substitute for this
requirement.
Final disposition of this case depends on factual findings
to be made b y the Board based on the record of any hearings.
Since we are not the finder of fact, we have no way of knowing
whether the ;applicant has carried his burden of proof regarding
these jurisdictional facts.
If the Board determines on the basis
of the record that the applicant has not demonstrated sufficient
"title, right or interest," it can either (1) dismiss the applica
tion for lack of jurisdiction, if satisfied that applicant has had
sufficient opportunity to so demonstrate, or (2) reopen the record
to permit the applicant an opportunity to establish the necessary
jurisdictional facts.
If the Board determines on the basis of the
record that the applicant has demonstrated sufficient "title, right
or interest," it must consider and rule on the proposal on its
merits.
If at some point the Board determines that it has juris
diction over part of the proposal, it must then decide whether that
partial development, standing alone, constitutes a development
which can satisfy all the requirements of § 484 of the Site Law.

William R. Adams, Jr.

Page 4

Karen z o .

ns

V7e would note in conclusion that the Board may not make
decision on the merits regarding any portion of the developmen
over which it has no jurisdiction. We believe it would be in
excess of the Board's authority and improper for the Board to
make any informal ruling or issue an "advisory opinion" on an
application over which it has no jurisdiction.

4J

JON A. LUND
Attorney General
JAL/ec
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Ed ito r's Note: The following opinion is a c la rifica tio n o f the preceding opinion, by deal
ing at greater length w ith the specific documents needed to establish title , rig h t, or interest,
and by dealing w ith specific problems relating to standing before the Board o f Environmental
Protection. The points made may be relevant for the Municipal Reviewing A uthority under
the Subdivision Law .

Inter-Departmental Memorandum

Date__April 11, 1974

To William R. Adams, Commissioner

Dept. Environmental Protection

prom

Debt. Attorney General___________

Donald G. Alexander, Assistant

Subject ‘Questions*, of Title,

Right and interest___________________________ _

Following is the response to the questions stated in your memo
of April 4, 1974, relating to application of the "Title, Right and
Interest" requirement and related matters.
"Title, Right and Interest"
is hereinafter referred to as "TRI."
Question 1 . What must an applicant show to prove title,
right or interest?
w
Answer: An applicant should be required to provide proof of
TRI by submitting copies of his deed or deeds to the property, or an
enforcible option to purchase the property, or a lease or some other
contractual agreement for use of the property. Where a lease or other
contractual agreement is presented to show TRI, it should be prima facie
deemed sufficient to show TRI only if it is for a duration of 99 years.
A lesser term should be allowed only where the applicant can demonstrate
that the lease or other contractual agreement for the shorter time period
is sufficient to cover the duration of the proposed development on the
property.
However, the actual documents need not be presented if, by other
means of proof, the applicant can demonstrate the nature and scope,
duration and enforcibility of his TRI with sufficient precision to give
standing. This proof must be more than an oral or written statement
by the applicant.
Discussion: In Walsh v. City of Brewer, Me., 315 A.2d 200 (1974)
the court refused to accept, as sufficient evidence of TRI, a stipulation
that the owners of the property - the wife and mother of the applicant would allow the applicant to use the property for desired purposes.
The Court held this stipulation as to TRI inadequate because it did not
show the "nature and source" of the authority or that it had "sufficient
duration" or "legal enforcibility" (pp. 2 07-2 08). Other courts have
also held that a simple statement of the existence of a purchase option
is insufficient, Tripp v. Zoning Board of Review of City of Pawtucket,
123 A.2d 144 (R.I. 1956) and that proof of the "precise nature" of the
agreement is required, Packham v. Zoning Bd. of Review of City of
Cranston, 238 A.2d 387 (R.I. 1968). However, where proof has been pre
sented, the Courts have accepted, as showing sufficient standing,
*ses
Ralston Purina Co. v. Zoning Board, 12 A.2d 219 (R.I.
) and contracts
to purchase the property, Slamowitz v, Jelleme, 130 A. 883 (N.J.
),
Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 226 A.2d 380 (Conn.
).
Also an owner can apply, even though he has contracted to sell the
property, contingent on a use permit being obtained. City of Baltimore
v. Cohn, 105 A.2d 482, 204 Md. 523.
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I was unable to find any case which absolutely required submission
of the actual documents which formed the basis of TRI and excluded other
methods of proof. Walsh v. City of Brewer and Tripp and Packham, supra,
all indicated simply that more proof of TRI was needed, without actually
specifying what that proof should be. Thus the conclusion that some
proof other than actual documents is adequate to show TRI, if that proof,
which must be more than a statement by the applicant, can demonstrate the
"nature and source," "sufficient duration," "legal enforcibility" and
"precise nature" of the TRI. For example, the Department might accept
written certification from a person expert in examining interests in
property which (a) states that such person has examined the applicants
claim of TRI, and (b) sets forth the facts upon which the judgment as to
TRI is based in sufficient detail to show the precise nature of the
applicant's TRI. The Department may, however, as a matter of policy
determine that it does not choose to rely on such a written statement
of TRI in lieu of the actual documents. Other means of proof, meeting
the above standards, can also be allowed.
However, a requirement of submission of actual deeds, contracts or
other agreements to prove TRI may be the only way that the Department
can gain the necessary proof of jurisdiction in all cases without dis
criminating among applicants. As the Opinion of the Attorney General
in the Pittston Case indicates:
"Since contracts or options to purchase
land may vary widely, the details of such contract, option or agreement
«re of critical importance. There are an infinite variety of such
contracts . . . ." To allow summaries of what an applicant's basis for
TRI is raises the possibility of inaccuracy in such statements which,
when discovered later, could render the whole proceeding on the applica
tion null and void.
To require actual copies of documents in some
instances and allow alternate proof of TRI in others raises the
possibility of charges of discrimination in application of the law.
Whether the Department will accept such written summary statements is,
however, a matter of policy not a matter of law.
Leases and other contractual agreements which allow major capital
improvements on a property while not transferring title are rare in
Maine in cases o^-her than those involving rights-of-way.
It is common
legal practice to make leases, easements or other contractual agreements
permitting use of property for capital improvements for terms of at
least 99 years. Therefore, this term is specified for the prima facie
case as to adequacy of TRI where leases or other contractual agreements
are presented to show TRI.
Question 2 . Does a public agency with eminent domain powers have
to prove title, right or interest?
Answer: The Department may take jurisdiction of applications from
public agencies possessing eminent domain powers without requiring
proof of TRI. Public agencies which do not have complete TRI in an
involved property at the time of application may demonstrate TRI by a
statement that such public agency is prepared to exercise its eminent
A G -5
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domain powers, if it is unable to acquire the property by other means.
Discussion:
The Walsh v. City of Brewer decision was based
principally on the question of standing and interpreted the question
of standing by analogy to the issue of justiciability before the courts
(p. 206). The Court listed several tests for determining if a matter
was justiciable; whether the matter was a case or controversy or an
"improper" advisory opinion, was the issue "ripe" for decision, are the
parties the proper parties to be presenting the case, are there other
policy reasons for exercising "judicial restraint" (p. 206). in a
footnote the Court stated that absent a clear legislative mandate
"governmental officials and agencies should not be required to dissipate
their time and energies in dealing with persons who are 'strangers' to
the particular governmental regulation and control being undertaken."
(p. 207, note 4)
Because of the existence of eminent domain powers, the policy
reasons the Court set out for refusing to consider a private applicant
without adequate TRI do not apply to public agencies. A public agency
without TRI would not present an application as a "stranger" but as
an applicant fully capable of implementing any project approved by the.
Department.
It should be noted, however, that if anywhere in the record of an
application a public agency indicates that it will not use eminent
domain powers to acquire all or part of the property which is the subject
of the application, then the status of that public agency, for the pur
poses of establishing standing, becomes the same as that of a private
applicant. The policy reasons for making the distinction no longer apply
Question 7. Does an application for a permit to operate a facility
(e.g. air emission and waste discharge license, oil terminal permits,
etc.) require a showing of title, right or interest?
Answer: There is no basis in the decided cases for a distinction
between applications for permits to construct and applications for permit
to operate on the issue of necessary proof of TRI. However, the Depart
ment may wish to make a policy distinction in terms of the degree of
proof required.
Discussion: The four criteria that must be met to achieve standing,
demonstrating the "nature and source," "sufficient duration," "legal
enforcibility" and "precise nature" of the TRI are simpler to meet for
one seeking to operate an existing facility for a relatively limited and
specified time period. Further, applicants for operating permits
generally are in possession of the facilities which are the subject
of the application and:
"Possession shows a prima facie title,"
Brookings v. Woodin, 74 Me. 222 (1882). Thus there is a policy basis
for requiring an applicant in possession and merely seeking permission
to operate to provide different proof, if the Department choses, than is
required of an applicant for actual construction and alteration of land.
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But the four criteria of adequate proof of TRI still must be
met. The distinction between construction and operation is not always
apparent. The question in the Walsh case was over an application for
a license to maintain and operate a mobile home park (p. 202), and Walsh
was in possession of the property but failed to qualify as an applicant.
Question 4. Can the Department process applications where there
is a dispute as to title, right or interest?
Answer: The Department can only process applications where the
applicant has TRI. Making a finding to that effect would be possible,
but difficult, in a case where TRI is contested.
D iscussion; Maine courts have held that they have both the power
an 1 the duty to examine jurisdictional questions in any case, Niles v.
Marine Colloids, Inc., Me. 249 A.2d 277 (1969), Look v. State, Me. 267
A.2d 907 (1970). In other states this same duty to examine jurisdictional
issues has been extended to administrative agencies; Hearn v. Cross,
80 A.2d 285 (D.C. 1951), 2 Am. Jur.2d., Administrative Law, § 332.
However, I was able to find no decision stating that once an agency had
considered the jurisdictional question and determined that it had
jurisdiction it could not proceed further simply because its jurisdiction
was contested. Such a decision to proceed could, however, be contested
in court, and any agency which did proceed would risk having a court
later declare its proceedings null and void because of lack of juris
diction, 2 Am. Jur.2d, Administrative Law, §§ 489-491. To protect
itself from wasted proceedings, therefore, the Department may wish to
adopt a policy that it will not act on matters where TRI is questioned
until the question has been judicially resolved or the question is
deemed frivolous. The Department could defer nonfrivolous questions
of this kind as the burden of proof of jurisdiction is on the applicant,
and a serious question as to TRI would make the bureen difficult to
sustain.
Q\;estion 5 . is an application and an approval void if a dispute
as to title, right and interest is discovered after Board approval?
Answer: An approval is not automatically void if a dispute as to
jurisdiction develops after the approval. The approval would only be
void if the jurisdictional issue were decided against jurisdiction.
Discussion: The Walsh case is clear that "lack of subject matter
jurisdiction is always open at any stage of the proceedings" (p. 210).
Thus, presumably the Department's duty to examine its jurisdiction is
a continuing one, but simply raising a question as to jurisdiction is
not identical in effect to a negative answer. Once the question is
raised, the’Department's options are to make a factual determination
as to TRI, as was ordered in Walsh, and proceed accordingly or to
refuse to act pending court determination of the issue. As in #4,
the Department's refusal to act in this case would be based on the
burden of going forward and the assumption that in a valid dispute,
A G -5
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the burden of going forward had not been sustained until the issue is
finally determined in Court.
Question 6. Do tax liens or other liens or claims against the
property affect an applicant’s title, right or interest?
Answer: Yes, but where such clouds on title are discovered, the
applicant still may demonstrate that he has sufficient TRI to pursue
the application.
Discussion; 74 C.J.S., Quieting Title, § 14 lists numerous claims
against property which constitute clouds on title and which thus can
compromise TRI. These include attachments or liens placed on property
by court order, taxes and other assessments against the property, ease
ments, leases or other contracts affecting the property, contracts or
options to purchase the property, conflicting deeds, and mortgages.
The impact of each of these on TRI can vary greatly from case to case.
Walsh v. City of Brewer did not rule that any compromise of TRI
would deprive an applicant of standing. It simply ruled that the
applicant, on the facts presented, had not demonstrated "sufficient"
TRI (p. 211). As the Attorney General's opinion in the Pittston Case
noted, the sufficiency of TRI is a matter of fact for the Board to
decide. Thus, where a cloud on title exists, the Board would have to
determine if the applicant retains sufficient TRI to have standing.
The Department of Attorney General is continuing to examine the
issues raised by questions 7 and 8; an answer on these points will be
provided shortly.

. DONALD G. ALEXANDER*"
.Assistant Attorney General

DGArmfe
«
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Ed ito r's N ote ; W hile this opinion is directed to the administration of the Site Location Act,
it also states that i f a particular subdivision is subject to both State and local review , both
must be obtained.

Inter-Departmental Memorandum
William It. Adams, J r . ,

Commissioner

Donald G. Alexander, Assistant

Date_J j * 1974

Environmental Protection
n

Attorney General

Relationship of Department of Environmental Protection Approvals
to LocaT Approvals of~"€He~ Same Activity
Your memorandum of April 4, 1974, contained two questions
regarding the relationship of DEP considerations to local land
use regulations.
QUESTION:
Can the Board consider applications involving property which
has not yet been zoned for its proposed use or which has not yet
received the required local subdivision approval?
ANSWER:

.

Yes.
DISCUSSION:
I could find no case holding that the state agency would not
have jurisdiction of a matter simply because local approvals
relating to that matter had not been received.
In addition,
adverse local zoning or other land use regulations do not
compromise an owner's title, right or interest in a property
as that term is defined in Walsh v 0 City of Brewer, Me., 315
A.2d 200 (1974), since zoning or other land use regulations in
no way compromise a person's capacity to convey the affected
property. There are a number of cases which have held that both
a city and a state may regulate a particular activity as long as
the regulations .are not inconsistent. Vela v . People, Colo.,
484 P.2d 1204. (1971); Town of Cicero v. Weilander, 111., 183
N.E.2d 40 (1962); Stary v. City of Brooklyn, Ohio, 114 N.E°2d .
633 (1953);.McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 26.23 (a) .
The facts in' some of these cases indicate that local and state
approvals may have been considered concurrently. Where there
is inconsistency, the local regulations will be preempted by
state action. Rinzler v. Carson, Fla., 262 So.2d 661 (1972);
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 15.21.
QUESTION:
Conversely, can the Board adopt a policy that it will not
consider applications until required local zoning and subdivision
approval has been received?
ANSWER:
The Board may, by regulation, adopt such a policy, and such
a policy would be most appropriately applied in cases where an
actual change in a zoning ordinance is required before a project

l®

Henry Warren and Jack Bader

Page 2

April 19, 1974

Section 483 itself states that persons applying for a
Site Location permit must submit the notice that they are
applying for the permit: "together v/ith such information as the
Commission may, by regulation, require." Thus, the Board can
require that an applicant provide adequate information before
it starts to consider an application, and the time limit on
consideration of the application need not begin running until
the Department determines that such information has been pro
vided.
It is important here to distinguish between an "incomplete"
application and an application which is complete, but does not
disclose sufficient information to warrant approval. The latter
application must be considered. The distinction between the two
situations is not exact and must be determined on a case by case
basis. As a partial guide one might distinguish the two by
determining if no information is provided on a matter required to
be addressed, thus rendering the application incomplete, or if
information is provided but it is insufficient to justify affirmative
action, thus rendering the application complete, but unsatisfactory.
However, where actions suggested to justify delay are a
result of the Department's own actions, such as seeking and
receiving comments from other departments, the same basis for
delaying consideration of an application does not exist. For
example, if the applicant were required to provide the comments of
the other department with his proposed application, then the 30-day
period would not have to begin running until such comments were
received, but if the Department itself seeks such comment after it
has received the application, this does not effect the running of
the 30-day period. As already noted, however, there exists an
opinion of the Attorney General relating to the advisory as opposed
to mandatory effect" of the 30~day requirement.

. Al e x a n d e r
Assistant 'Attorney General
donald g

DGA/bls
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Ed ito r's Note: The 10-acre provision of the d e finitio n of subdivision under the Site Location
Act has changed since the issuance of this opinion.

Inter-Departmental Memorandum

From

Henry Warren, Jack Bader,
Hollis McGlauflin
Donald G- Alexander, Assistant

n,.v-

May . S ' 1974

Vapt.

Environmental Protection

Dap r.

Attorney General

S'.ibjdct _Interpretation of "subdivision" under the Site Location Law

38 M.R.S.A. § 482(5)

Recently several questions have arisen as to what constitutes
a "subdivision” so as to subject a housing development to approval .
or enforcement procedures under the site location law. The law is
quite specific.
It states that a development is subject to the law
if it meets the following criteria:
.
1.

Division of a "parcel" into 5 or more lots. .

2.

Any lot being less than 10 acres in size.

3.

If the lots total more than 20 acres, and

4.

Are to be offered for sale or lease within a
5-year period.

*

:..-

Some confusion seems to have arisen because of the' word "parcel."
A "parcel" should be considered to be the block of land a developer
owns, regardless of size. The lav/, by assuming that lots larger than
10 acres may be included in a subdivision,^ clearly contemplates that
where part of a large parcel is divided into small lots and the
. *
remainder is left as one undivided lot, that large, undivided lot is
part of the subdivision for purposes of application of the site
location law.
Another point of confusion is over the term "to be offered for
sale." The language*of this phrase clearly implies an element of
intent, as all proposals the Department considers are,.at the very
least, statements of intent. However, to have a violation of the
law, more than just a plan on paper, must be shown; there needs
to be some overt act in furtherance of the intent, such as the
beginning o f construction (disturbing the soil) or an actual
offering for sale through solicitation or otherwise without a
permit.
A third point of confusion is the proper differentiation of
individuals and corporations when property is being transferred.
Generally individuals and corporations are regarded as separate and
distinct entities. However, this may not be the case where an
individual controls or owns a significant interest in a corporation.
Where there is a transfer between an individual and a corporation in
which such individual has a significant interest, and the apparent
result of the transfer is to exempt from the law activities which,
if done by the individual or the corporation alone, would be subject
to the lav/, then the law may well apply regardless of the transfer.
Each such case should be evaluated on its own in consultation with
the Department of Attorney General.

Pa g e
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A final note; persons contemplating subdivisions of less than.
2 0 £icres should be aware that if the sale or offering for sale of
lots on their parcel of land exceeds 20 acres within 5 years they
will be in violation of the Site Location Law as to all lots, not
merely those which exceed 20 acres. The first 20 acres are not free.
A person is subject to the Site Law when he takes the first action
in furtherance of an intent to develop or offer for sale more than 20
acres

d o n a l d g .^Al e x a n d e r
A ssistant Attorney General

DGA:mfe
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E d ito rs N ote : The firs t pdrt of this Informal opinion, dedllng w ith the question of whether a muni
c ip ality may define subdivision more re stric tive ly than State law, has been superceded by an opinion
dated July 21, 1976, which fo llo w s. The portion which deals w ith transfer o f interest in land to
an abuttor would s till appear to be valid.

STATE OF MAINE
Inter-Departmental Memorandum

June 1 1 , 1974

j 0____ Rich Rothe, Fourtin Powell

QepL

State planning Office______

prom

p ebL

Assistant Attorney General

Edward Lee Rogers, Assistant

Subject _ ___________ ________________________________________________________

In your letter of April 9, 1974, you ask the following
questions:
(1.) Where State law defines subdivision for the purpose
of required municipal review, can a municipality, by
ordinance or by planning board regulation, define
subdivision more stringently, or establish controls
for the regulation cf land divisions which are exempt from
the law's definition of subdivision (i.e., define subdivision
as two lots instead of three, and include the land retained
by the subdivider)?
(2.) If the answer to #1 is negative, will the recently
enacted changes in the Law apply only to ordinances and
regulations adopted pursuant to its enactment, or will
the new amendments nullify provisions in existing
ordinances or planning board regulations?
(3.) The recent amendment of § 4956, sub-sect. 1, added a
new sentence at the end to read as follows:
"For the purposes of this section, a lot shall
not includes transfer of an interest in land to
an abutting landowner, however accomplished."
Since this follows, rather than precedes, the provision
dealing with 40 acre lots, does the clause, n. . . except
where, the intent of such sale or lease is to avoid the
objectives of this statute.", apply to this new amendment?
(If it does not, then the new subdivision law amendment
exempting from review transfer of land to an abutting
owner appears to create the possibility of unlimited
subdivision without municipal review since such land is
by definition a non-lot. In other words, if A sells 20,000
square foot separate parcels to abuttor B, can B then
build on these parcels and sell them without review?)
In our opinion, the answer to question (1) is yes, and we
therefore do not reach the second question,, In our opinion, the
answer to question (3) is no, the exception does not apply to the
new amendment.
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H With regard to (1), 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 expressly authorizes
the municipalities to "adopt additional reasonable regulations
governing subdivisions" in subsection 2B. This authorization is
reiterated in 12 M.R.S.A. § 4812-A. Since 30 M.R.S.A. § 1917
grants municipalities the right to act unless prohibited from doing
so by the State, the question is whether promulgation of a definition
of subdivision by the State is a prohibition of the municipalities' right
to adopt a more restrictive definition.
The State could have expressly denied the municipality the right
to redefine subdivision. Instead it granted municipalities the
unrestricted right to adopt additional regulations and ordinances.
It is evident, therefore, the State was merely setting minimum
standards, while leaving municipalities the freedom to adopt regula
tions consistent with the State law. Municipalities have in fact
assumed that by passing a state minimum lot size law, the State
did not preempt the right to define "lots" more restrictely and
have acted accordingly. Given the expressed authorization in 30
M.R.S.A. § 4956, it is even more reasonable to assume municipalities
are free to define subdivision more restrictively.
The definition may be made by regulation or ordinance. Anderson
19.20, Yokley 12.3, Villa-Laken Corp. v. Planning Board, 138 N.Y.S.2d
362 (1954). However, in view of the provision in subsection 2B a
definition by ordinance would be more secure.
A warning should be added. Subsection 2B requires that
additional regulations be "reasonable." It may, therefore, be unwise
for a town to alter the "reasonable" provision in the State definition
without having particular justification therefor. For example, the
State law says no sale or lease of a lot 40 acres of larger shall be
considered part of a subdivision. Unless a town was attanpting to
preserve an agricultural or natural area where 40 acre lots would
not be sufficient to retain the character desired, it would seem of
dubious validity for the town to attempt to impose a stricter
definition than provided by this statute.
Turning to question (3), the new amendment to subsection 1
cannot be qualified by a clause preceding it in a separate sentence.
Thus, literally construed, the clause in subsection 1, "except where
the intent of such sale or lease is to avoid the objectives of the
statute" does not apply to transfers to abutting landowners.
You express further concern about this point in your letter
because the amendment states (somewhat ungrammatically) that "a lot
shall not include a transfer * * * to an abutting landowner."
(Underscoring supplied.) Further, the new amendment to subsection 5
(Section 2 of Chapter 700, P.L. 1973) provides that:
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"The owner of a lot which, at the time of its
creation, was not part of a subdivision, shall
not be required to secure the approval of the
municipal reviewing authority for such lot in
the event that the subsequent actions of a prior
owner, or his successor in interest, of the lot
creates a subdivis ion of which the lots is a part,
however, the municipal reviewing authority shall
consider the existence of such a previously created
lot in passing upon the application of any prior owner, or
his successor in interest, of the lot for approval of a
proposed subdivision."
Considering these tvo amendments together, your concern is that the
lot or lots transferred to an abutting landowner will be exempt from
the law even if a subdivision is thus created by sequence of transfers
from owner A to abutting owner B.
While the statute is not as clear as it ought to be, we believe
that such a
misuse
of the law could be successfully challenged.
Subsection 5 was amended solely to afford adequate title protection to
a landowner when the prior owner subsequently creates 3 subdivision.
An intentional avoidance of the law by transfers of lots to an
abutting landowner would constitute a subterfuge. The courts ought
to consider such conveyances dependent steps in an overall trans
action designed to achieve a subdivision in violation of the law
(the so-called "step transaction" doctrine).
The matter is not altogether free from doubt, however, and the
statute ought to be amended to clarify it with regard to these matters,
as well as several others. In particular, the assumption that we
should look to "intent" in administering a statute is a dubious one
because matters of intent or motive are difficult to prove as such.
It would be preferable if the statute were rephrased in terms of
the effect of certain conveyances resulting in evasion of the
objectives or purposes of the law. We therefore suggest for your
consideration the following changes:
1.

Subsection 1 of § 4956 would be amended to read as follows:
1. Defined. A subdivision is the division of a tract
or parcel of land into 3 or more lots within any 5-year
period, whether accomplished by sale, lease, develop
ment, building or otherwise, except when the division
is accomplished by inheritance, order of court or gift
to a relative^-unless-the-intente-ef-sueh-gi-ft-is-te
aveid-the-©te'jeetives-©f-th4s-eeeti©nT— Fes?-the-purposes
©f-this-see ti©n7-a--let-sha-14-Het--ine-lHde
A transfer of interest in land to an abutting
landowner7-hewever~aeeemp4ished-r shall not be
considered part of a division of land for the
purposes of this statute.
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In determining whether a parcel of land is divided
into 3 or more lots, land retained by the subdivider
for his own use as a single family residence for a
period of at least 5 years shall not be included.
No sale or lease of any lot or parcel shall be con
sidered as being a part of a subdivis ion if such a
lot or parcel is 40 acres or more in size^y-exeept
where-the-iRfeent-ef-sueh-sale-er-iease-is-te-avoid
fche-efe^eetivee-ef-this-statufeeT

The grantee, including a lessee, or his successors in
interest of a lot which at the time of its creation and
transfer to such grantee is not part of a subdivision
may, at his or their option, elect (1) to have the lot
not considered a part of a subdivision, or (2) as against
the grantor, including a lessor, or his successor m
interest who engaged in the actions hereinafter described,
rescind the transfer and recover the purchase price,
with interest, together with damages and costs in
addition to any other remedies provided by law, if,
solely by reason of the subsequent actions of the
grantor of such lot or his successor in interest with
regard to nearby lands, a subdivision is created of
which the lot is a part. Such lot, however, shall be
deemed a part of such a subdivision for the purpose of
considering an application of such grantor of such lot
or his successor in interest for approval of such proposed
subdivision or for the purpose of determining whether there
has been a violation of this statute by such grantor or his
successor in interest.
The exceptions to the definition of a division or sub
division provided in this section shall not apply to a
gift to a relative, to a lot 40 acres or more m size,
or to a transfer to an abutting landowner if, the
effect of such transaction or transactions would result
in avoiding the objectives of this statute.
The present amendment of subsection 5 provided by Chap. 700 of
P.L. 1973, would, of course, be struck if the foregoing amendment were
to be adopted.

Assistant Attorney General
ELR/ec
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Ed itor's Note: This opinion indicates that municipalities may, by ordinance, but not by regulation
adopted by the municipal reviewing authority, define a subdivision in ways more restrictive or all
inclusive than it is defined in the Subdivision Law. This opinion modifies the preceding opinion,
dated June 1 1 ,1 9 7 4 .
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Rich Rothe___________________
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July 21, 1976

Planning_________

Attorney.. General_______

Municipal Regulation of Subdivisions_____________________________

SYLLABUS: Under its Home Rule powers, a municipality may by
ordinance regulate a subdivision of land regardless of the provi
sions of the Municipal Subidivision Law, 30 M.R.S.' §4956. A
municipal planning board, however, (or municipal officers acting
in place of a planning board) may not, when discharging their
responsibilities under the Municipal Subdivision Law, alter, by
regulation or otherwise, the statutory definition of a subdivision.
FACTS: On June 11, 1974, this office rendered ah opinion at
the request of you and Fourtin Powell answering various questions
regarding the interpretation of the Municipal Subdivision Law, 30
M.R.S. §4956. One of those questions was whether a municipality
may by ordinance or planning board regulation, define and therefore
regulate a subdivision in a manner more restrictive than the
statute. In the opinion we answered this question in the affirmative.
Id at 2. On April 22,and April 27, 1976, however, we received
letters from two lawyers in the state who deal frequently with
questions of this type, Mr. David Plimpton of Portland and Mr.
Atherton Fuller of Ellsworth, indicating that they have been taking
a contrary position with their clients and asking whether we would
reconsider our position. Because of the state-wide importance of
the question, we have determined to do so.
The relevant portion of the 1974 opinion is as follows:
"With regard to (1), 30 M.R.S.A. §4956
expressly authorizes the municipalities to
'adopt additional reasonable regulations
governing subdivisions' in subsection 2B.
This authorization is reiterated in 12
M.R.S.A. §4812-A. Since 30 M.R.S.A. §1917
grants municipalities the right to act unless
prohibited from doing so by the State, the
question is whether promulgation of a
definition of subdivision by the State is a
prohibition of the municipalities' right to
$dopt a more restrictive definition.
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The State could have expressly denied
the municipality the right to redefine
subdivision. Instead it granted munici
palities the unrestricted right to adopt
additional regulations and ordinances. It
is evident, therefore, the State was merely
setting minimum standards, while leaving
municipalities the freedom to adopt regula
tions consistent with the State law.
Municipalities have in fact assumed that
by passing a state minimum lot size law,
the State did not preempt the right to
define 'lots' more restrictly and have
acted accordingly. Given the expressed
authorization in 30 M.R.S.A. §4956, it is
even more reasonable to assume municipalities
are free to define subdivision more restrictively.
The definition may be made by regulation
or ordinance. Anderson 19.20, Yokley 12.3
Villa-Laken Corp. v. Planning Board, 138
N.Y.S.2d 362 (1954). However, in view of
the provision in subsection 2B a definition
by ordinance would be more secure.
A warning should be added. Subsection 2B
requires that additional regulations be
'reasonable'. It may, therefore, be unwise
for a town to alter the 'reasonable provision
in the State definition without having
particular justification therefor. For
example, the State law says no sale or lease
of a lot 40 acres or larger shall be considered
part of a subdivision. Unless a town was
attempting to preserve an agricultural or
natural area where 40 acre lots would not be
sufficient to retain the character desired, it
would seem of dubious validity for the town to
attempt to impose a stricter definition than
provided by this statute."
QUESTION: May a municipality by ordinance, or a municipal
reviewing authority under the Subdivision Law by regulation, define
a subdivision more restrictively than contemplated by the
Subdivision Law?
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ANSWER: A municipality may make such a definition by ordinance,
but a municipal reviewing authority may not alter the statutory
definition by regulation.
REASONING: The 1974 opinion that municipalities may regulate
in a manner more restrictive than the statute was based on two
grounds:
(1) the existence, since 1969, of municipal "home rule"
powers, MAINE CONSTITUTION, art. VIII, pt. 2, §1; 30 M.R.S. §1917,
by which the municipalities may exercise any power inhering in
government generally which is not prohibited to them, expressly or
by clear implication, by the Legislature; and (2) the authority
conferred by subsection 2(B) of the Subdivision Law which permits
municipalities to adopt "additional reasonable regulations governing
subdivisions."
In basing its result on the second of these two reasons, it
appears the opinion was in error. In granting the authority to
municipal reviewing authorities to adopt "regulations governing
subdivisions" under the Subdivision Law, the Legislature clearly
could not have been using the word "subdivision" in any sense
other than the definition of that word explicitly provided in
subsection 1 of the law. Thus, while a municipality might be able
to adopt a regulation clarifying any ambiguity in the statutory
definition of subdivision, it could not adopt a regulation defining
a subdivision which is flatly contradictory to the statute. For
example, a municipality might adopt a regulation defining with
more precision the word "lease" in the statutory definition (so as
to exclude, for example, motels - whose tenants might be thought
to have one day "leases" - from the purview of the law), but a
municipality cannot by regulation define a subdivision as
consisting of only two lots, rather than the three required by the
statute.
This is not to say, however, that a municipality cannot, through
the exercize of its "home rule" powers, pass an ordinance regulating
subdivisions in any way at all, so long as it does not violate the
State or Federal Constitutions. To the extent the 1974 opinion rests
on this basis, it is correct. A municipality could be prevented from
so regulating only if it can be shown that the Legislature "expressly
or by clear implication" has denied it the power to do so. Such a
prohibition cannot be found in the Subdivision Law. That statute
merely requires that the municipalities of the state regulate
subdivisions to the degree set forth therein. Nowhere does it
prohibit - or even imply - that they may not go further. In the
absence of such a prohibition or implication, therefore, the munici
palities must be judged to have the power (since 1969) to pass
general subdivision regulatory ordinances defining subdivisions
therein in any constitutional manner they choose.
AG - 9

K !< I 1 A K \!

J o s I .P H E . B U P W A N

S.Coin X

J o a n M R P a t i u s o ;.
I ) O N \ l,n G . A 1. K X A N O O K

St a t e
D epartment
A

of

of the

M

aine

A t t o r n e y G eneral

u g u s t a ,M a i n e 0 4 3 3 3

November 30/ 1977

To:
From:

Allen Pease, Director, State Planning Office
Joseph E. Brennan, Attorney General

Subject:

Attorney General's Role in Enforcing the Subdivision
Law (30 M.R.S.A. §4956)

This opinion is in response to your question concerning
the Subdivision Law. The question posed was "If a town
consistently disregards the standards contained in the Subdivision
Law (30 M.R.S.A. §4956), and further, if these deviations are
considered to be significant, does the Attorney General have the
legal authority to require towns that consistently and substantially
disregard the standards set out in 30 M.R.S.A. §4956 to conform
to the law in their review of subdivisions.
The Attorney General in Maine inherited common law power
from England. Withee v. Land & Libby Fisheries Co., 120 Me. 121
(Me. 1921). As the chief law enforcement officer of the State he
has wide authority to protect the interests of the State and
its citizens:
". . . . a s the chief law officer of the
State, he may, in the absence of some express
restriction to the contrary, exercise all
such power and authority as public interest
may from time to time require, and may
institute, conduct, and maintain all such
suits and proceedings as he deems necessary
for the enforcement of the laws of the
State, the preservation of order, and the
protection of public rights. Withee,p . 23.
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The Court in Withee called the Attorney General's powers "numerous"
and "varied," Id. at 23.
In Lund Ex Rel Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d. 554 (Me. 1973), the
Law Court expressly recognized that the Attorney General is
a constitutional officer deriving this status from Article IV,
Section 11. The Court, stressed that he has the power, absent an
express statutory prohibition to the contrary, to maintain actions
and proceedings to preserve order and protect the public's right.
The Attorney General has the power to protect the entire community
when an injury is shared by all equally. Von Tiling v. City of
Portland, 268 A.2d. 888 (Me. 1970). In fact, he is the only
person authorized to bring such suits. He has this authority
because he is the representative of the people. A 1975 Massachusetts
case, Secretary of Administration and Finance v. Attorney General,
326 N.E. 3d. 334 (Mass. 1975), stressed this basis for his power.
"The Attorney General represents the
commonwealth as well as the Secretary
. . . who requests his appearance. He
also has a common law duty to represent
the public interest. Id at 338.
The Maine courts concur:
"The chief law officer represents the whole
body politic, or all the citizens and every
member of the State. Only a few of the
duties of the Attorney General are specified
by statute; that official is, however,
clothed with common law powers. It is for
him, in instances like these to protect and
defend the interests of the public."
In Re Maine Central Railroad Co. et al., 134
Me. 217 (Me. 1936).

I.

Attorney General's Power to Bring Mandamus Action.

One of the common law powers of the Attorney General is the
power to proceed against public officials in order to protect the
best interests of the State. The cases in Maine and elsewhere have
recognized that the Attorney General has the power to institute
mandamus proceedings. The mandamus action is a proceeding to
require the official or officials to do something they are required
by law to do. Rogers v. Brown, 134 Me. 88 (Me. 1935).
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It is generally conceded that a mandamus action by the
Attorney General is authorized by his common law powers. Although
Maine has abolished the writ of mandamus (a procedural device)
the substantive cause of action remains and may be brought pursuant
to Rule 80B Me. R. Civ.P. In determining whether mandamus must
be had however, recourse must be made to the common law. Young v.
Johnson, 161 Me. 64, 69 (1965).
In Kelley v. Curtis, 287 A.2d. 427 (Me. 1972), the Law Court
had before it a mandamus action brought under Rule 8OB, Me. R. Civ.
P. The Plaintiff, a petition sponsor, sought to require the
Governor of Maine to issue a proclamation of special election
within a reasonable time after presentation to the Legislature of a
petition seeking a ballot reform. The Legislature, before it adjourned,
determined the reform measure was validly initiated. The Governor
had not issued an order for six months following the adjournment,
and suit was filed. By law, the Governor was required to call
a special election "within a reasonably short time" after adjournment.
The Court apparently had no problem with the 80B process. Both
the Superior Court and the Law Court entertained the proceeding
initiated under 8OB. The Court did express some concern over the
standing of the petitioner to proceed, but since it did not need to
reach the standing issue, it was not discussed. In Farris, ex rel
Dorsky v. Goss, 143 Me. 227 (1948), the Court allowed a private
group to use the Attorney General's unique position of standing to
bring a mandamus action to compel the Secretary of State to place
an "initiated measure" as well as the enacted measure on the ballot
so the voters could decide which they preferred. The Court had no
problem with allowing the Attorney General to bring such an action.V
The power of the Attorney General to bring mandamus actions has
been recognized in other jurisdictions. In Attorney General v.
Trustees of Boston Elevated Railroad, 67 N.E. 2d. 676,685 (Mass. 1946),
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized the Attorney
General's power to proceed against public officers by manadamus.
A Texas Court, in Yolt v. Cook, 281 S.W. 837,843 (Tex. 1926),
recognized that the "ancient and modern rules of common law," allowed
the State and Attorney General the power to use mandamus proceedings
in supervising municipalities.

jV In McCaffrey v. Gartley, 377 A.2d.1367 (Me. 1977), a similar
action was brought without invoking the Attorney General's powers.
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The mandamus action serves a very specific purpose. Its
use is restricted to cases in which it is clearly shown that an
official has neglected or refused to do something required by
law. In Littlefield v. Newell, 85 Me. 246 (Me. 1893), the Maine
Attorney General filed a mandamus action against the mayor and
aldermen of Lewiston to force them to comply with the town's
charter and ordinances.
"It is a well-settled rule that mandamus
extends to all cases of neglect to perform
an official duty clearly imposed by law when
there is no other adequate remedy. If the
officers are required to act in a judicial
or deliberative capacity, the court cannot
it is true, control their official discretion,
but may by its mandate compel them to exercise
it. It cannot direct them in what manner to
decide, but may set them in motion and require
them to act in obedience to law. p. 111.
See also,Rogers v. Brown, supra and Mitchell v. Boardman, 10 A. 542
(Me. 1887), on protecting public rights.
II.

Attorney General's Power to Appeal Local Administrative
Decision.

The Subdivision Law (30 M.R.S.A. §4956 subsection 5) permits
the Attornev General to enforce the law although it is generally
envisioned that the Attorney General will only do so under
extraordinary circumstances and hopefully with the aid of the
municipality. In a joint memorandum filed by the Attorney General
and the Maine Municipal Association, dated March 2, 1972, this
office felt an 8OB appeal under the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure
would be available to those affected by decisions of the
municipal authority. It seems clear that nothing prohibits the
Attorney General from enforcing the law by requiring the municipality
to abide by its requirements. The Attorney General's principal
function is to protect the public interest and to maintain all
suits and proceedings to enforce the laws of the State. Withee v.
Libby Fisheries Company, supra at p. 123. Should he not carry
out these functions, he would be violating his responsibilities
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to the public. If a decision by the municipal authority in
a subdivision case was so contrary to the dictates of the
statute, the Attorney General might appeal from such a
determination. Apparently, the exact question has not been
ruled upon in Maine, although it is presently in front of the
Law Court in Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission, (Law Ct. Docket No. Ken 73-43).
Other states have recognized that the Attorney General
has the power to appeal from the decisions of agencies when
the public interest is involved. In a Nebraska case, In Re
Equalization of Assessment of Natural Gas Pipe Lines v. State
ex re Soreman, 242 N.W. 609 (Neb. 1932), the power of the
Attorney General to petition for a writ of error in the Supreme
Court from a tax board's decision was recognized. And in a
New Jersey case, Attorney General v. Delaware & B. B. R. Co.,
27 NJEq. 631, the court held:
"In equity, as in the Law Court, the
Attorney General has the right, in cases
where the property of the sovereign or
the interests of the public are directly
concerned, to institute suit by what may
be called 'civil information' for their
protections. The state is not left
without redress in its own courts, because
no private citizen chooses to encounter
the difficulty of defending it, but has
appointed this high public officer on
whom it has cast the responsibility, and
to whom, therefore, it has given the
right of appearing in its behalf and
enriching the judgment of the Court on such
questions of public moment. Id. p. 610.
Other cases in accord, Petition of Public Service Coordinated
Transport et al., 74 A .2d. 580, 586 (N. J~. 19 50) and State ex ~rel
Olsen v. Public Service Commissioner, 283 P.2d. 594 (Mont. 1955).
There seems little question that the Attorney General can
bring suit against a recalcitrant town to require it in the
future to apply the Municipal Subdivision Law or challenge sub
sequent decisions which substantially deviate from it. We would
note that the Attorney General retains discretion with regard to
bringing any particular action, and the decision on bringing an
action would relate to the seriousness of the violation of law
and the availability of resource of the Department to properly
prosecute the action.

JEB/bls
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Maine Municipal Association Opinions

Excerpts from the Maine Townsman
Legal Opinions

1.

Procedure for adoption of Regulations (Fe b ., 1972)
Question: Our planning board would like to adopt a subdivision regulation following
the new guidelines set forth by statute under Public Laws enacted by the 105th Legisla
ture, Chapter 45 4, Section 49 56 , Land Subdivisions, par. 3, A through L . What pro
cedure is necessary — such as how many days o f public notice, and is a public hearing
necessary before final adoption?
Answer: I believe that 7 days' public notice should be given and that a public hear
ing is necessary before final adoption.
Ed ito r's note: The requirement for a public hearing prior to adoption o f regulations by
the municipal reviewing authority is now required by subsection 2 . b. o f Section 4956
o f the Subdivision Law.

2.

Street Acceptance ( O c t., 1972)
Q uestion: Can the planning board be bypassed in ruling on the acceptance o f a road
in a subdivision by a petition being presented to the selectmen? I should mention that
this subdivision was deemed to be in existence prior to the planning board. There has
always been considerable doubt in the minds o f the planning board as to what authority
can be exerted over such subdivisions in this particular category. Perhaps I should further
c la rify to say the intent is to have this petition presented at either a special, preferably,
or regular town meeting.
Answer: If the subdivision was in existence prior to the new law of last September, then
I do not believe that the planning board would have a right to control the acceptance
of the street. I assume this was a street which appeared on the original plan which must
have been approved e a rlie r, and I assume that lots have been sold o ff prior to the new
law.

3.

G ifts (Ja n ., 1973)
Q uestion: This is to inquire i f a certain division of land in the town fa lls w ith in the
meaning of M .R .S .A ,T itle 30, Sec. 49 56 , amended, and thus should come before the
planning board for subdivision approval. Five lots ranging in area from 23 to 30 acres
have been divided from a farm and conveyed as gifts to children of the owner. Is there
anything that would exempt them from the subdivision approval requirement, particularly
the fact that they are gifts rather than arms-length transactions?
Answer: It seems to me that under M .R . S. A .Section 4956 o f T itle 30 and also under
your own regulations that the transfers would be legally proper since they constituted
g ifts and did not constitute either sales, developing or building of property. In other
words, I don't believe the intent o f the new statute is to apply to mere g ifts , w ills or
inheritances.
M M A -I to M M A -3

4.

Contiguous Parcels (Fe b ., 1974)
Question: Two problems have arisen in our town w ith respect to the de finition o f a
"parcel of land" for subdivision purposes. The two situations are as follows:
(1) An acreage was purchased prior to subdivision regulations and later this was
followed by the same individual buying an adjacent piece of acreage from another
person. Through the years the tracts were consolidated for fax purposes, but two
separate deeds remain. Can these be treated as separate tracts for subdivision?
(2)

A single deeded parcel separated by a public road is faxed as two separate parcels.
Is this considered two parcels for the purpose of meeting subdivision minimums,
thus allowing six lots to be sold instead o f three without a formal plan?

Answer: It is my opinion (1) that a contiguous parcel o f land held by one person is
treated as one parcel under the subdivision law, T . 30, M . R . S . A . § 4956, although
acquired under fwo deeds, and (2) that a parcel o f land divided by a town way is also
treated as one parcel for the purposes o f the subdivision law, unless the town owns the
way in fee.
Editor's Note: The Subdivision Law now states that lands located on opposite sides o f
a public or private road shall be considered each a separate tract or parcel o f land un
less such road was established by the owner of land on both sides thereof. This pro
vision o f the Statute did not exist at the time this opinion was rendered.
5.

Plantation Review Powers (O c t., 1974)
Question: Can you explain the duties of the plantation o ffic ia ls w ith respect to sub
division in our plantation?
Answer: The d e finitio n of the term m unicipality provided by 1, M . R . S . A . , § 72 (13),
and 30, M . R . S . A . , s 1901 (6), includes only cities and towns when used in most parts
of T itle 30.
I therefore conclude that a plantation cannot exercise any home rule powers as granted
to m unicipalities by 30, M . R . S . A . , 1 1911-1920, nor any of the subdivision review
functions charged to municipalities by 30 , M . R . S . A . , ! 4956.

6.

Sale to abutter (N o v ., 1974)
Question: A man in town owned several acres o f land on which he has maintained his
residence for several years. In 1972 he sold a one-acre lot and in 1973 he sold another
one-acre lo t. He s till lives on the remainder. He now wishes to sell a small strip o f
land to the abutter who purchased a lot in 1973. W ill this create a subdivision?
Illustration:
Lot
sold
by
A
in
1972

A’s
Residence

1
1
l
1

Lot
sold
by
A
in
1973

i
t
Small strip of land which A
wishes to sell to abutter.
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Answer: The State Subdivision Law (30, M . R . S . A . ,

l

4956) now provides that

tranfers of property from one landowner to an abutting landowner shall not be
counted as a lot for purposes of this law. Therefore, even though a person has
divided his land in such a way that the transfer of one more lot might create a sub
d ivisio n , he may s till transfer land owned by himself to an abutter w ithout having
to file a subdivision plan.
Parcels retained by subdivider

(D e c ., 1974)

Question: Does the law say you can sell two pieces of land and live on one tract and
not have a subdivision? Does the law say you can sell two tracts of land and reserve
one tract for future use?
Answer: It is my opinion that a person does not have a subdivision w ith in the scope
of 30, M . R . S . A . , Sec. 4956 i f he owns a tract o f land, sells two parcels and keeps
the remaining land for his residence.
However, a lot reserved for future use generally
counts as one lot for the purposes
of this law i f the subdivider does not use it as a residence. The following illustratio ns
may help.
A sold to B
in 1972
A sold to B
in 1973

A lives on
this parcel

No subdivision until A sells one more lo t, or until A moves from remaining parcel ( if
less than five years of use as a family residence).

so].! to B

;
• in IB72
H

A is retaining

A :;<>U1 in ii

this parcel for

ill !'>/.*

‘ future use.”

Subdivision exists in my opinion because there has been a division into three lots w ith 
in a five year period.
Editor's note: The Subdivision Law is now more precise about whether the property
retained by the Subdivider is counted as a lo t. The Law now stipulates that a lot re 
tained by the subdivider is exempt only i f two dividings o f a tract or parcel are
accomplished by a subdivider who shall have retained one o f such lots for his own use
as a single family residence at least 5 years prior to such second subdividing. Portions
of this opinion also appeared in the J a n ., 1975 edition of the Townsman.
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8.

Sale of lof to a water company not exempt (Fe b ., 1975)
Question: We have in our town a problem maintaining water pressure in a remote
elevated area. The water company feels this can be eliminated by the installation
of an intermediate pumping sta tio n. They have approached a property owner in a
location ideally situated for just such an insta lla tio n, and obtained a tentative agree
ment for the purchase o f the needed land.
The owner, however, wishes to be certain that this sale w ill not be considered a
division from the standpoint o f T itle 30, Section 4956, Land Subdivisions. He intends
to sell house lots from the same parcel.
Can this sale to the water d istric t be treated differently from private sales or must it
be counted for the purpose of the law?
Answer: In my opinion, such a sale is not entitled to special treatment and must be
treated as the sale of one lot for subdivision purposes.

9.

Granfathering of subdivisions
Question:

(J a n ., 1976)

We are seeking your opinion and advice on the follow ing:

1.

Are operators of subdivisions which were approved prior to the State Shoreland
Zoning Ordinance effective date but lying w ithin the land area covered by this
ordinance, required to alter the ir plot plans so that they comply w ith the minimum
frontage, area, and setback provisions of the ordinance?

2.

Is the Town obligated to, and is it recommended that the Town shall , notify such
subdivision operators of the need to comply w ith the provisions of the Shoreland
Ordinance where it is known that the plot plan approved o rig ina lly would not com
ply in some parts?

3.

What would be the proper method and best wording of such a no tific a tio n?

4.

What assistance can the Town receive in the enforcement of this ordinance from the
O ffic e of the Attorney General?

Answer: 1 . In my opinion, the shoreland zoning ordinance demands that subdivision plats
not now in conformance w ith the new and stricter environmental standards be revised by the
landowner and resubmitted to the planning board for approval.
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The law is well settled that, absent a statutory provision to the contrary, the
approval and recording of a subdivision plat does not vest rights in the landowner.
And the mere filin g of a subdivision plan vests no rig hts. (York Township Zoning
Board of Adjustment v . Brown, 182 A2d 707 (Pa. 1962)). Nor does o ffic ia l approval
under existing law "fre e ze " the applicability — and the developer's rights there
under — of the laws as regards the proposal. (State ex. re l. M a r-W e ll, Inc. v .
Dodge, 177 NE2d 515 (O hio , I9 6 0 ); State e x. re l. Bugden Development Co. v.
Kiefaber, 179 NE2d 360 (O hio , 1960). See, Anderson, American Law o f Zoning
at sec. 1 9 .2 3 ).
Where a zoning provision is changed before there is an actual use o f the land
in the subdivision, the developer must take heed of the new regulations.
The Ohio court said in the recent case;
Before an application for use of the premises is file d , (e .g . a building permit)
the zoning requirements may be changed by the authority having the power to
do so; and except w ith in the lim its fixed by the law, such changes are valid as
to lands not then in use. The fact that an allotment plat is approved and re
corded does not irrevocably fix the rights of the parties. Valid changes may
thereafter be made w ith respect to such things as lot size and minimum lot area
and the a llo tte r must conform thereto. (State ex. re l. M a r-W e ll, Inc. v . Dodge,
177 NE2d 515 (O hio , I9 6 0 )).
S im ila rly , a Connecticut court said:
The filin g of a map showing lots in a proposed development cannot create a
nonconforming use. If it could, a property owner, by the process o f map filin g
could completely foreclose a zoning authority from ever taking any action w ith
respect to the land included in the map, regardless of how urgent the need for
regulation might be (Corsimo v. G rover, 170 A2d 267 (C onn., 1961)).
Proposed use does not constitute an existing nonconforming use; the use must be
actual. Even where actual, as where part o f the subdivision has been developed, the
remainder of the subdivision may be subject to the new regulations. That the developer
planned on completing his original plat is not suffic ient to allow him exemption from
the new requirements. His potential profits are not protected by the law . O nly the
most extreme hardship — such as prevention of any economic use o f the property at all would allow him to complete his original plan (State ex. re. Bugden Development C o .).
Some re lie f, such as partial re lie f, might be given a developer whose improvements
were so related to existing zoning regulations and so substantial as to be tantamount
to a commencement of use, as to qualify him as a nonconforming user (Wood v . North
Sa lt Lake, 390 P2d 858 (Utah, 1964). Where the remainder of the subdivision has not
been at all developed, however, he would be held to the new laws.
You might anticipate the argument by developers, or on their behalf, that filed
subdivisions are grandfathered by a "general savings clause" in the statutes, 1 M . R . S . A .
§ 302 which states that:
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The repeal of an act or resolve passed after the 4th day of March, 1870, does
not revive any statute in force before the act or resolve took effe ct. The re
peal of an act does not effect any punishment, penalty, or forfeiture incurred
before the repeal takes e ffe c t, or any action or proceeding pending at the time
of the repeal, for an offense committed or for recovery o f a penalty or fo r
feiture incurred under the act repealed. Actions and proceedings pending at
the time of the passage or repeal of an act are not affected thereby.
Where the subdivision statute was amended by the Legislature to include stric te r
standards, those plats recorded under prior subdivision statutes were grandfathered by
this savings clause. However, the grandfathering does not apply where a completely
new environmental law is enacted, rather than a mere amendment to one already
e xisting .
2.
Although it is nowhere specified in the law as a duty of the planning board or
town o ffic ia ls, it would be in the interests of the town to take some preventive enforce
ment action, to avoid future controversy and litig a tio n when sales and application for
building permits are submitted. Such action would, in my opinion, make sure that
landowners do not sell lots to buyers who are not aware of the restrictions which
would prohibit their building. A lso , it w ill avoid the political and personal problems
where those unwary landowners, after being denied a building permit because of the
shoreland zoning restrictions, come to the board of appeals for a variance. (The ir
only legal recourse is against the subdivider who sold them the land in a costly c iv il
action along the lines of fraudulent sales). Any action the town takes now to assure
that landowners w ill revise their subdivisions selling and/or developing w ill be in the
interest o f future "consumers".
However, I repeat, I do not feel that the town is obligated to take such steps. The
burden is on the landowner to inform himself of land use ordinances and state statute
which are applicable to his land ownership, development and real estate sales.
3. Should the town wish to take such action, I believe a simple letter should
notify the landowners of the new zoning ordinance and either enclosing a copy or
giving information where it can be found. The letter might also state that, according
to legal advice you have obtained, the development cannot be undertaken w ithout
violating state law and local ordinances.
4 . I cannot answer with certainty what help is available from the Attorney General
o ffic e . I suggest a letter to the Environmental D ivisio n of the Attorney G eneral’s
office asking for their advice, should the landowners not comply.
Local o ffic ia ls might, of course, handle some problems administratively on the
local level through refusal o f necessary building permits. Where a developer or other
landowner applies for a building permit, and the proposed building would be in violation
of the shoreland ordinance, it should not be issued by the building inspector or code
enforcement o ffic e r. ( b y E .E .G .)
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10.

Boundary Disputes (Fe b ., 1977)
Question:

What must a subdivider produce as reasonable evidence o f his boundaries?

Answer:
The answer to this question is that, generally, a planning board should not be
concerned with pinpointing exact boundary lines; and no evidence o f boundary lines
specifically need be sought. Instead, the planning board should be concerned basically
w ith the developer's rig ht to come before the planning board; that is , his standing to seek
the jurisdiction o f the planning board. Therefore, the planning board should mainly be
concerned with the developer's ownership rights as to the property as a whole which he
seeks to subdivide, and not its specific boundaries.
Thus, a planning board would be well w ith in its jurisdiction to require the developer to
produce the deed under which he owns the property, which deed should contain a reason
able description o f the property, or require the developer to produce an option to purchase
or other such conditional agreement under which he would have standing to come before
them, which second type of document, i f the developer fa lls into this conditional owner
ship category, should either contain a reasonable description o f the property as a whole
or which document should be accompanied by a deed or survey or other w riting which
reasonably describes the property in general to which the developer has conditional owner
ship rights.
It should be emphasized that the above-mentioned documents which may be required from
the developer are not so required to prove the truth of the actual boundaries - for that
would be a question for a judge or jury - but rather simply to allow the planning board to
determine whether the developer has standing to come before them and, thereby, cause
them to exercise their duties and responsibilities and expend time and e ffo rt in the review
o f the developer's subdivision application.
Question: How involved should the planning board become in a boundary dispute between
the developer and an abutter?
Answer: G enerally, the planning board should not get involved in such disputes. It is not
the duty o f the planning board to look behind the documents presented to them and to
determine the truth behind such documents; substantiating actual boundary lines and deter
mining boundary disputes is the duty for a judge or a ju ry .
However, i f a boundary dispute is currently pending in the courts, it is my opinion th a t,
in order to avoid the po ssibility of compounding the damages that might be suffered by one
o f the parties involved in the dispute, it would be adviseable for a planning board to post
pone its determination as to the subdivision u n til either the courts have fin a lly determined
the actual boundaries, or until the planning board has conferred w ith the presiding judge,
in w ritin g , as to his opinion in regards to whether or not the planning board should fo llo w
through w ith its review o f the subdivision in question. (By PMB)
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11.

Second Dividing of Parcel (June, 1977)
Q uestion: A person has jived on a parcel o f land for more than five years. W ith in the
last five years he has conveyed away two lots from the parcel and has retained the third
lot as a single family residence. The person now wants to sell his single fam ily residence
to another party. Must,the person obtain subdivision approval before the sale or offer to
sell ?
Answer: Although T itle 30 , Section 4956(1), second paragraph, is quite ambiguous in its
wording, it must be interpreted i f possible, in a manner consistent w ith what is perceived
to be its purpose and inte nt.
The second paragraph reads as fo llo w s:
"In determining whether a tract or parcel of land is divided into three or more
lo ts, the firs t dividing o f such tract or parcel, unless otherwise exempted herein,
shall be considered to create the firs t two lots and the next dividing of either of
said firs t two lots, by whomever accomplished, unless otherwise exempted herein,
shall be considered to create a 3rd lo t, unless both such dividings are accomplished
by a subdivider who shall have retained one o f such lots for his own use as a single
fam ily residence for a period o f at least five years prior to such 2nd d ivid ing . Lots
of 40 or more acres shall not be counted as lo ts ."
The language after "3rd lo t" creates the problem. If the wording " . ..o n e o f such l o t s . . . "
refers to the two lots created by the firs t dividing, then subdivision approval would be
required before the sale o f the residence because the subdivider has not retained one of
the lots for his own use as a single fam ily residence for 5 years prior to the second d ivid 
in g . Stated d iffe re n tly , when the firs t lot in the parcel is sold the subdivider must retain
the balance of the parcel for a 5-year period or obtain subdivision approval before sale.
I f , however, the wording " . ..o n e o f such l o t s . . . " refers to the three lots created by the
second d ividing, then subdivision approval would not have to be obtained because the
subdivider retained a lot for his own single family purposes for the required 5-year period.
In my opinion, the second interpretation is the better one.
se lf to such an interpretation. It says:

F irs t, the language lends i t 

" . . . t h e next dividing o f eithe r the said firs t 2 lots . . . shall be considered to create
a third lo t, unless both such dividings are accomplished by a subdivider who shall
have retained one o f such lo t s .. . "
In other words the second dividing creates three lots unless one is retained and meets the
c rite ria . Second, the retention language is obviously intended to treat a qualified home
stead parcel (my wording) d iffe re nt from a parcel of raw land. However, under the firs t
interpretation above they would be treated the same. For example, a person can sell only
one lo t from a parcel of raw land w ith in a five-year period w ithout creating a subdivision.
S im ila rly , under the firs t interpretation a person could sell only one lot because he would
have to hold the remainder o f the pracel for five years from the date of the sale o f the
firs t parcel. F in a lly , the wording o f the paragraph has recently been changed from " . . .
for a period of at least 5 y e a rs.. . " to its current version " . . .fo r a period o f at least 5
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years p r i o r . . . " This change would again indicate an intent to treat homestead parcels
d iffe re n tly . Legislative intent must be respected i f discernible. State v . T u llo , 366
A2d 843 (1976) and, therefore, I feel the second interpretation to be the better one (G H H ).
12.

Exemption to Subdivision Law (O c t., 1977)
Question: One of the exemptions to the subdivision law is for subdivisions "in actual
existence on September 2 3 , 1971 that did not require approval under prior la w ", 30 M . R . S . A .
§ 4956(5). When is a subdivision considered to be "in actual existence" to qualify for
the exemption? A lso, once grandfathered, can the property then be subdivided in any
manner w ithout further approval?
Answer: The mere fact that a developer has a plot plan that was drawn up prior to Septem
ber 23, 1971 is not enough to claim the exemption.
In order to prove that a subdivision was in actual existence, there must be shown not only
the existence of such a plan but also that the land was actually surveyed and lots marked
on the surface of the earth by steel pins or regular markers and numbered in accordance
w ith the plan, prior to September 23, 1971 . State Ex Rel Brennan v. R .D . Realty C o rp .,
M e ., 349 A . 2d 301 (1975).
To put it a little more clearly in order to claim that the subdivision was in actual existence
prior to September 2 3 , 1971, the subdivider must show at a minimum, not only
1) the existence of the plot plan, but also,
2) that the land was surveyed and marked on the surface of the earth w ith w ith steel
pins or regular markers and numbered, in accordance w ith the plan, and,
3) that such was accomplished before September 23, 1971, the critical date under the
statute.
Should the subdivider meet the above c rite ria in regard to the entire plan, then the
plan may be considered "grandfathered" and exempt from further approval under 30 M . R . S . A .
§ 4956. Should the subdivider meet the above criteria but only in regard to a portion of
the entire plan, then only that'portion shown to be in actual existence would be considered
exempted.
Furthe r, only that specific plan, or specific portion thereof, that is shown to be in
actual existence prior to September 23, 1971 may be considered exempt from subdivision
approval.
Therefore, in order to develop unproven portions, or to develop the land in a manner
that does not conform to the proven plan, the subdivider would firs t have to secure prior
approval from the planning board. To reite ra te, once a particular plan has been proven to
be in actual existence, it is only that particular scheme that is considered exempt, and
the subdivider may not develop the land in a manner which deviates in any respect from
that particular scheme w ithout firs t obtaining planning board approval, since such deviations
would be considered amendments to the "grandfathered" plan.

\
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F in a lly , even i f i f is determined that a particular subdivision was in actual existence
prior to September 23, 1971, i f i f is further determined that the subdivider, subsequent
to that date, had conveyed, leased, or developed any portion in a manner not in con
formance with the proven plan, in my opinion i f would be clear that the subdivider
would be deemed to have waived or given up any rig ht to claim an exemption under
30 M . R . S . A . §,4956(5).
However, the determination of whether or not the plan was "in actual existence" is not
applicable i f the plan was recorded prior to the critica l date since 30 M . R . S . A . § 4956(5)
also provides an exemption for subdivisions "a plan of which has been legally recorded
in the proper registry of deeds prior to September 23 , 1971." ( C .M .J .)
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State Planning O ffice Memorandums

M EM O RA N DUM

May 1, 1973

TO :

A ll Regional Planning Commissions

FR O M :

Fourtin Pow ell,

S U B J E C T:

Approval of Subdivision Plans

Regional Planner, State Planning O ffic e

It has been brought to the attention of this office by John A ttig o f the
Androscoggin V alley Regional Planning Commission that the enabling legislation
fo r Subdivision Control Regulations, M . R . S . A . T itle 30, §4956, does not specify
who shall sign the plan of a subdivision to indicate approval or approval w ith terms
and conditions when the selectmen or planning board act on a proposed subdivision.
In order to assure the legality of such signing, the O ffic e o f the Attorney
General has inform ally suggested the follow ing procedures:
1.

When a subdivision plat or plan is signed by the selectmen in
the absence of a planning board, it is preferable that a ll three
selectmen sign the plat or plan. Th is would mean tha t, even i f
one signature were later declared invalid due to a c o nflic t of
interest or other reason, a majority of the selectmen would s t ill
have approved the subdivision.

2.

When a subdivision plat or plan is signed by the planning board,
it is preferable that a majority of the planning board members
sign the plat or plan.
Where approval is unanimous, i t v/ould
be appropriate for a ll members present at the vote to sign the plat
or plan.
In cases where only the chairman of the planning board
signs the plan, the clerk o f the planning board should indicate
on the plat or plan by a ffid a v it that the chairman’s signature
reflects the vote of the majority of the planning board.
Th u s, in
each case, there can be no question as to whether or not the
approval of the subdivision reflects the w ill of the majority o f the
planning hoard.
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A pril 2 , 1974

TO :

A ll Regional Planning Commissions, Cooperative Extension Service

FRO M :

Fourtin Powell, Regional Planner, State Planning O ffice

S U B JE C T:

Subdivision Review Procedures - W ater Supply

The State Subdivision Review law, T itle 30 , Section 4956, contains various features
related to environmental protection and features prim arily related to consumer protection.
Those portions dealing w ith water supply contain strong elements of consumer protection.
Subsection 2 reads, in part, as follows:
"The municipal reviewing authority shall . . . issue an order denying or
granting approval of the proposed subdivision or granting approval upon
such terms and conditions as it may deem advisable to satisfy the c rite ria
listed in subsection 3 and to satisfy any other regulations adopted by the
reviewing authority, and to protect and preserve the public's health, safety
and general w elfare. In all instances the burden of proof shall be upon the
persons proposing the subdivisions. In issuing its decision, the reviewing
authority shall make findings of fact establishing that the proposed subdivision
does or does not meet the foregoing c rite ria ."
The c rite ria in Subsection 3, which must be met to the satisfaction of the municipal
reviewing authority in order for them to approve a subdivision, include the fo llo w ing :
" 3 . G uidelines. When promulgating any subdivision regulations and when
reviewing any subdivision for approval, the planning board, agency or
o ffic e , or the municipal o ffic e rs, shall consider the following c rite ria and
before granting approval shall determine that the proposed subdivision:
B. Has sufficient water available for the reasonably foreseeable needs
of the subdivision;
C . W ill not cause an unreasonable burden on an existing water supply,
i f one is to be u tilize d ; . . .- "
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Part C, above, applies to already installed public or private water supply systems.
Th is criterion would be used where the subdivision was to be served by a common
system. The average water usage of a single fam ily dw elling, as used in the Minimum
Lot Size law, T itle 12, Section 4807-A , is 300 gallons per day. Therefore, where the
average yield of an established ground or surface water supply is known, calculation of
the additional water needs of the proposed subdivison and a determination of whether or
not the necessary capacity is available is a rela tive ly simple matter.
Part B, above, is the more general criterion which applies equally to any subdivison,
whether supplied from a public or private (common) water source or from on-site, individual
water sources. The most common individual water source is the w e ll.
Since the municipal reviewing authority, " . . . shall determine that the proposed
subdivision. . . has su ffic ie n t water available for the reasonably foreseeable needs of the
subdivision . . . " , that reviewing authority must be supplied w ith information which
w ill enable it to make that determination. This information shall be furnished by the persons
proposing the subdivision.
It is not possible to determine the presence of a given quantity and quality of under
ground water supply w ithout d rillin g and pumping a w e ll. Due to the expense of d rillin g ,
it is not possible in most instances for the subdivider to d rill wells for each of his proposed
lots or even for a sampling of the lots, particularly as there is no assurance that the
subdivision w ill be approved. In any case, the presence of an adequate supply of potable
water from one well does not guarantee that a nearby well w ill have a sufficient yie ld .
The Subdivision Review law was not intended to burden the subdivider w ith the
expense of d rillin g wells which may not be used fo r a water supply, but it was intended to
protect the potential buyer of a lot in a subdivision. The a va ila b ility of suffic ient ground
water for single family residential purposes in many areas of Maine may be almost assured.
However, where known ground water sources are lim ited and uncertain, the municipal
reviewing authority may wish to use the following procedure:
1)
Require the applicant to submit w ritten d rillin g reports for w ells in the v ic in ity
of the proposed subdivision. These reports would not have to be actual "lo g s" of
the w e lls, as these are the property of the well d rille rs , but the reports should be
based on logs of these w e lls. No specific distance from the proposed subdivision is
required, but a radius of one mile should provide a reasonable indication of groundwater a v a ila b ility and q u a lity. Where records of nearby wells vary greatly, it may
be advisable fo r the subdivider to hire a ground water hydrologist to provide expert
testimony regarding the available inform ation.
2)
Require disclosure of the w ritten d rillin g reports on which the municipal reviewing
authority based its decision to the purchaser of any lot in the subdivision. This
disclosure would be one of the conditions for approval of the subdivision and would
be recorded w ith the proper registry of deeds.
This procedure would appear to provide three benefits:

(1) The municipal reviewing

authority would record the bases for its decision to approve the subdivision, (2) the
potential buyer would be provided w ith information which would assist him in assessing
the risks of purchasing a given piece of land, and (3) the presence or absence of water on
SPO - 2
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a given lo t remains a private matter; the municipal reviewing authority would not
"guarantee" the purchaser that suffic ient potable water w ill be available on his lo t.
Any comments, suggestions and alternatives to the above procedure would be
welcome.
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TO :

Regional Planning Commissions
Dec. 30, 1976

FRO M :

Rich Rothe

RE:

Planning Board status and review o f subdivisions

In a shore land zoning newsletter dated March 13, 1974, we stated that there were several
diffe rent types o f Planning Boards, and that the way a Planning Board was created could affect
its subdivision review powers. We stated that most Planning Boards were created in one of 3
ways:
1.

Prior to September 23, 1971, specific State Statutes governed the creation o f planning
boards. These permissive laws were repealed by the 105th Legislature in 1971 when
the principle of Home Rule was recognized by an amendment to the State C onstitution,
and in T itle 30, M . R . S . A . , Sec. 1917, which states that:
Any m unicipality may, by the adoption, amendment or repeal o f ordinances
or bylaws, exercise any power or function which the Legislature has power
to confer upon i t , which is not denied either expressly or by clear im plication,
and exercise any power or function granted to the municipality by the Consti
tu tio n , general law or charter. No change in the composition, mode of
election or terms of office o f the legislative body, the mayor or the manager
of any municipality may be accomplished by bylaw or ordinance.
The legal authority for the continuation of these "p re-1971" planning boards, and hence,
their a b ility to function as the "municipal reviewing authority" for the purposes of the
Subdivision Law, rests w ith the "savings provision of T itle 30, M . R . S . A . , which states
that:
§ 4964.

Savings provisions

Any planning board or d istric t established and any ordinance, comprehensive
plan or map adopted under a prior and repealed statute shall remain in effect
until abolished, amended or repealed. Any property or use existing in violation
of such an ordinance is a nuisance. Planning boards established pursuant to pro
visions o f repealed section 49 52 , subsection 1 shall continue to be governed by
those provisions until they are superseded by municipal ordinance and the muni
cipal officers may pay board members a set amount, not to exceed $1 0, for each
meeting attended.
2.

A fte r September 23 , 1971, a number of planning boards were created by ordinance, in
accordance w ith the Home Rule Provision. In so doing, many m unicipalities u tilize d
M M A 's "Establishment of Municipal Planning Board" model ordinance, found in the
appendix of SPO 's "G uidelines for Local Planning Boards". This model includes pro
visions for composition, appointment (by selectmen), organization and ru le s, duties,
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and powers. Planning boards created by this method would also have the authority
to serve as the municipal reviewing authority for the purposes of the subdivision law.
3.

A fte r September 23, 1971, a number of Planning Boards were created inform ally by
appointment o f the Selectmen and w ithout approval at a Town Meeting. Most of
these informal Planning Boards were created in smaller towns that had never had a
Planning Board for the purpose of preparing a shoreland zoning ordinance. In e ffe c t,
these informal Planning Boards were created w ithout the specific authorization con
tained in the now repealed Statute T itle 30, M . R . S . A . , Section 4952, and w ithout
specific authorization contained in a locally enacted municipal ordinance. Based on
several discussions w ith attorneys at the Maine Municipal Association and the Attorney
General's O ffic e , if is our conclusion that such planning boards clearly had the
authority to prepare the necessary ordinances in order to comply w ith the Mandatory
Shoreland Zoning A c t, but that such Planning Boards should not exercise the sub
division review powers given to Planning Boards under the Subdivsion Law. Instead,
such inform ally created Planning Boards should probably serve in an advisory capacity
to the Selectmen, who in turn should make the final decisions to approve or disapprove
a particular subdivision application. State law does not specifically prohibit an in 
formally created Planning Board from exercising the function of municipal reviewing
authority, but the m unicipality would probably be on firm er legal ground i f this function
were performed by a Planning Board created by method ^1 or ^2, or in the absence o f
either of these, by the Selectmen.
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Maine Supreme Court Cases

Excerpt from: Dickinson v. Maine Public Service Company, M e . , 244 A . 2d 549
(1968) at 551.
Editor's note: The following language is taken from a case involving the Public
U tilitie s Commission. W hile the case itse lf does not pertain to the Subdivision Law,
or subdivision review , the excerpt does suggest that a decision must be limited to the
law as of the date of the proceedings. Th is may have a direct impact on the admini
stration o f the subdivision law. For instance, in attempting to evaluate whether a
subdivision has been created, it may be necessary to research the status of the Sub
division Law at a gij/en point in time in order to determine whether the sale, lease,
or development o f a particular lot or parcel created a subdivision at that point in
tim e.

[2-6] The Commission was of course
cognizant of the fact that the Legislature
had enacted amendments to become effec
tive on a date subsequent to the Commis
sion decree. In this connection the Com
mission stated: ‘‘We take judicial notice
of the fact that the Maine Legislature has
changed the existing law by Chapter 3S2
of the Public Laws of Maine, 1967, AX
ACT to Grant Public Utilities Commission
Control over Cooperatives. This law,how
ever,does not become effective a? such un
til ninety-one days after the adjournment
of the Legislature which willbe October 8,
1967. We are bound by the law that isin
existence at the time of our decision.”
The Commission accordingly based its de
cision primarily on its determination as to
whether ornot itwas economically feasible
for Maine Public to render the requested
service. Heath v. Maine Public Service
Co. (1965), 161 Me. 217, 210 A.2d 701.
This was the applicable test under the law
as it existed on October 3, 1967, the date
of the decree. As a quasi-judicial body the
Commission had a duty to render decisions
on petitions which had been pending more
than two years and was under no obliga
tion to defer its decision because of a
change inthe law effective in fu tu re >.
Moreover, the same Legislature enacted P.
L.1967, Ch. 10 which amended 1 M.R.S.A.

MSC - 1

Sec. 302 to read: “Actions a n d p ro c e e d 
pending at the time of the passage or
repeal of an Act are not affected thereby.”
(Italicized words added by amendment).
The petitions were “proceedings” pending
before the Commission, Dickinson, supra,
and as such would by force of the amend
ment be governed by the law as itexisted
before the enactment of P.L.1967, Ch. 3S2.
P.L.1967, Ch. 10 became effective on Octo
ber 7, 1967, whereas as we have seen P.L.
1967, Ch. 3S2 by express legislative fiatbe
came effective one day later. Decision
does not rest, however, on this difference.
Even ifthe amendments had become oper
ative on the same date, the result would
have been the same. P.L.1967, Ch. 10 and
Ch. 382 are not conflicting,mutually incon
sistentor irreconcilable. Each can be giv
en its full force and effect without dimin
ishing the effect of the other, “and both
must stand as statutes of the State.”
Stuart v. Chapman (1908), 104 Me. 17, 24,
70 A. 1069, 1072. So construed, the stat
utes provided prospectively new criteria
for determination by the Commission of
petitions filed by customers of a coopera
tive seeking service from another utility
serving the same area— but these new cri
teria are not applicable to petitions al
ready pending on October 8, 1967. It is
apparent, therefore, that the appellant was
not prejudiced by the factthat the order of
the Commission was promulgated a few
days before the amendments became opera
tive.
in g s

BOUTET v. PLANNING BOARD OF CITY OF SACO

Me.

53
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Ronald B O U T E T et al.
v.
P LA N N IN G BOARD OF the C IT Y OF SACO.

Supremo JudicialCourt ofMaine.
May 1,I960.
Proceeding on appeal from a judg
ment of the Superior Court, York County,
denying appeal from city planning board’s
refusal to approve subdivision plat. The
Supreme Judicial Court, Williamson, C. J.,
held that city planning board, which was
not authorized by ordinance or regulation
to grant conditional approval of plat giv
ing to developer settled rights to approval
on compliance, had no authority to give
conditional approval to subdivision plat
with buffer area, and thus board’s tenta
tive approval of plat gave no rights to
landowner to compel final approval on
compliance with theconditions. The Court
further held that exclusion of buffer zones
in subdivision plats was not unreasonable.
Appeal denied.
I. Municipal Corporations 0=43

City planning board, in passing on
subdivision plat, acts in administrative ca
pacity and is without authority to impose
conditions beyond compliance with munici
pal ordinances and general reasonableness.
30M.R.S.A. §4956.
MSC - 2
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had no bearing on review of board’srefus
Two-step process of tentative and fi al to approve another buffer strip, and is
nal subdivision plat approval rests on stat sue of whether second buffer striplawfully
utes or regulations authorized thereunder. could have been approved was not present
ed forreview.
2. Municipal Corporations G=43

Authority to
grant condi
tional approval.
Tentative
approval does
not compel
final approval.

3. Municipal Corporations 0 4 3

City planning board, which was not
authorized by ordinance or regulation to
grant conditional approval of platgiving to
developer settled rights to approval on
compliance, had no authority to give con
ditional approval to subdivision plat with
buffer area, and thus board’s tentative ap
proval of plat gave no rights to landowner
to compel final approval on compliance
with the conditions.
4. Estoppel 062(5)

Landowner, who, between time subdi
vision plat with buffer strip was tentative
ly approved and date board reviewed plat
and advised itwould approve platwith ex
clusion of buffer strip, did no more than
take down a barn, obtain variance of zon
ing ordinance with reference to lot sizes,
which would have been required apart
from issue of the buffer strip, and spend
$30 or $40 in obtaining a new plat did not
acquire right toapproval of the subdivision
platwiththebufferstripbyestoppel.
5. Municipal Corporations <3=43

Legislature, in enacting statute relat
ing to land subdivisions, intended that
there should be room for exercise of dis
cretion by planning board. 30 M.R.S.A. §
4956.
6. Municipal Corporations C=>43

Exclusion of buffer zones in subdivi
sion plats, which buffer zones resulted in
street with taxable land on only one side
and with problem of maintenance, was not
unreasonable even though subdivision plat
with buffer zone had been tentatively ap
proved prior to public hearing on and ap
proval of policy against buffer strips. 30
M.R.S.A. §4956.
7. Municipal Corporations C=43

Charles W. Smith, Roger S. Elliott,
Saco, for plaintiff.
Ronald E. Ayotte, Sr.,Biddeford, for de
fendant.
Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and
WEBBER, DUFRESNE and WEATHERBEE, JJ.
WILLIAMSON, Chief Justice.
The Planning Board of Saco refused to
approve a subdivision plan fordevelopment
of house lots submitted under 30 M.R.S.A.
§ 4956. The appeal before us is from the
denialofappealintheSuperiorCourt.
The controversy centers about a buffer
strip zone two feet in width and running
between the side of a proposed street or
way and neighboring land, which the ap
pellant insists he is entitled to have ap
provedintheplatbytheBoard.
The proceedings before the Planning
Board and the appeal to the Superior
Court were in the name of Ronald Boutet.
In the Superior Court it first appeared
that titleto the land inthe proposed subdi
vision was, in fact, in Barbara Boutet, the
wife of Ronald Boutet. The motion of the
wife tojoin as a party plaintiff was grant
ed inthe Superior Court over the objection
of the Planning Board. It is apparent
from the record that Ronald Boutet acted
at all times with the full knowledge and
consent of his wife and we may well con
sider him to have been her agent. We
find neither defect in procedure nor lack
of jurisdiction. The facts, in substance, are
as follows:

Mr. Boutet sought to develop the area
Fact that city planning board had ap with an access road from a city street to
proved second buffer strip in subdivision the rear of the land for the purpose of
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opening a housing development. A plan of
C. Approval of a subdivision is based
the proposed subdivision was submitted to on its compliance with municipal ordi
the Planning Board in September, 1965. A
nances and its general reasonableness.”
month later, by agreement, certain lots of
which the title was in dispute were re [1J The Board in passing upon a subdi
moved from the plan. The proposed plan vision platacts inan administrative capaci
called for the buffer strip as indicated for ty. It iswithout authority to impose con
ditions beyond “compliance with municipal
adistanceofapproximatelyS00 feet.
ordinances and itsgeneral reasonableness.”
On October 19, 1965 (reaffirmed on Oc
tober 20) the Planning Board voted unani “In exercising its function of approving
mously that: “We notify Mr. Boutet that or disapproving a subdivision plan, the
if he will present a revised plan that ful planning board acts in an administrative
fills the seven points outlined as per at capacity. In passing upon a plan, itsac
tached letter— the Board will approve his tion is controlled by the regulations
adopted for itsguidance. It has no dis
plan.” Under point 6 of the letter the
cretion or choice but to approve a subdi
Planning Board required that the buffer
vision which conforms to the regula
strip in question and also another buffer
tions.” Langbein v. Planning Board of
strip, with which we are not concerned,
City of Stamford, 145 Conn. 674, 146 A.
should be clearly labeled as belonging to
2d412,414, (1958).
“Boutet”.
See also Forest Construction Co. v.
On December 15th the Planning Board
P
l
a
nning 8c Zoning Com’n, 155 Conn. 669,
adopted, after public hearing, land subdivi
2
3
6
A.2d 917 (1967).
sion regulations, including Article VII—
We turn later to consideration of the
“ G e n e ra l R e q u ire m e n ts f o r th e S u b d iv iregulation adopted by the Planning Board.
sio n o f L a n d * * *
Mr. Boutet vigorously contends that the
B. The subdivider shall observe the fol Board conditionally approved the plat with
lowing: * * *
the buffer strip in October, 1965 and that
t
10. Buffer zones shall not be allowed.” herefore on compliance with the condi
tions in April, 1966 he was entitled as a
In April, 1966 Mr. Boutet firstsubmitted matter of law to approval by the Board.
a revised plan or plat in which he met all There is nothing, however, in the record
of the conditions for approval stated inthe to establish that either by ordinance or
seven point letter of October. The Plan regulation the Planning Board in October,
ning Board in May again reviewed the 1965 was authorized to grant a conditional
plat, and advised Mr. Boutet that the plat, approval of a plat giving to the developer
with the exclusion of the buffer strip “will settled rights to approval on compliance.
be approved forthwith upon its receipt by
By statute or regulation provision is
the Board. Such approval, however, as this sometimes made forwhat has been calleda
letter of intent implies, will not be extend two-step process of subdivision plat ap
ed beyond October 30, 1966.” It is from proval involving tentative approval to be
this decision that Mr. Boutet has appealed. followedby finalapproval.
The statutereadsinpartasfollows:
In Pennyton Homes, Inc. v. Planning
Bd. of Stanhope, 41 N.J. 578, 197 A.2d 870,
“30 M.R.S.A. § 4956: L a n d S u b d iv i S72 (1964) the court in commenting on the
sio n s.
originalplanningactsaid:
1. R e g u la tio n . A municipalitymay reg “There was no provision for the current
two-step process of tentative and final
ulate the subdivision of land. * * *
Me.Rep. 243-256 A.2d— 14
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plat approval. ‘Approval’ was a single
act, final in nature, (except perhaps in
one limited situation, see R.S. 40:5o—19)
and there was no problem of protection
to a developer by reason of any prelimi
naryortentativeapproval.”
In Levin v. Livingston Tp., 35 X.J. 500,
173 A.2d 391, 397 (1961) the court said:
“So the general revision of the planning
act in 1953 introduced for the first time
a two-step approval procedure, permit
ting municipalities to provide for ‘tenta
tiveapproval’of plats, X.J.S.A. 40:55-1.18,by which these basic matters may be
settled. From what has been said, it is
obvious that tentative approval is the
most importatnt phase of the subdivision
regulation process.”
See also Hilton Acres v. Klein, 35 X'.J.
570, 174 A.2d 465, 470 (1961); 3 American
Law of Zoning (Anderson), (1968) § 19.13
“Preliminary and final plats: tentative ap
proval”;§ 19.19 “Subdivision regulations”;
2 Zoning Law and Practice (Yokley)
(1965) § 12-7.
[2] The two-step process, useful as it
doubtless is to developer and Planning
Board, in our view rests on the statutes or
regulations authorized thereunder. Here
we find no foundation for a conditional
approval inOctober, 1965.
[3] The action of the Board in Octo
ber, 1965 thus gave no rights whatsoever
to the landowner to compel final approval
on compliance with the conditions. In
reaching this conclusion we do not accept
the argument of the defendant that the
Board did not, in fact, give a tentative ap
proval. We think the intention of the
Board in October was clear.We are saying
that the Board simply did not have author
itytomake suchacommitment.
[4] The landowner gains nothing in
this instance on the basis of an estoppel
against the Planning Board and City. As
suming that under certain circumstances a
landowner may acquire rights by estoppel

he has not done so on the facts of this
case. At most between October, 1965 and
April or May, 1966 the landowner did no
more than take down a barn, which was an
action not directly attributable to the loca
tion of the buffer strip, obtain a variance
of the zoning ordinance with reference to
lot sizes which would have been required
apart from the issue of the buffer strip,
and spend some $30 or $40 in obtaining a
new plan. This isnot sufficient change in
his situation to claim that justice requires
thatthe Planning Board and City are to be
bound by the tentative approval inOctober,
1966. See Levin v. Livingston Tp., supra,
173 A. at p. 402; Tremarco Corp. v. Garzio, 32 N.J. 448, 161 A.2d 241, 245 (1960);
Municipal Law (Rhyne) p.893 (1957).
The question then becomes whether the
subdivision plat submitted in April, 1966
met the requirements of the ordinances of
Saco and the general reasonableness test.
If so, the landowner was entitled without
more toapprovalbytheBoard.
[5] In our view the rule against
buffer strip or zone was proper under the
“general reasonableness” provision of the
statute. The Legislature intended that
there should be room for exercise of dis
cretion by the Planning Board. Ifthe ordi
nances alone bounded the field of its au
thority the words “general reasonableness”
wouldhave nomeaning.
The regulation by the Planning Board
was properly adopted as part of a compre
hensive plan for the city of Saco. 30 M.
R.S.A. § 4952 relating to planning boards
reads in part:
“2. P la n s. The board shall prepare,
adopt and may amend a comprehensive
plan containing its recommendations for
thedevelopmentofthemunicipality.
A. Among other things, the plan may
includethe proposed general character,
location, use, construction, layout, ex
tent, size, open spaces and population
density of all real estate, and the pro
posed method for rehabilitating blight
ed districtsand eliminating slum areas.
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have taxable land opened up to iton the
other side, as well. So that you have the
problem of maintenance. You have the
problem of development which isthe, for
the best of the community, which should
C. Once adopted by the board, the
be so they could be opened up on both
plan becomes a public record. Itshall
sides. I could find no technical way in
be filedintheofficeoftheclerk.”
which this could be done and still grant
Mr. Boutet a buffer strip without just
The Board, therefore, inMay had before
having removed it from the plan. We
it the policy against approval of buffer
zones found in the regulations. The test, tried very hard, or I tried very hard,
certainly, to find a method in which we
however, remains one of reasonableness.
Ifthe policyof the Board, whether by reg could grant this. And I don’t want to
get into areas where I am giving other
ulation or otherwise, does not lie wdthin
people’s opinions. But I find itis very
the test of reasonableness, itmust fail and
d
ifficultto. Because, obviously, Ihad to
cannot be used as a measure of disapproval
go to * * * and in this case I was
by the Board.
acting for the Board— to other sources
[6 ] On the record before us we are un for our information concerning the use
able to say that the exclusion of buffer
of buffer strips. The only time that I
zones as a matter of law isnot reasonable.
could find that a buffer strip was ap
The reasons against the approval of buffer
proved by planners in subdivisions, or at
zones in subdivision plats were persuasive any place, iswhen itisused for a public
ly set forth by the Chairman of the Plan use. This is wrhere it would be in the
ning Board in the adoption of the subdivi
form— ”
sion regulation in December, 1965. He
T h e C O U R T : In other words, the ad
testifiedinpartas follows:
joining land is devoted to public pur
‘T investigated the treatment of buffer
poses?
strips in subdivisions and by other Plan
T h e W I T N E S S : * * * When i
tis,
ning Boards and by other planners in
for example, in a playground or a park,
Maine. I consulted Mr. Klunder who is
or something similar to that, they some
our planning consultant for the City. I
time, when itisa publicuse,willprovide
consulted certain legal, got certain legal
a
buffer strip. Other than that, I could
opinion about this. And in no place
find no instances where buffer strips
could Ifind where buffer strips,as such,
was an approved device to be used in a
were an approved device ina subdivision
subdivision— excuse me— subdivision reg
plotting. Further than this,from a point
ulation, or in a subdivision approval.
of view of the land involved, it meant
We become sophisticated in our treat
that the Board, ifthey should approve a
ment, or in our consideration of these
buffer strip here, would be approving a
problems the longer that we get into
strip some seven hundred odd feet long
things, and the more we have experience
on one side of the property, which was
on them. We certainly, ar.d I certainly
then, ifyou project to what isnormal in
knowrmuch more about buffer strips to
a final disposition of subdivisions, that a
street would then be asked to be ap day than I did a year ago, and much
proved by the City. And then the subdi more a year ago than I did two years
ago. So that our information is con
vider would have to be asking the City,
stantly, and our knowledge is constantly
in effect, to approve half a street. That
growung on these things. This is one
is, they would be approving a street
which would only have taxable land on it reason, Ithink, why our subdivision reg
ulation lay on the table so long, because
one side, when it would be possible to
253 A.2d— 4 Vi
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we had had it presented to us by onr
first comprehensive planner back in
19-.
* * * I will say that I had several
opinions, professional opinions as re
gards to buffer strip. None of them in
dicatedthatsuch shouldbeapproved.
* * * The basis used for approving
plats at the present time isa subdivision
regulation which we have adopted as of
December 15, 1965.
Q — And you are familiar with the statu
tory provision with regard the basis to
be used?
A — Yes.
0 — And what i
s that basis?
A — That i
son thebasisofthecompliance
with the ordinances, and of general rea
sonableness.
It isargued that if the buffer strip was
reasonable in October, 1965 ittherefore as
a matter of law must be considered reason
able in May, 1966. This argument does
not take into consideration that after pub
lic hearing, the Board in December, 1965
adopted the policy against buffer strips.
No guarantee was given or could have
been given that a buffer stripreasonable in
October would be reasonable in May. Un
der the view of the landowner progress in
the development of regulation and control
of land subdivisions would be at a stand
still.

effect, he is asking the Planning Board
and the Courts on appeal that the tentative
approval based on conditions which he met
ripened intoa final approval in May. Itis
the two-step process which he seeks to uti
lizeand which isnot available tohim. We
find no error inthe decision of the Superi
or Court upholding the failure of the Plan
ning Board to approve the subdivision plat
on the ground that there was not compli
ance with the “general reasonableness”
provision of the statute.
The entry will be:
Appeal denied.
TAPLEY and MARDEN, JJ., did not
participate.

[7]
Furthermore, the fact that in both
October and May the Planning Board ap
pears to have approved a second buffer
strip in the subdivision has no bearing
upon the refusal toapprove the strip in is
sue. We need not determine whether the
second buffer strip lawfully could have
been approved. It is sufficient for our
purpose that the plat with the buffer strip
inissuewas not approved.
If Mr. Boutet had first applied in May,
1966 he would have been faced with a poli
cy castinthe form of a subdivision regula
tion against his desired two-foot buffer
stripapproximately SOD feet in length. In
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In the Matter of SPRING V A L L E Y D E 
V E L O P M E N T By Lakesites, Inc.

formed on the property after it is develooed. 38M.R.S.A. §482.
See publication Words aiul Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Suprem e Ju d icial Court of Maine.
Feb. 0. 1973.

3. Health and Environment C=’25.5

In enacting the Site Location of De
velopment Law the legislature intended to
bring residential developments within the
application of the Law and the offering
for sale of subdivided lots constituted
“commercial development” within provision
which requires persons intending to con
struct or operate development which may
substantially affect local environment to
notify the Environmental Improvement
Commission before commencing the con
struction or operation. 38 M.R.S.A. §§
482-485.

The Environmental In:;rovement Com
mission issued order which denied sub
divider the right to proceed with itsdevel
opment of 92-acre tract along one side of
pond until such time as the s::l,divider had
made proper application to the Commission
and had received the Commission’sapprov
al. The subdivider appealed. The Su
preme Judicial Court, Weath.-rbee, J.,held
that the Site Location of Development
Law which requires persons intending to
construct or operate a development which
See publication Words and Phrases
may substantially affect local environment
for other judicial constructions and
to notify, before commencing the construc
definitions.
tion or operation, the Environmental Im
provement Commission of their intent and 4. Statutes C=220
the nature and location or the development
When administrative body has carried
is a reasonable exercise of the police pow
o
u
t
r
easonable and practical interpretation
er, isnot unconstitutionally vague and does
o
f
s
t
a
tute and this has been called to the
notdeny equal protectionofthelaw.
attention of the legislature,the legislature’s
failure to act to change the interpretation
Affirmed and appealdenied.
is evidence that the legislature has ac
quiesced intheinterpretation.
1. Statutes C=> 181(1)

5. Health and Environment C=>25.5

In seeking legislative intent the court
In enacting the Site Location of De
turns first to the language which the law
v
e
l
o
p
ment Law the legislature intended
makers chose to use to carry out their pur
t
h
a
t
a
development with particular propen
pose.
sity to damage the environment should not
he located in areas where the environment
2. Health and Environment 0^25.5
is particularly incapable of sustaining the
“Commercial” within the Site Location impact without public i n j u r y . 3S M.R.S.A.
of Development Law which requires per §§ 481-488.
sons intending toconstruct or operate com
mercial development which may substan 6. Health and Environment C=>25.5
tiallyaffect local environment tonotify the
The Site Location of Development
Environmental Improvement Commission Law encompasses residential developments
before commencing the construction or op in which the developer merely subdivides
eration of the development, was intended the land into lots and offers the lots ioi
to describe the motivation. :Lr the develop sale without any intention io construct
ment and not the type of activity tobe per buildings or to provide additional improveMSC - 3
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mcnts or services on the lots. 38 M.R.S.A. isa reasonable exercise of the police pow§§ 481-188.
er. 38 M.R.S.A. $§481-488.
7. Constitutional Law C=*8(!)

14. Constitutional Law C=8I

All acts of the legislature are pre
In order that statute may be sustained
sumed to he constitutional; this presump as exercise of police power the act and its
tionisofgreatstrength.
application under the police power must
have clear, real and substantial relationship
8. Constitutional Law C=48(!)
tothepurposesoftheact.
The burden ison him who claims that
statute is unconstitutional to snow its un 15. Health and Environment 0=21
constitutionality
Application of the Site Location of
Development Law to one who merely sub
9. Constitutional Law C=8I
divides property is a valid exercise of the
The state is permitted to exercise the policepower. 38 M.R.S.A. §§481-488.
police power for the protection of the pub 16. Eminent Domain C=2(l)
lic welfare, safety, order, morals and
The application of the Site Location
health.
of Development I.aw to subdivider of lakeshore property did not constitute such v.n*0. Health and Environment 0=20
rensona’w burden upon the property as
Thu. .■'Irttv may act, if it acts properly, would e.,ual an uncompensated taking. LT.
under the police power to conserve the S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5; M.R.S.A.Const,
quality of air, soil and water and to do so art.1,$21; 38 M.R.S.A. §§481-488.
the state may justifiably limit the use
which some owners may make of their !7. Statutes C=47
property. 38 M.R.S.A. 481-488.
The Site Location of Development
Law, pertaining to the protection of the
i I. Property C=>7
environ-' .-nt, is not unconstitutionally
Landowner holds his property su’Act vague and impossible of compliance. 38
a the limitation that he may not use itto M.R.S.A. ^ +81-4S3.
theseriousdisadvantage ofthepublic.
18. Health and Environment C=2I
!2. Heaitii and Environment C=20

The limitation of use of property for
.•_purpose of preserving from unree.v.ma
in destruction the quality of air, soil and
water for the' protection of the public
"alth and welfare is within the police
power, .18 M.R.S.A. 481—kSS.
and Environment 0=2!

Requirement of Site Location of De
velopment Law that proposed developments
must no: he built on soil types which are
unsuit.:'1.
;to the nature of the undertaking
isreasonable. 38 M.R.S.A. §484.
19. Health and Environment C=20

The legislature runy properly derr w.d
that ah puate provision will be made for
load:nan parking and traffic movement betore the Environmental Improvement Cornmission .4-.all approve a commercial or in
dustrial development. ks M.R.S.A. § 484.

The Site Location of Development
Law which requires persons intending to
construct or operate development which
may substantially affec: local environment
to notify, before commencing me construc
tion or operation, the Environmental Im 29. Constitutional Law C=62(I0)
provement Commission of their intern and
hr -gislature may not endow the
the nature and location of the development Lnvir nnu-.ntal Improvement Commission
300 A.2d— <7
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with naked discretion. 38 M.R.S.A. §§
4S1-488.
21. Health and Environment C=>25.5

The effect of commercial or industrial
development upon property values is out
side the scope and purposes of the Site Lo
cation of Development Law and the Envi
ronmental Improvement Commission would
he impermissibly applying the force of the
state’s police power in the enforcement of
the Act ifitdenied approval of a develop
ment because of failure of proof that prop
ertyvalueswould notbeadversely affected.
38 M.R.S.A. §484.
22. Statutes 064(1)

26. Constitutional Law 0 211
Health and Environment 0 2 1

The Site Location of Development
Law did not deny equal protection of the
law to subdivider by administratively creat
ing piecemeal zoning with arbitrary dis
tinctions. 30 M.R.S.A. § 4962; 3S M.R.S.
A. §§481-488.
27. Constitutional Law 0211

The application of the Site Location
of Development Law on case by case basis
but under the guidance of the explicit cri
teriaof the statute isnot in itselfdenial of
equal protection. 3S M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.
28. Appeal and Error 0 6 6

The provisions of the Site Location of
Strong policy exists against piecemeal
Development Law arc severable and the appellate review. Rules of Civil Proce
unconstitutionality of provision that prop dure, rule72(c).
erty values must not be unreasonably af
fected by the development does not affect 29. Health and Environment 0 25.5
the validity of the remainder of the Act.
The Environmental Improvement Com
38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.
mission is without authority to present in
terlocutory appeal to the law court or for
23. Statutes 0 4 7
the law court to entertain directappeals on
The standards which statute sets out piecemeal basis. 38 M.R.S.A. §4S7; Rules
to guide the determinations of administra ofCivil Procedure, rules73,73(f).
tive bodies must be sufficiently distinct so
that the public may know what conduct is 30. Health and Environment 0>25.5
barred and so that the law will be adminis
The Environmental Improvement Com
teredaccordingtothelegislativewill.
mission acted regularly and within the
scope of its authority when it denied per
24. Constitutional Law 0208(1)
mission to subdivider to subdivide 92 acres
The legislature may, in its judgment, located on one side of large pond on
create classifications so long as they are ground that the developer had failed to
not arbitrary and are based upon actual demonstrate that it had plans that would
differences in classes which differences adequately protect the public's health, safe
bear substantial rational relation to the ty and general welfare. 38 M.R.S.A.
public purpose sought to be accomplished 481-488.
bythestatute.
31. Health and Environment C=>25.5
25. Constitutional Law 0211
Health and Environment 0 2 1

The requirement of Site Location of
Development Law that subdivider over 20
acres must receive the approval of the En
vironmental Improvement Commission is
not denial of equal protection of the law.
38M.R.S.A. §§481-488.

Findings of the Environmental Im
provement Commission that proposed sub
division of 92 acres on one side of large
pond would degrade the quality of ground
water in and around the development and
that the developer had failed to present
plans that would adequately protect the
public’s health, safety and general welfare
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were supported by substantial evidence. 3 S 20,000 square feet to 53,000 square feet
M.R.S.A. §§4S1-488.
with several other areas reserved from
sale. It refers to this property as its
Spring Valley Development.
Verrill, Dana, Philbrick, Putnam & Wil
Lakesites has cleared and graded por
liamson by Loyall F. Sewall, Portland, for
tions of this land, has built a road for in
Spring Valley.
gress and egress and has surveyed the
E. Stephen Murray, Asst. Atty. Gen., property, marking off the boundaries of
Augusta, for Environmental Improvement the individual lots. While it contemplates
Comm.
that purchasers will build year-round or
part-time homes on their lots it does not
Before DUPRESNE, C. J., and WEB intend to construct or participate in the
BER, WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, construction of the buildings or to control
WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, Jj.
the use of the lots"except insofar as there
are any required deed restrictions”. No
action has beer, taken with respect to pro
WEATHERBEE, Justice.
viding services forany of the lots.
Raymond Pond islocated in the town of
Raymond and is slightly more than one
Lakesites proposes that the selling of
mile in length. Lakesites, Inc. isthe own these lots be a profitable venture and it
er of a large tractof land containing about has placed their sale in the hands of li
92 acres located on one side of the Pond. censed realestatebrokers.
Lakesites’development of this land into a
residential subdivision has been interrupted
Lakesites submitted its subdivision plan
by an order of the Environmental Im to the Raymond Planning Board which,
provement Commission directing ittocease after some changes had been made, ap
the operation of this development until proved itas satisfying the only subdivision
Lakesites has applied for and received 'he requirement then existing in the town ordi
Commission’s approval of its develop!:er.t. nance— that of lot size. The subdivision
lan was then recorded in the Cumberland
The Commission claims to have derived p
C
its authority for this order from 38 M.R. ounty Registryof Deeds.
S.A. §§ 481-48-3, Site I.ocation of Develop
There was in effect at this time the Site
ment Law, hereinafter referred to as the Location Law the constitutionality of
Site Location Law. Lakesites’appeal at which is under attack. This law required
tacks both the Commission’s interpretationI
. persons intending to construct or operate a
of the Act as including residential sub
development which may substantiallyaffect
sions and the Act’s constitutiona!ity. We local environment to notify, before com
conclude thatthe authority ofthe Cop.:rus- mencing the construction or operation, the
i:.
r;sions
sion does extend to residential:sub(.
Environmental Improvement Commission
and that the sitatute representS C. 'valid.CA“ of their intent and the nature and location
ercise of the police power. 1vYe deny■the of the development. If the Commission
appeal.
determines it to be necessary, a hearing
The agreed statement of facts and the shall be held at which the developer has
testimony presented at hearir.S ^ tore rhv the burden of satisfying the Commission
that the development will not substantially
Commission re:\ea!that Lakesit:
■—
extends along the shore of the jc'C a t adversely affect the environment or pose a
least 3400 feet4 Lakesites ha.s su*r\:...C'J threat to the public’shealth, safety or gen
this tract into 90 lots ranging in size : ■ ■ eral welfare. 38 M.R.S.A. §§483,484.
I.

The testimony and map indicate a frontage on the Pond much in excess of this figure.

V eAeo. 3C0-3C7 A .23— 2
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The L egislatu re defir.vii developm ents
which m ay substantially a ; fee: environ
ment asmeaning
. . [I] any commercial or in
dustrial development which requires a li
cense from the Environmental Improve
ment Commission. [2] or which occupies
a land area in excess of 2n acres, [3] or
which contemplates drilling for or exca
vating natural resources, excluding bor
row pits for sand, fillor gravel, regulat
ed by the State Highway Commission
and pits of less than 5 acres, [4] or
which occupies on a single parcel a
structure or structures in excess of a
ground area of 60,000 square feet.” 38
M.R.S.A. §482(2).
Although Lake-sites’development did oc
cupy a land area in excess cf 20 acres, it
did not notify the Commission of itsinten
tions. However, the Commission eventual
lylearnedof Lakesites’plansand proceeded
at once to schedule and conduct a hearing
as it is authorized to do by section 485.
Notice of the hearing was given Lakesites.
2.

Lakesites was represented at the hearing
by its attorney who challenged the Com
mission’sjurisdiction to regulate Lakesites'
activity contending that the mere subdivi
sion of land does not constitute a “com
mercial or industrial development” within
the scope of the Site Location Law. The
attorney made a formal objection to all
testimony other than that relating to juris
diction. He elected to waive his right to
contest as to the merits of the case al
though he was offered full opportunity to
do so, choosing not to offer evidence or to
cross-examine witnesses who testified re
garding the proposed development.
These witnesses testified at length as to
various aspects of the environment which
they said would be substantially adversely
affected by the proposed development.
Later, after consideration of the matter,
the Commission made findings of fact2
and held that Lakesites had failed in its
burden to prove that its proposed develop
ment meets the standards for approval es
tablished by the Legislature in section484345
7.
The record indicated that most of
the soil in the area is unsuitable for
septic tank disposal of domestic sewage.
S. The development has been subdi
vided in such a fashion so that it will
support housing for 90 families, all of
whom must dispose of domestic sewage
in some manner.
9. Since the developer. Lakesites,
Inc., has not indicated that it has made
any provision for collection, treatment or
disposal of such sewage, and no munici
pal treatment and disposal system exists
in the vicinity of the development, the
only alternative is underground disposal
of such sewage by means of a septic
tank or related system.
10. The installation of up to 90
spetic tank disposal systems in and upon
the said development could degrade the
quality of ground water in and around
the said development, such ground water
possibly being used for a drinking water
supply, and degrade the waters of R ay
mond Pond.”

“ 1. Lakesites. Inc. is the owner of a
lot or parcel of land locate! in Ray
mond. Maine, on or near Raymond
Pond, exceeding 2<> acres in size, to wit,
02 acres more or 1-ss.
2. Lakesites. Inc. has divided said 92
acres more or less, into approximately
90 lots ranging in size from 20,'r.K) to
.43,OOO square feet.
3. Lakesites. Inc. has sold, is s-lling
or is planning to s*-:l <.r otherwise trans
fer interests in and to said lots to pur
chasers as a commercial venture, such
lots to be used for year round or sea
sonal residential and/or recreational
purposes.
4. Lakesites, Inc. has been and is op
erating a commercial development with
in the meaning of Title 3S M.R.S.A. $
482(2).
5. I>akesitcs. Inc. has mad* no ap 
plication to nor submitted any i-vid-nce
at the hearing held by the K .I/'. for
approval pursuant to the Site Location
of Development Law. although it was
given ample opportunity to do so.
<*. The record indicated that m.cr of
the soil in the area tx-ing develop,-.i by
Lake-sites, Inc. is of a steep slop.' and
lias a high seasonable water tab!*-.'
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3.

‘ The commission shall approve a de
velopment proposal whenever it finds
th a t:
1. Financial capacity. The proposed
development has the financial capacity
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and had failed to d-emonstrate that ic had
plans that would adequately protect the
public’shealth, safety and general welfare.
It issued an order denying Lakesites the
right to proceed with itsdevelopment until
such time as ithas made a proper applica
tion to the Environmental Improvement
Commission and has received the Commis
sion’s approval.
From this decision of the Commission,
Lakesites has appealed to the Supreme Ju
dicial Court sitting as the Law Court, [38
Yf.R.S.A. § 487] raising specifically the is
sue as to whether the offering for sale of
subdivided lots of the type owned by Lakesitesiseither a commercial or an industrial
development4 subject to the provisions of
38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488 and. secondarily, if
the Site Location Law is applied to this
developer, are there constitutional viola
tions of Equal Protection and Due Process.
T h e in ten t o f the L e ji d a i o .r e .

As to the first ’S'-ue,
lature’s intent.

u e s< ck th e L eg

bility to meet state air
and technical a
and water pol lotion control s r indards.
has made nd- •ante p-•■ "vision fo>- solid
waste disposal , r11r- ci iritrol of of fimsi vc
odors, and th •• sei-ii!r:r;;' and maintenaive of suffii •i •nt anid hea’ idsi'n- water
supplies.
2. Traffic movement. The proposed
development li as mad - rMlapia IC prove
si on for load: ;i;t. p.i!rkin^ a Pii] traffic
movement froi u tie- ’••vdIojmd •'■ it area
onto public ro; ids.
3. S o advert;:e effe,- r on P.:. • aral cnvironrnent. T he proposed (!•••. •■'ojiiii--ar
has made adeij into provision f<>r fitting
itself hormoni on sly i nto the exist51,','
natural enviro nmerit and will not adi: ie charvcr.--ely affect exi.stit:v FsuS,
actor, natii:-.'.1 rest; \1•'v.s or proporty
values iii the municii-Pity or i a adjoining lranicipakt ies.
-1. Soil type-V. Tim proposed deV.dop
men t a 111 h- imilt on soil ry; es which
are suitable to rlie nature of d m undertaking.”
The nppelh'e no•k‘*s no claim X -r Lnlosites’ p ro jv t i~ an imim ; rial d- -lopnienr.
"See. 4 si.

Fin ■iin^s a nd purpo »•

‘'Legislative intent is the fur.dam-r.ta! Legislative intent is
rule in the construction or :r.tcrprvtat:on key in interpreting
of statutes. . . . Such a construc law.
tion ought to he put upon a statute as
ma\ best answer the intention which the
Legislators had in view, and when deter
minable and ascertained, the courts must
give effect to it. . .
King Re
sources Co. v. Environmental Improve
ment Commission, Me., 270 A.2d 863, 869
(1970).
In 197(.ithe 104th Legislature, rr.evtingin
special session, enacted several pieces oi
legislationdirected tovvard recucir.ythe destruction of our natttral environrr.cm. One
of the pieces of legislation introtruccd v.?.s
L.D. 1834 entitled ’‘AX ACT to Regu.j.vr
Site Location of Development 5u::•start: : : . 1:y
Affecting Environrr.er.t” with ivhich v.e
are row concerned. After am.::timer: it
S—
9 tl*.V.i
was enacted as P.L,.1969. ch. 57!,£
became 38M.R.S.A.§§481-4S8.
The Legislature’s concise sta::en:en: of
its Findings and Puirposc5 makes clear to
u- th basis for it-•conclusion that d.ve
action was essentialt*>:whiirc tp.ci*;cvmrr:rThe Legislature fin.-Isth.-.trl.e '•'ir.OIiML*
aridsocialwellbeingof tlm«-irtr-:*-r.s -Irtm
State of Maine <!•-j-nd upon the —-trion
ofcommercial and industriald-w-dwith respect to tie
of tlie State; rh-tt many dev-’- :-ms
hrrrui i ' >)f their si :
<■and :>•!*>, n--apali’--of causing irrej.arabR damanpeople and the uivironrnent in 11 -:r >-rroundings: that the location of A •>vclopne-ntsistooini•joT*r:inrrr»]>*1•:*oi\ iv
to the determination of the ow < of
sc.r-Ji dm-iopinents; and thar ’!s-r-rior.
must vested in srcr»*;;ur'i«*nry r.-cu• wI.
late rim h-cation of dcvelor-ra-r."■
•• v substantial’;
. aff-T -m:-u.m-m.
Tim purpose of tic's sui--!:.apvr is
p-ovi-lea flexible and p a I rn-a.ns ry
which th- State, a-■tine r11r- -’ RL•
.>sn*:i.in
virorum-ntal Improv -tit
consultation with a•■nrepr. »: ■1s
t-r• . i;,k. -■f
Sratc p- control ri.- ]•M.•r?1 of -v>I--P',--'r'i■ snh'fanirially at’:--iteuvin-nna-nt in orb•rto in- *' •rv.;sh
it.a am:-d.-vl-i-iiT:.
’itswill !c
•:
win- will iiavcan
on rim natural iniin»nr:.-r." **f •ir
roundings.’’ (E:up!nvds add—].<
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rial and industrial developments which b e 
will im
pose unusually heavy demands v.por. the
natural environment, shall not be located in
areas where the environment does not have
the capacity towithstand the impact of the
development. But did the Legislature in
tend to bring re sid e n tia l developments
within the application of the law? If so,
did itintend to include mere subdivisions?
c a u se o f th e ir n atu re o r th e ir sic e ,

larf/c developments, apart from the type of
activity located thereon, have an inherent
potential for over-taxing the involved land,
air and water upon which the public de
pends to sustain an acceptable quality of
human living.

But the Legislature chose to apply the
Act only to large developments which are
industrial or commercial. The word ‘'com
mercial” broadly means “from the point of
[1] In seeking the legislative intent we view of profit” . . . "having profit
turn first to the language which the law as the primary aim”. Webster’s Third
makers chose to use to carry out their pur Xew International Dictionary, 1967.
pose.
[2 ] We think that the use of the word
In reference to real estate, a "develop “commercial” was intended to describe the
ment” may be defined as "a developed m o tiv a tio n for the development and not the
tract of land” and "to develop” as '.ocon type of activity to be performed on the
vert (as raw land) into an area suitable property after itisdeveloped. We consid
for residential or business purposes” er that the Legislature chose to distinguish
''to alter raw land (into an area between commercial and non-commercial
suitable for building)”. Webster’s Third developments for a sound reason— itdoubt
less concluded that a greater need for su
Xew International Dictionary, 1967.
pervision exists in the case of a commer
When we analyze the legislative defini cially motivated development where the
tion of developments which may substan dominant factor isthe hope for profit than
tially affect environment we find that the in a non-commercial development where
Legislature saw fit to concern itself with land is being prepared for public enjoy
two kinds of developments— 1 ) those the ment or divided for family distribution or
operating procedures of which include the for some other purpose than profit. In
consumption of the natural resources them other words, commercial residential devel
selves or w:hich have a propensity to dis opments have a propensity for being big,
charge, in the course of their processes, concentrated and exhausting to the re
wastes and residues which lower the quali sourcesoftheenvironment.
ty of surrounding air, soil or wrater and 2 )
those which are not in h ere n tly ecologically
[3] It seems to us that the business of
destructive but which because of their s ic e subdividing large tracts of land and selling
are likely to impose great demands upon the lots must be considered a Commercial
the environment.
venture. The Legislature doubtless so
The Legislature’s concern for the first viewed it. Certainly, thisconstruction best
class is obvious. The operation of many accords with the purpose of the statute.
industrial and some commercial develop Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 275, 6 8 A.
ments— whether large or small— are likely 2d241,250 (1949).
to be direct assaults upon the environment
This interpretation finds support in the
itself. The ecological danger from the
h
i
s
tory of the legislationwe are examining.
members of the second group, unlike the
first, comes not principally from the type
This legislation was originally proposed
of activity tobe performed on the property to the 104th Legislature in the form of L.
after it is developed butt rather from the D. 1782 which stated that its purpose was
size and concentration of such develop toenable the State toguide and control the
ments. The Legislature’sconcern was that location of c o m m e rc ia l d e v e lo p m e n ts which
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substantially affect local environment.
Such developments were described as in
cluding "any recreational, commercial, edu
cational. industrial or residential develop
ment which by reason of its size, purpose,
manufacturing process or use or handling
of natural resources or products may tend
toharm or adversely affect the natural en
vironment of a locality to a substantial de
gree.”
The Joint Select Legislative Committee
on Natural Resources reported the bill
back in a new draft, as L.D. 1834 and that
it“Ought to pass”. The new draft stated
that its purpose was to enable the State to
guide and control the location of commer
cial a n d in d u str ia l developments substan
tially affecting local environment. Such
developments were characterized simply as
commercial and industrial— the L.D. 1782
"recreational”,“educational” and “residen
tial” development language being dropped.
The new draft as reported back also would
have excluded from the operation of the
Act developments intending “to locate in
the appropriate zoned area of any munici
pality which had adopted a municipal plan
and zoning and sub-division ordinances
based thereon.”

At the same session L.D. 1061 was intro
duced. Its sole purpose was to exclude
from “commercial developments” all resi
dential developments in municipalities
which have planning b o a rd s. The State
ment of Fact accompanying L.D. 1061 ex
plained the purpose of the Bill as follows:
“The Environmental Improvement
Commission has asserted authority under
the site location law passed at the Spe
cial Session over residential develop
ments, even though the statute islimited
to ‘commercial and industrial develop
ments.’ This bill would clarify that this
isnottheintentofthelaw.”
This clear attempt in L.D. 1061 to re
move some residential developments from
the Site Location Law was also defeated.

In considering both L.D. 963 and L.D.
1061 the Legislature had its attention spe
cifically directed to the inclusion of resi
dential developments. It is significant
that, even if enacted, neither of them
would have removed a ll residential devel
opments from the operation of the law.
The Legislature, with its attention specifi
cally directed to the fact that the Commis
sion was then construing the Act to give it
authority over residential developments of
The Legislature eliminated the latter over 2 0 acres, still refused two opportuni
provision6 thus rejecting the concept that ties even to limit the Commission’s power
local zoning is -'apable of protecting the toexercise thisauthority.
public from ecological harm. The new
draft, as amended, was then enacted and
[4]
It is a well accepted principle of
was the law existing at the time of the statutory construction that when an admin
present problem here under consideration.' istrative body has carried out a reasonable
nd practical interpretation of a statute
In the 105th Legislature, two attempts a
a
were made to remove c e rta in classifica nd this has been called tothe attention of
he Legislature, the Legislature’s failure to
tions of residential developments from the t
a
c
operation of the Act passed by the pre t tochange the interpretation isevidence
that the Legislature has acquiesced in the
vious Legislature.
interpretation. Androscoggin Savings
L.D. 963 was introduced in the 105th Bank v. Campbell, Me., 2S2 A.2d 858
Legislature. Jts sole purpose was to ex (1971); Burrough of Matawan v. Mon
clude by amendment “permanent year- mouth County Board of Taxation, 51 X.J.
round housing” occupying less than 40 291, 240 A.2d S, 13 (l96Sj; 2 Sutherland,
acres from the operation of the Site Loca J. G., Statutes and Statutory Construction,
(3rd Ed.) Frank E. Horack, Jr., § 5109.
tionLaw. L.D.963 was defeated.
L

House Amendment "A ” (II-G91).

7. P.L.19G9,-h.571.§2.
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The 105th Legislature also had before it to make itclear that subdivisions are cov
L.D. 1257, L.D. 710 and L.D. 1790 (a new ered by the Site Law and to define 'subdi
draft of L.D. 71d>. The significance of its visions’.” L.D. 1790was defeated.
actionon those measures isobscure.
While the earlier actions of the Legisla
L.D. 1257 concerned itself in part with ture in defeating the two attempts to ex
proposing some nine changes to the Site clude some residential developments from
Location Law. One such change defined a the Site Location I.aw appears to indicate
“development which may substantially af clear-cut approval of the Commission’s in
fect environment" as one specifically in terpretation of the Act as including such
cluding municipal, educational, commercial developments— that is, L.D. 963 and L.D.
or industrial developments “including real 1061— the defeat of L.D. 1790 contributes
estate subdivisions”. The Committee on little if anything to our understanding of
Natural Resources reported L.D. 1257 in a legislativeintent.
new draft under the same title which no
L.D. 963 and L.D. 1061 were specific
longer made reference to the Site Location att
empts to remove so m e residential devel
Law, and itthus becomes irrelevant to the
o
p
m
ents from the operation of the Act—
present discussion.
tacitly recognizing the Commission’s au
L.D. 710 proposed some eleven changes thority over residential developments— and
to the Site Location Law , one of which both failed. L.D. 1790, on the other hand,
was toalter the definition of “development not only would have made it "clear that
which may substantially affect environ subdivisions are covered” but would have
ment” to specifically include “any state, given the word subdivisions a drastically
municipal, quasi-murrcipal, educational, wide meaning and would have worked sev
commercial or industrial development, in eral other important changes in the Site
cluding subdivisions”. L.D. 710 defined a Location Law.8
"subdivision” as meaning a division of an
We simply cannot say what one or more
existing parcel of land into three or more
o
f
these proposed changes or additionsmay
parcels within any 5-year period. The
h
a
v
e motivated the Legislature to reject
Committee on Natural Resources reported
L
.
D
.
1790.
L.D. 710 in a new draft, L.D . 1790, under
the same title, which contained some ten
The Legislature met in special session in
changes tothe Site Location Law. Among 1972 and considered L.D. 2045 which
others, it would have amended the defini would amend the Site Location Law in
tion of developments which may substan several respects. One of these proposed
tially affect environment to read “any changes added in section 4S2.2) after
state, municipal, quasi-municipal, educa "commercial or industrial developments”,
tional, charitable, commercial or industrial the words “including subdivisions”. The
development, including subdivisions, but amendment’s statement of purposes includ
excluding public ways.” L.D. 1790 then ed “(2 ) to make it clear that subdivisions
defined a "subdivision" as meaning the di are within the coverage of the law
vision of a parcel of land into two or more
.”, The attention of the Legisla
parcels within a 5-year period. The State ture was again specifically directed to the
ment of Fact accompanying the new draft fact that the Commission was interpreting
included this explanation of purpose: “(6 ) the Act to include residential developments
8. During legislative debate on L.D. 1790
in the House of Kepres-r.Tat ives, Repre
sentative Marion Fuller Brown informed
the House that residential subdivisions
had already been a major consideration in
the administration of the Site Location
Law. She said that in its administration

of the .Site Location Law to that dan-,
the Environmental Improvement Commis
sion had processed 102 applications for
approval and C>lr/ c of these bad involve.?
subdivisions. Legislative Re>-ord—House.
June 21. 1971. at 4397.
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(Statement of fact accompanying House manner which will have a minima! adverseAmendment “A” to L.H. 2045) and that impact on the natural environment of their
this present appeal from the Commission’s surroundings”. (Emphasis supplied.) The
order, involving a determination of legisla Legislature found “that the location o'
tive intent, was then pending in court (Re such developments is too important to be
marks of Representative Owen L. Han left only to the determination of the own
cock, Legislative Record-House, 105th Leg ersofsuch developments”.
islature, 1st Special Session, 1972 at 799).
ion 483 requires a notification to the
The House was informed by Representa Seoi’
C
o
m
m
i
s
sion by any person intending to
tive Louis J.Marstaller that the purpose of
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t or operate such a development
the bill was to make itclear that residen
b
e
f
o
r
e
commencing
constriction or opera
tial subdivisions arc within the application
t
i
o
n
.
The
Commission
is then empowered
of the Site Location Law (Legislative
t
o
a p p ro v e th e lo c a tio n or schedule a hear
Record-House, 105th Legislature, 1st Spe
cial Session, 1972, at 798). Representative ing thereon.
Earl H. Smith told the House in debate
[5] The language of the Act ar.d its
that 85% of the applications acted upon by
c
l
e
ar underlying purpose reflect the Legis
the Commission in the past two years had
l
a
t
ure’s intention that a development with
been residential subdivisions (Legislative
a
p
articu’ar propensity to damage the envi
Record-House, 105th Legislature, 1 st Spe
r
o
n
ment should' not be located in areas
cialSession, 1972,at8 8 6 ;.
where the environment isparticularly inca
With this information before it,the Leg pable of sustaining the impact without pub
licinjury.
islatureenacted theamendment.9
Cits- -,s, Mi-.,

Wc find itsignificant in our assessment
of legislative intent that the 105th Legisla
ture, aware that the Commission was inter
preting the Act to include residential sub
divisions, took no affirmative action to in
dicate a contrary intent, rejected two at
tempts to remove so m e residential subdivi
sions from the operation of the Act and fi
nally acted to add the specific words ‘"in
cluding subdivisiim.7’.
In our opinion the 104th Legislature in
tended to include commercial residential
developments among those developments
which may substantially affect environ
ment. But did the Legislature intend the
Act to affect commercial residential devel
opments where the developer merely plots
the tract, subdivides it into lots by plan
and offers the lots for sale to the public?
We consider that this :.\ * s the Legisla
ture’s intention. The basic theory of the
Act, as disclosed by the Legislature's
Statement of Purpose, i.- to insure that
“such developments ivill he lo c a te d in a
9. It beeam-i P.L. 1971, 8;.e

The Appellant argues to us that it was
the.Legislature’s intention to prevent acts
being done to the land which would harm,
the land and that, therefore, the law isdi
rected to the person who will do the act—
such as the builder— and not to the person
who merely subdivides and sells the land.
With this we cannot agree. The Legisla
ture intended the Commission to scrutinize
the proposals b e fo r e the harmful act could
be done. The Act isa preventive measure
and the injury sought to he avoided can
Wm 1 ••prevented as soon as plans for de
velopment reveal the harm which will oc
cur upon itscompletion. We would hardly
expect that the Legislature intended to
pO'tpme the determination of suitability of
an area for a residential development until
the lets had been sold to purchasers who
w:;l, upon starting construction, discover
that they are participants in— as well as
victims of— a local environmental disaster.
Furthermore, ifa subdivider has sold the
lots to numerous individual purchasers
each of whom, among other things, is to
S ession 19711, eh. (11.4 § 2.
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construct his own budding, article his own
land, build his own driveway to the street,
ami provide for his own sanitary sewage
disposal, there would be no one “intending
to construct or operate a development”
who could be held responsible under the
statute. We do not ascribe to the Legisla
ture an intention that legislation so impor
tant to the public welfare would suffer
from such inherent futility.

presumption of great strength and that the
burden ison him who claims that the Act
is unconstitutional to show its unconstitu
tionality. State v. Fantastic Fair, 158 Me.
450, 1S6A.2d352 (1961).

[9,1 0 ] The State is permitted, of
course, toexercise the police power for the
protection of the public welfare, safety, or
der, morals and health. Prudential Insur
ance Company of America v. Insurance
[6 ] We consider that both the legislaCommissioner, Me., 293 A.2d 529 (1972);
tive intent and the statutory language of York Harbor Village Corporation v. Libby,
the Act encompass residential developments 126 Me. 537, 140 A. 3S2 (1928). It seems
in which the developer merely subdivides self-evident in these times of increased
the land into lots and offers the lots for awareness of the relationship of the envi
sale without any intention to construct ronment to human health and welfare that
buildings or to provide additions’improve the state may act— if it acts properly— to
ments or services on the lots. We do not conserve the quality of air, soil and water.
find that the Act as so interpreted and ap
plied is constitutionally impermissible.
[1 1 ] To do so the State may justifiably
The subdividing isthe initial step insuch a limit the use wrhich some owners may make
development.
of their property. Our law has long rec
o
The Commission correctly ruled as fact gnized that a landowner holds his proper
that this particular residential development ty subject tothe limitation that he may not
is a commercial development which may use it to the serious disadvantage of the
substantially affect environment requiring public.
compliance with the provisions of the Site
As early as 1835 the legislative body of
Location Law.
the City of Bangor determined that the
public safety demanded that wooden build
ings should not he built in certain sections
C o n stitu tio n a lity o f th e S t a t e ’s e x e r c is e o f
o
f the City and enacted an ordinance for
its p olice p o w e r u n d er th is /le t .
bidding owners of land inthese areas from
In enacting the Site Location Law-, the erecting wooden buildings on their proper
104th Legislature presented the State wdth ty. This Court upheld the constitutionality
a means of minimizing, through the exer oftheordinance saying:
cise of its police power, the irreparable
‘'Police regulations may forbid such a
damage being done to the environment.
u
s
e
, and such modifications, of private
But the mere urgency of the action taken
p
r
o
perty, as wrould prove injurious tothe
cannot override the necessity that the de
c
i
t
i
zens generally. This is one of the
vice which the Legislature has chosen for
the public protection isone which isconsti benefits which men derive from associat
tutionally permitted. It is Lakesites’con ing in communities. It may sometimes
occasion an inconvenience to an individ
tention that the Legislature has not chosen
ual; but he has a compensation, in par
such adevicehere.
ticipating in the general advantage.
[7,8 ] In our consideration of the valid Laws of this character are unquestiona
ityof the Legislature’schoice oflegislation
bly within the scope of the legislativeto accomplish itspurpose we have in mind
power, without impairing any constitu
that all Acts of the Legislature are pre tional provision. Itdoes not appropriate
sumed to be constitutional, that this is a
private property to public uses; but
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C ite »<. M.>.. :;n<> a i<i 7 r,

10. The
to .-luwcr.
that a "solenm occasion"
! not (■> :.«t
inasmuch as the Legislature ha 1 a 5-

o

rii

ty, however absolute and unqualified
merely regulates its enjoyment.
may he his title, holds it under the im
. . . ” Wadleigh v. Gilman, .12 Me.
plied liabilitythat hisuse of itmay be so
403,405 (1835).
regulated that itshall not be injurious to
In 1907 the very philosophy contained in
the equal enjoyment of others having an
the statement of purpose of the present
equal right to the enjoyment of their
Act was expressed hy the Justices of thD
property, nor injurious to the rights of
Court in an Opinion in which they re the community. All property in this
sponded to a question from the Maine Sen
commonwealth, as well that inthe interi
ate. The Senate inquired whether
or as that bordering on tide waters, is
derived directly or indirectly from the
“In order to promote the common wel
fare of the people of Maine by prevent government and held subject to those
general regulations w'hich are necessary
ing or diminishing injurious droughts
and freshets, and by protecting, preserv for the common good and general wel
fare. Rights of property like all other
ing, and maintaining the natural water
social and conventional rights, are sub
supply of the springs, streams, ponds,
and lakes and of the land, and by pre ject to such reasonable limitations in
their enjoyment as shall prevent them
venting or diminishing injurious erosion
from being injurious, and to such rea
of the land and the filling up of the riv
s
onable restraints and regulations estab
ers, puiids, and lakes, . . .” Ques
l
i
shed by law as the Legislature, under
tions and Answers, 103 Me. 506, 507, 69
t
h
e go\eruing- and controlling power
A. 627 (1907).
v
e
sted in them by the Constitution, may
the Legislature had power under the Con
t
h
i
nk necessary and expedient.
stitution tc pass legislation which would
. Questions and Answers, su
prohibit the owners of wildland from un
p
r
a
.
1
0
3 Me. at 510, 69 A. at 624-629.
necessary cutting or destruction of small
liees “to preserve or enhance the valu<‘of
The Maine Justices also quoted and re
such lands and trees thereon and protect nal ..on the language of the Maryland
and promote the interests of such owners fourt in Windsor v. State, 103 Md. 611. Cand the common welfare of the people". \.2 S- 1'- j;:
While the Opinion of the Justices is not
'■'Property of every kind is held sub
precedent, we find that the reasoning
j
e
c
t to those regulations which are nec
which led to their conclusions is most im
e
s
s
ary for the common good and general
pressive. The Justutes found that the pro
•
w
e
l
fare. And the Legislature h.s the
posed legislation would not offend the con
power
todefine the mode and manner in
stitutionally guaranteed right of “acquir
wh
i
c
h
one may use his property/"
ing, possessing and defending property” or
•
/
n
o
t
i
o
n
s and Answers, supra, 1-3 Me.
the provision that private property shall
a
t
5
1
3
,
6
9
A.at630.
not be taken for public uses without just
compensation. Constitution of Maine, Art.
The Tusticessaid:
1,§§ 1 ,21. Six of theJustices answered.10
i hce are two reasons of gre;.
quoting with approval the language of
we -g ht for applying this strict construe
Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v.
tior. of the constitutional provision t
Alger,7Cush. 53 (1851):
•rty in iand: 1st, such property i
Pr'V •
"‘We think it a settled principle,
he result ofproductive labor, but 1
growing out ofthenature of well-ordered
vi - July from the State itsGf. th
civilsociety, that every holder of proper.MM n
.alowner;
before the question could he
:m - •• • -••>!. The o
i.yhth Justice •! £1 i;..r

par'iGpar-.
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being incapable of ineivaM-. it the owners of large tracts can waste them at
will without State restriction. the State
and itspeople may be helplessly•mp:verished and one great purpose c: government defeated.” Questions and Answers, supra, 103 Me. at 511. 60 A. at
629.
In York Harbor Village Corp:>rat:on v.
Libby, supra, this Court upheld the consti
tutionality of the statute which authorized
village corporations to enact zoning ordi
nances and of the ordinance enacted under
it. The Court followed the same reasoning
as to the susceptibility of private property
to restrictions upon its use necessitated by
thepublicinterest,saying:
"It is said that police power has not
been, and perhaps cannot be. defined
with precision. .
Itisnot the offspring of constitutions.
It isolder than any written ccr.stitution.
Itisthe power which the states have not
surrendered to the nation, and which by
the Tenth Amendment were expressly
reserved ‘to the states, respectively, or to
the people.’
Limitations expressed or necessarily
implied in the Federal Constitution are
the frontiers which the police power can
not pass. Within those frontiers its au
thority is recognized and respected by
the Constitution and given effect by all
courts.

itself reasonable and not merely arbi
trary, and not violative of any constitu
tional limitation, is valid. It is not a
deprivation of property which the Con
stitution forbids, but an enforcement of
a condition subject to which property is
held.” York Harbor Village Corpora
tion v. Libby, supra, 126 Me. at 5 4 0 .541,
140A.at385,386.

Basis for Police
power regulation.

[12,13] We consider it indisputable
that the limitation of use of property for
the purpose of preserving from unreasona
ble destruction the quality of air, soil and
water for the protection of the public
health and welfare is within the police
power.
C o n stitu tio n a lity o f a p p lic a tio n o f the .-let
to one 7oho only su b d iv id e s.

Lakesites does not deny the power of the
State to act properly under the police pow
er to protect the environment but urges us
that the application of the Act to one who
merely subdivides isconstitutionally forbid
den. It argues that a remedial Act must
he designed and applied rationally and rea
sonably to achieve the purposes for which
the Act was devised. The evilto be avoid
ed, the appellant contends, isthe damaging
impact of the development upon the envi
ronment and the impact occurs and the
damage is sustained only with the con
struction and occupation of the premises—
not when the land is only subdivided on
plans and the lotsare sold. L’ntil such ac
tivity creating the impact occurs on the
land, the Appellant argues, there isno bur
den or impact which can affect the envi
ronment and so the application of the Act
to a mere subdivider as a prerequisite to
his selling his land is not directly related
tothe Act’spurpose.

We have seen that private z roperty is
held subject to the implied cor.tition that
itshall not be used for any pi:rpose that
injures or impairs the pub!;;c health,
morals, safety, order, or welfare. Under
the police power, statutes and :
iuthorized
ordinances give this condition practical
effect by restrictions which gulate or
[14] It istrue that the Act and itsap
prohibitsuch uses.
plication under the police power must have
1 fthe use i
sactually and su stantially a clear, real and substantial relation to the
an injury or impairment of :hc public in- purpose oftheAct..
terest in any of its aspects a''ove enu"'In order that a statute may be sus
merated, a regulating or re<tra:ring stattained as an exercise of the police pow
ute or ordinance conforming *
.hereto, if er, the courts must be able to see that
MSC - 3
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the enactment has for itsobject the pre
vention of some offense or'manifest evil
<>r the preservation of the public health.
ty. morals. or general welfare, that
there is seme clear, real, and substantial
connection between the assumed purpose
of the enactment and the actual provi
sions thereof, and that the latter do in
some plain, appreciable, and appropriate
manner tend toward the accomplishment
of the object for which the power isex
ercised.'" State v. Union Oil Co. of
Maine, 151 Me. 43S, 447, 120 A.2d 70S,
712 <19561,quoting from 16 C.J.S. Const'tutionalLaw §195,at940.
f151 In our opinion such a connection
'-tween the purpose of the Act and itsap
plication to the subdivider isclear and rea
sonable. We have concluded earlierinthis
opinion that the Legislature intended to
empower the Commission to prevent eco
logicaldamage before itoccurs rather than
permit the occurrence of harm which
can then be cured only at great public ex
pense— if a: all. It is not unreasonable to
place upon the subdivider who plans the
number, size and location of the lots to be
■tiered for -unle the responsibility for
avoiding an inevitable large scale ecologic.-.l calamity. The subdividing for sale is
the fmst step in a commercial residential
development and the Legislature rcasona!y concluded that the public welfare re
quires that control be exercised through
the subdivider rather than attempting it
through Cn this case) 90 different pur
chasers whose properties can perhaps nev
er at that later point— because of sheer
weight and concentration of numbers—
avoidenvironmental misadventure.

Me. 749
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the record indicates that the Act as applied
constitutes such an unreasonable burden
upon the property as would equal an un
compensated taking. State v. Johnson,
Me., 265 A.2d 711 (1970): 16 Am.Jur.2d,
Constitutional Law, § 294. In fact, the
record demonstrates only that the Appel
lant's land cannot be sold for residential
purposes while subdivided to the extent
and in the manner Lakesites originally
planned.
I s the A c t u n c o n stitu tio n a lly v a g u e a n d im 
p o ssib le o f c o m p lia n c e ?

[17] The Appellant also argues that its
land is being taken from it impermissibly
because the criteria which the Act requires
the landowner to meet isunconstitutionally
vague and impossible of compliance.
Section 484 requires the Commission to
approve a development proposal whenever
itfindsthat:

■ does the A c t ta k e L a k e s it e s la n d zoithout
» ‘. p e n sc :i- :n ?

[16] We see no merit to the Lakesites’
contention that the application of the Act
:s an unconstitutional taking of its
and without compensation.11 Nothing inI
.

“1. Financial capacity. The proposed
development has the financial capacity
and technical ability to meet state air
and water pollution control standards,
has made adequate provision for solid
waste disposal, the control of offensive
odors, and the securing and maintenance
of sufficient and healthful water sup
plies.
2. Traffic movement. The proposed
development has made adequate provi
sion for loading, parking and traffic
movement from the development area
ontopublic roads.
3. No adverse affect on natural envi
ronment. The proposed development has
made adequate provision for fittingitself
harmoniously into the existing natural
environment and will not adversely af
fect existing uses, scenic character, natu
ral resources or property values in the
municipality or in adjoining municipali
ties.

II. Constitution of the United States, Amendment V;
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4. Soil tvpes. The proposed developburden upon a residential developer or
ment will be* built on soil types which amount to a taking of his land. The Court
are suitable to the nature of the under adopted the language of 2 Rathkopf. The
Law of Zoning and Planning, c’
n. 71. § 9
taking."
(1960):
Lakesites protests that as it is only a
“‘Since the subdivision of a large
subdivider itcannot accurately foresee the
tract of land into a number of small
activity to be performed on the lots itsells
building lots and the development there
and so cannot control the future adequacy
of, either for residential or industrial
of provisions relating to pollution control
and maintenance of healthful water sup purposes increases the value of the land
inthe aggregate to the subdivider and at
plies. To be sure, the Act imposes upon
the developer— including the mere subdivi the same time imposes new burdens upon
the municipality and, if uncontrolled,
der— responsibilities which he has not had
in the past. The Legislature has deter upon other elements in the community,
the validity of imposing a duty upon the
mined that an owner of a large tract of
subdivider to comply with reasonable
undeveloped land may no longer subdivide
c
onditions relating to location, site plan,
it, sell the lots and then walk away from
l
ocation of and width of roads and side
the transaction indifferent to the local ca
tastrophe that may result when construc walks, the installation of necessary storm,
drains and sewers, and to restrictions or.
tion and occupancy reveal the incapacity of
lot sizes so that the subdivision will con
the environment to withstand the impact of
the development. It may be that this re form to the local requirements for the
safety, health and general welfare of the
sponsibility can more e a sily be met by a
subsequent owners of the individual lots
subdivider who isalso a.constructor of the
therein and of the community has beer,
buildings but itisequally the responsibility
generally recognized.’’’ Blevens v. City
of the subdivider who chooses only to sell
of Manchester, 103 X.H. 284. 170 A.2d
the bare lots. The duty is no doubt more
121, 122 (1961).
burdensome as the land isless suitable and
it may be impossible of compliance if the
environment isof a type incapable of sus The Courtadded:
taining the proposed development. In the
"The subdivision of land has a definite
latter situation the public welfare demands
economic impact upon the municipality
that the land be used for another purpose
and hence the regulation of subdivision
or that the impact of the same use be di activities has been sustained as a means
minished. In many situations the subdivi by which the interests of the public ami
der may be able to meet his burden of af the general taxpayer may be safeguarded
firmatively demonstrating to the Commis and protected. Since the subdivider of
sion that he has met the criteria through
land creates the need for local improve
satisfactory conditions in his instruments
ments which are of special benefit to the
of sale. We do not consider the burden to
subdivision, it is considered reasonable
be unreasonable in view of the overriding
that he should bear the cost rather than,
publicinterest.
the municipality and the general taxpay
er. . .
The Xew Hampshire Court expressed
the same basic philosophy when it found
that an ordinance which required approval
[18,19] The Appellant concedes that
of subdivision developments conditioned the requirement that a proposed develop
upon the developer’s paying for street ment must not be built on soil types wh ;h Soils must
gradings and surfacing, curbings, side are unsuitable to the nature of the under suitable.
walks, water mains, sewers and other im taking is a reasonable one, and we agree
provements d:d not impose an unreasonable We also feel that there can be no serim.:-
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.MOOA.L'dTHti
question but that the Legislature may prop minimal destruction to be superior to the
erly demand that adequate provision will owner’s rights in the use of his land and
lie made for loading, parking and traffic has given the Commission adequate stand
ards under which to carry out the legisla
movement and hasdone soclearly.
tivepurpose.
The requirement that the Commission
must he satisfied that there will be no ad
[21] For reasons not known to us the
verse effect upon the natural environment Act recites that p ro p e rty v a lu e s also must
is the very substance of the Legislature’s not be (unreasonably) affected. In our
efforts to reduce despoilation of the envi opinion, the effect of developments upon
ronment to a minimum. While most such property values is outside the scope and
developments may be expected to “affect” purposes of the Act and the Commission
the environment adversely to the extent would be impermissibly applying the force
that they add tothe demands already made of the State’spolice power in the enforce
upon it,it is the u n re a so n a b le effect upon ment of this Act ifitdenied approval of a
existing uses, scenic character and natural development because of failure of proof
resources which the Legislature seeks to that property values would not be adverse
avoid by empowering the Commission to ly affected. We consider the addition of
measure the nature and extent of the pro this dubious criterion constitutionally
posed use against the environment’scapaci barredand void.
tytotoleratetheuse.
[22] There appears no reason to be
[2 0 ] Of course, the Legislature may lieve that the Legislature, with its purpose
not endow the Commission with a naked of ecological protection appearing so clear
discretion and ithas here established crite ly,would have felt that the provision as to
ria to guide the Commission’s exercise of property values was indispensable to the
itspower.
effectiveness of the Act. We consider the
While the Legislature has used general section to be severable and that the validity
language in requiring proof that the pro of the remainder ofthe Act isunaffected.12
posed development has adequate provision
The invalidity of this portion of the cri
for fitting itself harmoniously into the ex teria has no effect upon the Commission’s
isting natural environment, the Legislature refusal to approve of the development.
has throughout the Act pointed out the The Commission’s findings make clear that
specific respects in which the development the effect of Lakesites’development upon
must not offend the public interest and in property values in Raymond, if any, did
which the development would he ecologi not influence the Commission’s decision.
cally inharmonious. The Act recognizes
[23] We have frequently held that the
the public interest in the preservation of
the environment because of itsrelationship standards which a statute sets out to guide
to the quality of human life, and in insist the determinations of administrative bodies
ing that the public’s existing uses of the must be sufficiently distinct so that the
environment and its enjoyment of the sce public may know what conduct is barred
nic values and natural resources receive and so that the law will be administered
consideration, the Legislature used terms according to the legislative will. The
capable of being understood in the context standards here are much more explicit than
of the entire bill. The Legislature has de those which we found to be insufficient in
clared the public interest in preserving the Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning
environment from anything more than Appeals, Me.. 241 A.2d 50 (1968) and those
• 2. In 1972 the Legislature, in Special Ses
sion <!uring the pendency of this appeal.
•diminaTv*! this condition as to property

values from the statute.
P.L. 1971,
Special Session 1972. Cli. 013, § 5 .
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of which we approved in State v.Johnson, much of the soilhas a high seasonal water
Me.,265A.2d 711 (1970_>.
table and is unsuitable for septic tank dis
posal of domestic sewage, the potential
We find that the standards which the danger to the environment from the dis
Act imposes upon the commission and the charge of sewage from 90 residences must
applicants are clear, explicit, rationally re be greater than the discharge from 2 or
lated to the purposes of the Act and are from 19. Drawing the line at 20 acres is
adequate guides for the conduct of both not a denial of equal protection. Ivanho-e
the Commission and the applicants.
Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S.
275, 78 S.Ct. 1174, 2 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1958m
D o c s the A c t den y the d e v e lo p e r eq u al p r o 
Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin.
tection o f the laze?
293 U.S. 194, 55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281
[24] Finally, Lakesites argues that the (1934).
Act denies a developer— and especially it
“A state ‘may direct its law against
— equal protection under the law. It
what
itdeems the evil as itactually ex
argues that the subdivider of over 20 acres
i
s
t
s
w
i
thout covering the whole field of
must receive the Commission’s approval
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e abuses, and it may do so none
while the subdivider of under 20 acres
faces no such requirements, and so itcon the less that the forbidden act does no:
differ in kind from those that are al
tends it is denied equal protection because
lowed. . . . ifa class isdeemed to
size, itsays, has no rational or reasonable
present a conspicuous example of wha:
correlation to the environmental impact.
A 21 acre subdivision, itargues, may con the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th
Amendment allows itto be dealt with al
tain 5 residences while one of 19 acres
may contain 19 residences. It iselementa though otherwise and merely logically
not distinguishable from others not em
ry thatthe Legislature may in itsjudgment
braced in the law’.” Hall v. Geigercreate classifications so long as they are
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 556-557, 37 S.
not arbitrary and are based upon actual
Ct.217,223,61 L.Ed.480 (1917).
differences in classes which differences
bear a substantial rational relation to the
“When a legal distinction is deter
public purpose sought to be accomplished
by the statute. In re Milo Water Compa mined, as no one doubts that itmay be.
between night and day, childhood and
ny, 128Me. 551. 149A. 299 ( 1950).
maturity, or any other extremes, a point
has to be fixed or a line has to be
[25] The purpose, as we have said,was
to control the locations of those commer drawn, or gradually picked out by suc
cessive decisions, to mark where the
cial and industrial developments which
could substantially adversely affect the en change takes place. Looked at by itself
vironment. The Legislature evidently con without regard to the necessity behind it
the line or point seems arbitrary. It
cluded that the size of adevelopment has a
distinct relationship to the amount of its might as well or nearly as well be a little
potential adverse impact upon the environ more toone sideor the other. But whet:
itis seen that a line or point there must
ment and concluded that at this time the
be, and that there is no mathematical or
public interest could best be served by
logical way of fixing itprecisely, the de
applying the admittedly severe restrictions
cision of the Legislature must be accept
of the new law to large developments.
ed unless we can say that itisvery wide
The justification of the distinction as to
of any reasonable mark.” Louisville Gas
size seems most clear in such legislation as
this. For example, inan area with no mu & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 LbS. 32.
nicipal sewage disposal system, such as in 41, 48 S.Ct. 423, 426, 72 L.Ed. 770, 775
(1927).
Spring Valley Development, and where
MSC - 3
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In State v. King, 135 Me. 5 18,3 A. 775
(1936) ue found no constitutional violation
in the classification of carriers which de
manded a certificate of public convenience
and necessity or a permit to operate as a
contract carrier of those carriers who op
erated beyond 15 miles of the point of re
ceipt, quoting- the language used by the
United States Supreme Court indcciditig'a
similarissue:
,

"'We think that the Legislature could
properly take these distinctions into ac
count, and that there was a reasonable
basis for differentiation with respect to
that class of operations. In this view,
the question issimply whether the fixing
of the radius at twenty-five miles is so
entirely arbitrary as to he unconstitu
tional. Itisobvious that the Legislature
in setting up such a zone would have to
draw the line somewhere, and unques
tionably it had a broad discretion as to
where the line should be drawn.’” Con
tinental Baking Company v. Woodring,
286 L.S. 3c2. 370-371, 52 S.CtV595, 601,
76 L.Ed. 1155, 1166 (1931).
We see no irrational or arbitrary dis
crimination in the application of the Act to
the large mere-subdivider. It ishis act of
subdividing that initially indicates the vol
ume of the impact likely to fall upon the
environment.
The distinction made by the Legislature
doesnot appear tobe unreasonable.

Mo. 753

While the Site Location Law hears a re
semblance to zoning ordinances 14 in that
both seek to restrict the use of land to
areas appropriate for the purpose, thebasic
purposes of the two laws are distinguisha
ble. We have said that the Legislature has
authorized municipalities to adopt zoning
ordinances
. . as an integral part of a
comprehensive plan for municipal devel
opment and promotion of the health,
safety, and general welfare of itsinhabi
tants. The geography, the economic and
industrial development, the residential
necessities, the nature and extent of resi
dential,business and industrial growth of
one municipality may be entirely differ
ent from those in another municipality.”
Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 16S,
200 A.2d 543,545-546 (1964).
The W rig h t Court saidalso:
”Iu considering the provisions of a
comprehensive zoning ordinance the leg
islative body may take into consideration
the nature and character of the commu
nity and of its proposed zone districts,
the nature and trend of the growth of
the community and that of surrounding
municipalities, the areas of undeveloped
property and such other factors that nec
essarily enter intoa reasonable and wellbalanced zoning ordinance.” Wright v.
Michaud, supra, 160 Me. at 173,200 A.2d
at 548.

[26] In furtherance of its claim that it [27] The Site Location Law on the
is denied equal protection, I.akcsites con other hand is not directed toward pro
tends that the statute would in effect au moting an orderly community growth relat
thorize the Commission to create spot ing one area of a community to all other
zones, administratively. The absence of a areas. It is not concerned with where a
requirement of a comprehensive plan such development takes place ingeneral butonly
as was demanded by the enabling statute that the development takes place in a man
which authorized municipalities to enact ner consistent with the needs of the public
zoning ordinances,13 Lakesitcs argues, re for a healthy environment. Jt did not
sults in piecemeal zoning with arbitrary grant the Commission the authority to de
distinctions.
termine where the location of a develop13. 30 M .R.S.A. $ 4953, repealed P.L. 1071,
eli. 465. <5 3. The comprehensive plan is
now re q u ire by 30 M .R.S.A. § 4002.

14. King R e so u n d Cu. v. Kin iron mental
Improvement Commission. M e., 270 A.24
X(i3, 80S (19701.

3CO A 2d— ’- l
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(Hidden, N.2 Me. 2"1, 303, 10 A. I'A, 16/
HS'-M embraces our present problem.
'rite pov. rs of t'u Environmental Jmprovernent Commission are wholly statuto
ry. King Resource' Company v. Environ
mental Improvement Commission, supra.
The authority todispose of issuespresented
at hearing which the statute gives the En
vironmental Improvement Commission is
to "make findings of fact and issue an
ord’
.r granting or denying permission
*>

The jurisdiction of the Law Court is
also entirely statutory. 33 M.R.S.A. § 487
provides for an appeal direct to the Law
Court from an o r d e r of the Commission.
The statub states:
"The cr.urt shall decide whether (he
commission acted regularly and within
the scope of its authority, and whether
the order is supported by substantial evi
dence, and on the basis of such decision
»
.that the appk'c.atiort of the Act
nt.v. enter iudgment affirming or nulli
..Resitct noos : offer..-i the t-revisions
fyingsuch determination.”,G
Cj * e
ither t.he state or fodcra! constifutions.
[29j There is completely absent any
statutory authority for the Commission to
MS'1 A strong policy against piecemeal present an interlocutory appeal to the Law
rip''ilrttC 7wiew has been manifest in the Court or for the Law Court to entertain
dec:Mons <>f this Court for many years. direct appeals on apiecemeal basis.
Hand v. Xivkerscn, 14tSMe. 4 6 5 ,467,‘>5 A.
Although I.akesites chose to confine its
2 d '1 v
.Si5 1953... The principle that:only
p
a
r
ticipation in the bearing to an attack on
fird judgments arc ripe for appellate re.'reserved in the structure of our the Commission’s jurisdiction and waived
Marne Civil Rides and in{cr!ocrtory review the right of cross-examination and of pre
is authorized only when ordered by a Jus- sentation of evidence, the Commission’sor
rive in the Superior Court in exceptional der fully "decides and disposes of the
STi.ations.15 The definition of final judg whole cause” and leaves “no further ques
ment as one which "fully decides and dis tions for the future consideration and
poses of the whole cause leaving: no fur judgment” of the Commission as to the de
ther questions for the future consideration velopment as presently proposed by Lakeand judgment of the court" Gilpatrick v. sites.
15. M.R.C.P.. Rule 72(e).
An excellent discussion of tli<> final,
juusrment rule is found in F o ld. MeKusick
and Wroth. >Fn?.• ^ Civil Practice. 73.1 73.5.
10

EPVi-rix' September 23. 1071 M.R.C.P..
Ride 73 wns amended b.v ad dins subsec
tion tfi wl.Ieli now provides tlmt an ap-

peal from an order of the Environmental
Improvement Commission to the Law
Court shall be taken “ in the same manner
as an appeal from a judgment of the. Su
perior Court in a civil notion” except for
the time pc-iod within who h the appeal
must be taken. This amendment supplies
no authority for interlocutory review.

MSC - 3

STATE v.MtKEOUGH
Cit*as.M*..?,(•< A.'2d7.V<
[30,31] We find that the Ounrin--.ion
acted regularly and within the scope of its
authority and that itsorder issupported In
substantial evidenced*
The Commission’s18 determination is af
firmed and theappeal isdenied.
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3.
of Maine ex rel. Joseph E. B REN
NAN, Attorney General and the Board
of Environmental Protection

S T A T E

v.
R. D. R E A L T Y CORPORATION.
Supreme Ju d ic ia l Court of Maine.

Dec. 18, 1975.
State appealed from a judgment of
the Superior Court, Sagadahoc County, de
nying an injunction prohibiting construc
tion of subdivision. The Supreme Judicial
Court, Pomeroy, J., held that where land
had been divided and lots surveyed and
numbered prior to September 23, 1971, sub
division was in existence on such date and
thus not subject to municipal subdivision
law; and that subdivision project which
was being developed in 1967 and 1968 was
exempt from requirements of the siteloca
tion of development law which does not
apply to developments under construction
on January 1, 1970.
Appeal denied.
1. Municipal Corporations <£=43

Statute allowing municipal officers to
act in the place of a planning board for
purposes of approving proposed subdivi
sions applies only if municipality has
adopted a land subdivision ordinance; in
the absence of a duly enacted regulation
for subdivisions no approval by municipal
officers is required for a subdivision. 30
M.R.S.A. § 4956.

Health and Environment <£=>25.5

Where there was active and contin
uous development of subdivision project
during 1967, 1968 and 1969, project was
exempt from the site location of develop
ment law which does not apply todevelop
ments under construction on January 1,
1970, relieving developer of duty tocomply
with the notification requirements of such
law. 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481 et seq., 482, 483,
4S8.
4. Health and Environment <£=25.5

A determination that a subdivision de
velopment is subject to regulation by the
Environmental Improvement Commission
or exempt therefrom by the grandfather
clause should be made preliminarily by
Commission itself; judicial intervention in
the controversy should take place prior to
any administrative determination only in
rare instances where issue issolely one of
law or where relief sought is beyond ca
pacity of administrative agency to give or
where injunctive relief is sought to main
tain status quo pending hearing and order.
38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
<£=228, 229

“Primary jurisdiction” and “exhaus
tion of administrative remedies” are both
closely allied in basic function and concept
for each rests on premise that an agency
has primary authority to make certain
decisions deemed relevant to determination
of controversv.
6. Administrative Law and Procedure <£=>229

2. Municipal Corporations <£=43

Where land had been divided into lots
and lots had been surveyed, marked and
numbered before September 23, 1971, sub
division was in existence on September 23,
1971 and thus not subject to municipal
subdivision law which was not applicable
to subdivisions in actual existence on
September 23, 1971. 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956.

“Exhaustion” is a defense to judicial
review of administrative action not as yet
deemed complete.
7. Administrative Law and Procedure <£=>228

“Primary jurisdiction” determines
whether the court or agency should make
initial decision.

349 A .2d— 13 Vt
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under the provisions of 38 M.R.S.A. §4SS1
The ‘‘doctrine of primary jurisdiction” was valid.
isnot an attempt to allocate power between
This appeal by the State was seasonably
courts and administrative agencies.
entered following the denial of a complaint
for injunction.

8. Administrative Law and Procedure C='228

9. Administrative Law and Procedure C=|228

We deny the appeal.
As a matter of judicial policy, court
will generally not decide an issue concern The factsare not indispute. Inlate 1966
ing which an administrative agency has or early 1967, the property in question was
decision capacity until after agency has acquired by the Dube family. A corpora
considered the issue.
tion was subsequently formed with family
members as sole stockholders with the in
tention of developing the area sufficiently
t
Cabanne Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Au o permit the sale of lots.
gusta, for plantiff.
In 1967 a contractor was hired to clear
5
m
iles of rough roads to enable prospec
Marshall, Raymond & Beliveau by John
t
i
v
e
purchasers to be shown the property
G. Marshall, Lewiston, for defendant.
during periods of favorable weathe-.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEAIn that same year a cottage was builton
THERBEE, POMEROY, WERXICK,
t
h
e
property. The cottage was used as an
ARCHIBALD and DELAHANTY, JJ.
office and occasionally as an overnight
dwelling. Electricity was connected to the
cottage. A small area was cleared and
POMEROY, Justice.
made suitable for use as a small airplane
The jurisdiction of the Maine Board of landing area.
Environmental Protection to issue or deny
In 1968 an engineer was employed to
approval of a development under the Site prepare a rough plan of the area and to
Location of Development statute, 38 cause the lot sketched on the plan to be
M.R.S.A. § 481 et seq., is in issue in this generally indicated on the surface of the
case as a result of the denial of a perma earth. This work was completed during
nent injunction.
that year.
That appellee, R. D. Realty Corporation
Many thousands of dollars have been
is creating a subdivision within the mean expended by the developer in preparation
ing of 38 M.R.S.A. § 482(5) is not de ofthedevelopment forthe saleoflots.
nied.
All these facts were found as fact by
t
h
e
presiding Justice.
Also agreed is that appellee did not
‘‘notify the commission in writing of his
The complaint for injunction was in two
[sic] intent and of the nature and location Counts.
of such development” before commencing
Count I of the complaint alleged a vio
its construction. 38 M.R.S.A. § 483.
lationof the Site Location of Development
The complaint for injunction was denied law, 38 M.R.S.A. § 481 et seq.
as the result of a finding by the Court that
the claim asserted by appellee that itwas
Count II alleged violation of the munici
exempt from the provisions of the Act pal subdivision law, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956.
I. "T h is Article shall not apply to any de
velopment in existence or in possession of ap-

plicable state orlocal licenses tooperate or un
der construction on Jan u ary 1, 1970 . . . .”
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In ruling as he did the presiding Justice
based his conclusion that there was no
violationof law on Sec.488 of 38 M.R.S.A.
and Sec. 4956 of 30 M.R.S.A.
■
Sec. 488 provides that:

At all times material hereto the Town
of Phippsburg had no regulation controlling the subdivision of land. The State
points to subsection B of Section 1, 30
M.R.S.A. § 4956, which reads, in part, as
follows:

“This Article shall not apply to any de
velopment in existence or in possession
of applicable state or local license to
operate or under construction on Jan
uary 1, 1970.”
The conclusion which the Justice below
reached was:
“I find that this development was ‘under
construction’ on January 1, 1970, and
therefore is exempted by section 48S
from application of the Site Location of
Development Law.”

“In a municipality which does not have
a planning board, the municipal officers
shall act in itsstead for the purposes of
this section.”

As to Count II of the complaint, the
Justice referred to 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956,
paragraph 5, which reads as follows:

This, the appellant says, requires that
the municipal officers give approval to a
proposed subdivision before itcan be law
fully made, even though the municipality
has no planning board and has adopted no
regulations for subdivisions.
With this argument we cannot agree.
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 came into being as
a result of Public Laws of Maine, 1957,
Chapter 405. This Chapter was entitled
“An Act Revising the General Laws Relat
ing to Municipalities.” Section 1 amended
the Revised Statutes by adding thereto a
new chapter, which itnumbered 90-A.

‘‘This section shall not apply to proposed
subdivisions approved by the planning
board or the municipal officials prior to
September 23, 1971 in accordance with
Section 61 of Chapter 90-A (of which
laws then in effect nor shall they apply
s
u
b
division of land is a part), provides:
to subdivisions as defined by this section
in actual existence on September 23,
“A municipality m ay act for the purpose
1971 that did not require approval under
of municipal development according to
prLr law . . ..”
the following provisions.” (Emphasis
supplied)
He then concluded as follows:
Among those provisions is that with
‘‘I find that the area under considera
w
h
i
ch we are presently concerned: “A
tion was subdivided prior to September
m
u
n
i
ipality m a y regulate the subdivision
23, 1971 and that the lots were actually of lc
a
nd.”
surveyed and marked either by steel pins
or regular markers and numbered at a
This was merely an Enabling Act.
time when no approval was required by
Certainly it cannot be argued that the
the municipality under prior law and
S
e
l
ectmen of the Town of Phippsburg had
therefore was exempted by the terms of
a
u
t
h
ority to regulate the subdivision of
30 M.R.S.A. Section 4956.”
land inthe absence of any ordinance enact
The “prior law” was the municipal sub ed pursuant to this Enabling Act. Since
division law as itread in 1964. This sec the Town of Phippsburg did not see fitto
tion provided, among other things, “A adopt a subdivision ordinance until long
municipality may regulate the subdivision after the subdivision was commenced in
of land.”
1967, we think it apparent there was no
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The answer is: “Subdivision as defined
requirement of municipal approval for the
by this section.”
subdivision at that time.
[1] We read the section to which ap What section?
pellant refers, i. e.,
The answer is: “Section 9456, para
g
r
a
ph 5, of 30 M.R.S.A.”
“In a municipality which does not have a
planning board, the municipal officers
A subdivision was defined by the Act in
shall act in itsstead for the purposes of effect at all times material to this case as
this section.”
“A division into three or more lots in
urban areas or four or more lots in
tomean thatinany municipality which had rural areas . . . .”
adopted a land subdivision ordinance or
There isno dispute in this case but that
regulation (which Phippsburg had not) if
there was no planning board inthe munici there had been a division of the total par
pality which could approve the plat of a cel of land into many lots and as the pre
proposed subdivision, the municipal offi siding Justice found: “these lots were
cers were directed to act in the stead of a actually surveyed and marked by steel pins
planning board for the purpose of giving or regular markers and numbered” before
September 23, 1971, the critical date under
approval.
the statute.
In the absence of a duly enacted regula
[2 ] We are satisfied then that the pre
tion for subdivisions no municipal officer’s
s
i
d
ing Justice was correct in his finding
approval was required for a subdivision
under the statute as itread atthe time this that the subdivision was “in actual exist
ence” within the meaning of the applicable
subdivision was undertaken.
statute.
We hold the presiding Justice was cor
rect in his conclusion that the subdivision
[3] We likewise conclude the presiding
in this case was made at a time when no Justice was correct in his finding that 38
approval was required by the municipality. M.R.S.A. § 48S exempted this development
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956.
from the application of the Site Location
of Development law because “the develop
Appellant directs attention to 30 ment was under construction on January 1,
M.R.S.A. § 4956 and observes that to be 1970.”
free of the application of the municipal
subdivision law, the subdivision must have
The appellant argues that the appellee
been “in actual existence” on September had abandoned whatever “grandfather”
23, 1971.
rights which existed because, it says,
n
The Legislature’sintention, the appellant othing was done to prosecute the develop
says to quote from its brief, isclear “that ment for a period of five years.
in the case of projects for which municipal
The presiding Justice found as fact
approval was not required only those ac based on believable evidence that there was
tually completed by September 23, 1971, active and continuous development of the
would qualify for grandfather’s rights.”
project during the years 1967, 1968 and
1969.
Again we must disagree.
In view of this finding which issupport
The statute uses the words “in actual
e
d
by credible evidence, it becomes un
existence” and not the words “actually
n
e
c
e
ssary to discuss what period of in
completed.”
activity will justify a conclusion there has
What was “inactual existence?”
been an abandonment of the subdivision.
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That the Superior Court had jurisdiction
38 M.R.S.A. § 485 contains, among other
of the subject matter and the parties is things, provision that the Environmental
undoubted.
Improvement Commission
That this Court had jurisdiction to con “may at any time with respect to any
sider and decide the appeal from the denial
person who has commenced construction
of the injunction by the Superior Court
or operation of any development without
Justice is likewise apparent.
having first notified the commission
pursuant to section 483, schedule and
We have, therefore, reviewed this record
conduct a public hearing in the manner
and have concluded that the complaint for
provided by section 484 with respect to
an injunction was properly denied. This
such development.”
isour decision in the case.
The following paragraph in Section 485
However, we do have another concern. provides that the Commission
This is a matter which was not raised by
the parties, either in their briefs or at oral
“may request the Attorney General to
argument, but which we choose to discuss
enjoin any person, who has commenced
in some detail.
construction or operation of any develop
ment without first having notified the
The complaint for injunction recitesthat
commission pursuant to section 483,
‘‘the plaintiff, Attorney General of the
from further construction or operation
State of Maine, is acting for himself and
p
ending such hearing and order.”
on behalf of the Board of Environmental
Protection.”
It thus becames clear that the statutory
s
c
heme envisions that ordinarily the En
Two separate and distinct statutes, he
v
i
r
onmental Improvement Commission will
alleges, are authority for the action taken:
make
the determination that a development
to wit, 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-4882 and 30
i
s
o
r
i
snot exempt from regulation by the
M.R.S.A. 4956.
Environmental Improvement Commission,
in the first instance. The scheme con
58 M.R.S.A. §486 provides as follows:
templates judicial participation in deter
“All orders issued by the commission mining the question inissueonly after such
under this subchapter shall be enforced issue ispreliminarily resolved by the Com
by the Attorney General. 'Ifcompliance mission after hearing, unless
with any order of the commission is not
(a) it clearly appears the issue is only
had within the time period,therein specione of law, or
f’
.ed, the commission shall immediately
notify the Attorney General of this fact.
(b) harm will result before the Commis
\\ithin 30 days thereafter the Attorney
sion can act ifitisultimately found
General shall bring an appropriate civil
t
he development isnot exempt from
actiondesignedtosecure compliance with
r
egulation by the Commission, (in
such order.”
which case the status quo is main
tained “pending such hearing and
30 M.R.S.A. § 4956(5) provides in part
that:
order” (under 38 M.R.S.A. § 485)).
The judicial participation is usually ini
“The Attorney General, the municipal
ly or the appropriate municipal officers tiated either by appeal from the Commismay institute proceedings to enjoin the ion’s Order under the provisions of 38
violation of this section.”
M.R.S.A. § 487 in which case appeal isto
2. Provision for judicial review of any order of the Board of Environmental Protection is
found in 38 M .R.S.A. § 487.
Vs.Rep. 344-351 A .2d— 13
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the Supreme Judicial Court sitting as a
Law Court3or by invoking 38 M.R.S.A. §
486, in which case “appropriate civil ac
tion” (i. e., complaint for injunction), is
initiated in the Superior Court.
In I n R e S p r i n g V a lle y D ev e lo p m e n t,
Me., 300 A.2d 736 (1973), one of the issues
was, as here, whether or not the action of
the developer was subject to regulation by
the Environmental Improvement Commis
sion or exempt therefrom by the “grand
father clause.”
There, as here, the Commission learned
of the developer’s activity, even though it
had given no notice to the Commission of
its intended development.
Upon learning of the developer’s activi
tiesthe Commission gave notice of hearing
as provided by 3S M.R.S.A. § 483 and pro
ceeded to adjudicate the issue.
When that issue was decided adversely
to the developer, appeal was taken to the
Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law
Court pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. § 487.
When judicial participation in the con
troversy was invoked there had already
been a preliminary resolution of the issues
by the Commission, which determination
was made afterhearingpursuant toSection
483.

nation only in those rare instances where
the issue issolely one of law or where the
relief sought is beyond the capacity of the
administrative agency to give, or where
injunctive relief is sought under 38
M.R.S.A. § 485 to maintain the status quo
“pending such hearing and order.”4
We see “the doctrine of primary juris
diction” as the occasion for this rule.5
In S t a n t o n v . T r u s t e e s o f S t . J o s e p h ’s
Me., 233 A.2d 718 (1967), we
accepted the “doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies” as a general prin
ciple.
C o lle g e ,

We recognize that the “doctrine of pri
mary jurisdiction” is somewhat different
from the “doctrine of exhaustion of ad
ministrative remedies” and of “ripeness.”
Nevertheless, they are closely akin.
P u b lic

U tilitie s

C o m m issio n

v.

U nited

355 U.S. 534, 78 S.Ct. 446, 2 L.Ed.
2d 470 (1958).
S ta te s,

[5] “Primary jurisdiction” and “ex
haustion of administrative remedies” are
both closely allied in basic function and
concept. Each rests on the premise that
an agency has the primary authority to
make certain decisions deemed relevant to
the determination of the controversy.

[4] We decide that in all future cases [6] “Exhaustion” emerges as a defense
determination that a development is sub to judicial review of an administrative ac
ject to regulation by the Environmental tion not as yet deemed complete.
Improvement Commission, or exempt
therefrom by the “grandfather clause” (38
[7] “Primary jurisdiction” determines
M.R.S.A. § 488), should be made prelimi whether the Court or the agency should Discussion of
narily by the Commission itself. Judicial make the initial decision. U n ite d S t a t e s : primary ju risd ic tio n
intervention in the controversy will take W e ste rn P a c . R . C o., 352 U.S. 59, 77 S.Ct exhaustion of
place prior to any administrative determi- 161, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956).
remedies.
3. See:

K in g R e s o u r c e s Co. v. E n v ir o n m e n ta l

I m p ro v e m e n t C om m ission ,

Me., 270 A.2d S63

(3970).

4. We can envision the situation in which
a developer may go on the site of a develop
ment with large earth-moving equipment and
in a matter of hours make irreparable chang
es in the contour of the earth. In a case such
as this, for example, a petition by the Com

mission for injunctive relief ought be enter
tained.
5. See:

A t c h i s o n , T o p e k a <£- S a n t a F e ' R a i h c a y
C o m p a n y v . W i c h i t a B o a r d o f T r a d e , 412

U .S. 800, 93 S.Ct. 2367, 37 L.Ed.2d 3o0
(1973) ; see also N e w E n g l a n d T e l e p h o n e 4
T e l e g r a p h C o . v. P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s C o m m i s 
s i o n , Me., 329 A.2d 792, SOI (1973).
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[8] The “doctrine of primary jurisdic
tion” is not an attempt to allocate power
between the courts and the administrative
agencies. Authorities agree "the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction” was established in
T e x a s & P a c . R a ilw a y v . A b ile n e C otto n

plaint it is alleged that confiscation of
property or other violation of constitu
tional right results from such ruling or
order, the law court shall exercise its
own independent judgment as to both
law and facts.”

204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.
Even though the statute by its express
Ed. 553 (1907). While in that decision
t
e
r
ms directed thatthe Law Court exercise
there was no explicit reliance on Commis
i
t
s
own independent judgment, both as to
sion expertise as the controlling considera
l
a
w
and facts, we ordered that
tion, latercases rationalizedthe application
of the rule on that basis.
“ . . . [T]he Public Utilities Com
mission is herewith directed promptly to
[9] As a matter of ju d ic ia l p o lic y we
take out evidence, inaccordance with the
will generally not decide an issue concern foregoing delineations, from New Eng
ing which an administrative agency has de land and any other of the parties who
cision capacity until after the agency has
might wish to present evidence.
considered the issue.
“After ithas heard and taken such ad
One of the obvious results of the crea dition evidence the Commission, as it
tion of the Maine Board of Environmental
deems appropriate by reason thereof, is
Protection isthatan agency has been creat authorized, in accordance with Section
ed which has developed an expertise in re 305, to modify itsoriginal findings, con
solving the special problems with which it clusions and Order, or tomake new find
is, by law, required to become concerned.
ings and conclusions and a new Order.
Merest prudence suggests that the courts
“The Commission shall report all the
ought to have the benefit of the Commis
a
d
d
itional evidence which ithas taken to
sion's prior expert evaluation of contro
t
h
e
Law Court promptly and in manner
verted facts, before itintervenes in a con
s
u
c
h
that, as required by Section 305,
troversy over which the Commission has
jurisdiction, (except to use legal processes
“*. . . the proof may be brought as
to maintain the status quo pending hearing
nearly as possible down to the date of its
and decision of the issue in controversy by
report thereof to the court.’
th e C o m m issio n .)
“Ifthe Commission has modified itsorig
An example of the application of this
inal findings of fact or made new find
rationale by thisCourt isL e w is to n , G re e n e
ings of fact, or modified itsoriginal Or
& M . T . C o. v . N e w E n g la n d T . & T . C o.,
der, or made a new Order, it shall file
Me, 299 A.2d 895 (1973). There this
with the Law Court such modified find
Court was concerned with 35 M.R.S.A.
ings of fact or Order or such new find
§ 305. That section provides, in part:
ings of fact or Order, if any.”
“ . . . [I]nallcasesinwhich thejust This Court had earlier established the
ness or reasonableness of a rate, toll or principlethateven where independentjudg
charge by any public utilityor the consti ment as to facts is mandated, the Law
tutionality of any ruling or order of the Court
commission is in issue, the law court
“ . . . may nonetheless exercise the
shall have jurisdiction upon a complaint
prescribed ‘independent judgment’as to
to review, modify, amend or annul any
facts and yet in that very process be
ruling or order of the commission, but
‘
informed and aided’by findings of the
only tothe extent of the unlawfulness of
P
ublic Utilities Commission.” C e n tr a l
such ruling or order. If in such comO il C o.,
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M a in e P o w e r C o m p an y v . P u b lic U tili

156 Me. 295, 304, 163 A.
2d 762, 768 (1960).
In the ease now before us the Board
of Environmental Protection has capacity
to determine the mixed question of law
and fact as towhether the development be
ing operated by the defendant is or is not
exempt from the requirements of 38 M.
R.S.A. § 4S1 et seq.
As to allcases arising subsequent to this
date, determination of all issues within
its legal capacity should be made by the
administrative tribunal before judicial in
tie s C o m m issio n ,

MSC - 4

tervention will be invoked, except in those
instances earlier described.
In thiscase the factual basis for the de
nialof injunctive reliefhas been thorough
ly developed before the Justice of the Su
perior Court. The issues of law have been
ably presented by both counsel. Under the
circumstances we consider it appropriate
todecide thiscase.
The entry must be,
Appeal denied.
All Justices concurring.
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1. Zoning @=*5
Municipalities taking advantage of zon
ing powers granted by statute are bound by
legislative definitions.
2. Zoning <3=>278
Creation of specified number of camp
sites did not constitute a division into lots
contemplated by statute empowering mu
nicipalities to make zoning laws respecting
approval of a “subdivision.” 30 M.R.S.A.
§ 4956.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

3. Statutes

181(1)

That construction should be placed on
statute as may best answer intention which
legislators had in view, and when determi
nable and ascertained, courts must give ef
fect to it.

TOWN OF ARUNDEL
v.
Morrill and Frances SWAIN.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
June 8, 1977.
Town brought action to enjoin landowners from violation of local subdivision
ordinance. The Superior Court, York Coun
ty, entered judgment for the landowners
and the town appealed. The Supreme Judi
cial Court, Delahanty, J., held that: (1)
town was bound by legislative definition of
subdivision in enabling statute; (2) creation
of a campground was not within the statu
tory definition of a subdivision into lots,
and (3) town had no jurisdiction over cre
ation of campgrounds.
Appeal denied.
9. We do not read Carey v. Mackey, 82 Me. 516,

20 A. 84 (1890) as inconsistent with our analy
sis here.
In Carey this Court interpreted a silent Flori
da divorce decree as leaving intact a previous
separation agreement. Several factors, how
ever, diminish the relevance of Carey for
present purposes. First, while the Court held
the agreement untouched by the Florida decree,
it modified the agreement itself by crediting
amounts paid under the decree to amounts due

4. Municipal Corporations «=>43
Statute relating to approval of subdivi
sions by municipalities and speaking of a
“division” into lots contemplates the split
ting off of an interest in land and creation,
by means of one of various disposition mod
es recited in statute, of an interest in anoth
er.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

5. Statutes o=>188
Words are to be given their plain and
natural meaning and are to be construed
according to their natural import in com
mon and approved usage.
under the contract. Second, Florida apparently
did not then recognize separation agreements
as valid, so the Florida divorce court could not
have modified what was to it an illegal con
tract. Third, for the same reason there was no
Florida statutory equivalent of § 61.14 to clari
fy the issues raised in Carey. Fourth, it could
be argued that the lump sum awarded by the
decree was not inconsistent with the contractu
al provision of periodic payments.
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6.

Municipal Corporations <@=►43
Campground was not composed of req
uisite “lots” referred to in statute relating
to municipality’s approval of a subdivision
defined as a division into “lots.” 30 M.R.
S.A. § 4956.

See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
7. Statutes
181(2), 184, 208
Absent legislative definition terms
must be given meaning consistent with
overall statutory context and must be con
strued in light of subject matter, purpose of
statute, occasion and necessity for law, and
consequences of particular interpretation.
Smith, Elliott, Wood & Nelson, P.A. by
Alan S. Nelson, Saco, for plaintiff.
Reagan, Ayer & Adams by Wayne T.
Adams, Kennebunk, for defendants.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and POMER
OY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ.
DELAHANTY, Justice.
By its complaint, the Town of Arundel
(the Town) sought to enjoin defendants,
Morrill and Frances Swain (the Swains),
from violation of a local subdivision ordi
nance. From judgment entered for defend
ants, the Town appeals. We deny the ap
peal.
Pursuant to 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956,1 the
Town enacted a subdivision ordinance on
March 17, 1972 which required local approv
al of subdivision developments. Although
they believed that their proposed camp
ground was not a subdivision and that,
therefore, the Arundel Planning Board (the
Board) had no jurisdiction over their en
deavor, the Swains nevertheless submitted
their plan to the Board on January 25, 1975.
Under their preliminary plan, they sought
permission to construct a campground, con
taining 101 campsites, with an operating 12
1. 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956 provides in pertinent part:
2. Municipal review and regulation.

season extending from Memorial Day to
Labor Day. A camper would pay a fee to
the Swains in return for the right to occupy
a campsite for “a period of one day, several
days or a longer period.” Each campsite
would have its own electrical, water, and
sewer outlets and, in addition, all campers
would have access to certain common facili
ties including toilets, showers and washing
machines.
The Swains’ plan was approved on May 5,
1975. But then on May 27, 1975 that ap
proval was rescinded, allegedly in order to
hold an additional public hearing as re
quired by the Town subdivision ordinance.
On June 9, 1975 the Town filed a complaint
alleging that the respondents had willfully'
disregarded the rescission and had proceed
ed with the construction of roads and build
ings for the campground without the requi
site approval. Averring that irreparable
injury would be suffered if the subdivision
ordinance were permitted to be so openly
violated, plaintiff asked that the Swains be
enjoined from continuing with their en
deavor.
On October 28, 1975 the defendants, pur
suant to the camping area licensing provi
sions contained in 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 2491 et
seq., were granted a license from the State
Department of Health and Welfare to oper
ate a campground of seventy-five sites.
The license provided that an additional
twenty-six sites could be requested if an
adequate water supply were established.
On December 2, 1975, the Swains submitted
to the Board a revised plan for 101 sites,
although they specifically stated therein
that they were not recognizing Board juris
diction over the proposed campground.
Approximately two months later, on Feb
ruary 3, 1976, the Board granted approval
for seventy-five campsites, but it limited its
approval to only twenty-five campsites in
the first year, with construction of an addi
tional twenty-five sites in the second year
and twenty-five in the third year being
dependent upon certain factors such as the
A. Reviewing authority. All requests for
subdivision approval shall be reviewed by the
municipal planning board
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impact of the campground on road condi
tions and traffic safety.
On May 26, 1976 the Town moved to
amend its original complaint, inserting a
claim that the respondents had begun de
velopment of and intended to operate more
than twenty-five campsites in the first
year. Plaintiff asked that an order be is
sued requiring the Swains to comply with
the Board conditions of February 3, 1976.
The presiding Justice issued an order de
nying the Town’s motion, finding that the
Town had failed to show a “sufficient juris
dictional basis for the granting of such ex
traordinary relief” and that “there has been
no showing of irreparable harm.” In re
sponse to plaintiff's motion for findings of
fact and conclusions of law, the court filed
a decree in which it said:
The Court concludes as a matter of law
that a campground is not a “subdivision”
within the meaning of Title 30 M.R.S.A.
Section 4956 as amended and, therefore
that Petitioner lacks jurisdiction over the
proposed development of a campground
by respondents.
A final judgment was entered on May 10 ,
1977.2
[ 1 ] The sole question to be resolved in
this case is whether the proposed camp
ground is a “subdivision” within the mean
ing of 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956. If it is a subdivi
sion, then the local ordinance enacted pur
suant to § 4956 is applicable and the Town
has jurisdiction over the proposed use.3

tract or parcel of land into three or more
lots within any five-year period whether
accomplished by sale, lease, development,
building or otherwise . .
We do
not believe that the creation of a specified
number of campsites is the type of “divi
sion” into “lots” which was contemplated by
the legislature when it enacted § 4956. Al
though we intend to intimate no opinion on
the issue, we recognize that a campground
might fall within the scope of the phrase
“development, building or otherwise.”
However, since we find lacking the pre
scribed “division” into “lots,” we remain
convinced that a campground does not qual
ify as a “subdivision” within the purview of
§ 4956.
[3]
In construing the statute, we must
bear in mind the fundamental rule that
[s]uch a construction ought be put upon a
statute as may best answer the intention
which the Legislators had in view, and
when determinable and ascertained, the
courts must give effect to it. In re
Spring Valley Development, Me., 300
A.2d 736, 741 citing K ing Resources Co. v.
Environmental Improvem ent Commission,

Me., 270 A.2d 863,869(1970).
See also Natale v. Kennebunkport Board o f
Zoning Appeals, Me., 363 A.2d 1372 (1976);
Emple K nitting Mills v. City o f Bangor, 155
Me. 270, 153 A.2d 118 (1959). In Blier v.
Inhabitants o f Town o f Fort Kent, Me., 273

A.2d 732 (1971) we said:

[2] A “subdivision” is defined in the
statute as “ . . . the division of a

Legislative expression must be read in
the light of the lawmakers’ purpose as

2. For clarification purposes, we note that the
presiding Justice ordered the Town’s motion
for a temporary and permanent injunction de
nied on June 23, 1976. Judgment was entered
accordingly. However, no order affirmatively
granted relief for defendants until May 10, 1977
when, upon stipulation of counsel at oral argu
ment and by leave of Court, a judgment of July
23, 1976 was finally filed. That judgment not
only denied petitioner’s motion but also direct
ed that “final judgment upon the Complaint is
ordered for the Defendants.”

that the definition in the enabling statute con
trols, we can safely assume that the definition
of subdivision is identical in both the ordinance
and the enabling statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956.
See The Peninsula Corp. v. Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 149 Conn. 627, 183 A.2d 271 (1962);
Pratt v. Adams, 229 Cal.App.2d 602, 40 Cal.
Rept. 505 (1964); Stoker v. Town o f Irvington,
71 N.J.Super. 370, 177 A.2d 61 (1961); see
generally 3 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning
and Planning § 4 (3d ed. 1972). We fully agree
with the principle that “[mjunicipalities taking
advantage of the powers granted by the statute
are bound by the legislative definition.” Stok
er, supra, 71 N.J.Super. at 378, 177 A.2d at 66.

3. The local subdivision ordinance enacted by
the Town has not been made a part of the
record on appeal. However, since we are in
accord with those jurisdictions which have held
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the object the statute designs to accom
plish oftentimes furnishes the right key
to the true meaning of any statutory
clause or provision. Id. at 734 citing Mid
dleton’s Case, 136 Me. 108, 3 A.2d 434
(1939).
Ofttimes cited as a fundamental purpose
of subdivision legislation is the protection of
the purchaser or lessee of land from unscru
pulous developers. See, e. g., 3 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning § 2
(3d ed. 1972). This goal is obviously only
relevant when land is purchased or leased
from a developer.4
Some enlightenment as to the lawmakers’
intent can be gleaned from a reading of the
enforcement section, 30 M.R.S.A. § 4956,
which provides that a fine shall be charged
against
[a]ny person, firm, corporation or other
• legal entity who sells, leases, or conveys
fo r consideration, offers or agrees to sell,
lease or convey for consideration any land

not happen when a camper temporarily oc
cupies a campsite.

[5, 6] We also believe that a campyground is not composed of the requisite
“lots” prescribed in the statute. Words are
to be given their “plain and natural mean
ing” and are to be construed according to
their “natural import in common and ap
proved usage.” Moyer v. Board o f Zoning
Appeals, Me., 233 A.2d 311, 317 (1967) citing
1 E. Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice § 184
(2d ed. 1953). A “lot” has been defined as
“a measured parcel of land having fixed
boundaries.” Webster’s Third New Inter
national Dictionary 1338 (1971). Nowhere
in the stipulated facts before us is it stated
that the campsites have clearly delineated
or fixed boundaries, and we cannot assume
that they are so precisely measured off .5
Pelletier v. Dwyer, Me, 334 A.2d 867 (1975);
Trafton v. Hill, 80 Me. 503, 15 A. 64 (1888).

Here, a single tract of land is involved,
whether before or after its use as a camp
ground. The situation is akin to the rent
ing or occupying of space in an exhibition
hall, a parking lot, or a drive-in theater. Of
course, in all of these situations, land is
somewhat parceled off, each customer be
ing given a certain space to occupy for a
certain period of time. But in our opinion
this is not the type of “division” into “lots”
[4]
Accordingly, it is our judgment that which the legislature intended to regulate
when the statute speaks of a “division,” it when it enacted § 4956.
contemplates the splitting off of an interest
[7] In our analysis we attem pt to imple
in land and the creation, by means of one of
the various disposition modes recited in ment the sound principle of construction
§ 4956, of an interest in another. This does that
in a subdivision which has not been ap
proved as required by this section .
(emphasis added).
Since the sanctions are aimed at those who
sell, lease or convey for consideration (or
those who offer or agree to do so), it may
reasonably be inferred that the legislature
intended to protect only purchasers, lessees,
or those receiving land for consideration.

Specifically speaking of Maine’s subdivision
law, one commentator has noted that the state
and municipality are interested in
accurate surveying, monumenting and legal
description of properties to prevent fraud, to
facilitate the marketing and conveyancing of
and to enable accurate tax assessment and
collection[,]
considerations relevant only when land is
bought and sold. O. Delogu, “Suggested Revi
sions in Maine’s Planning and Land Use Con
trol Legislation Part II,” 21 Maine L.Rev. 151,
158 (1969).
5. Although, in our estimation, a campground is
not divided into “lots” within the meaning of
§ 4956, this conclusion is not based upon our
4.

holding in Robinson v. Board o f Appeals, Me.,
356 A.2d 196 (1976), a case strongly relied
upon by defendants. According to the Swains,
Robinson held that “the application of lot size
requirements to campgrounds is absurd.” It is
important to point out that our decision not to
apply lot size requirements there was bottomed
on an initial finding that a campground was not
a “dwelling” to which the local zoning law
would be applicable. Our holding today that a
campground is not divided into “lots" is based
solely on what we consider to be the common
and natural meaning of the word. Defendants’
reliance on Robinson is misplaced.
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[ajbsent a legislative definition, the terms
[“divide” and “lot”] must be given a
meaning consistent with the overall stat
utory context, and be construed in the
light of the subject matter, the purpose
of the statute, the occasion and necessity
for the law, and the consequences of a
particular interpretation. Finks v. Maine
State Highway, Me., 328 A.2d 791, 798
(1974) citing Grudnosky v. Bislow, 251
Minn. 496, 88 N.W.2d 847 (1958).
Having found the inherent policies of the
subdivision law heavily directed toward pro
tection of one taking an interest in land (as
well as promotion of planned regulation of
community growth), we conclude that a
campground is not a subdivision within the
scope of § 4956 and that therefore the
Arundel Planning Board has no jurisdiction
over the Swains’ proposed endeavor.
The entry must be
Appeal denied.
All Justices concur.
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Maine Superior Court Cases

RULES O F CIVIL PROCEDURE
R U L E 80B.

R E V IE W O F G O V E R N M E N T A L A C T IO N

( a ) M ode o f R e v ie w . W h e n re v ie w b y th e S u p e r io r C o u rt,
w h e th e r b y a p p e a l o r o th e rw is e , of a n y a c tio n o r f a ilu r e o r r e 
fu s a l to a c t b y a g o v e r n m e n ta l ag e n c y , in c lu d in g a n y d e p a r t
m e n t, b o a rd , c o m m is s io n , o r o ffic e r, is p ro v id e d b y s t a t u t e o r is
o th e rw is e a v a ila b le b y law , p ro c e e d in g s f o r su c h re v ie w s h a ll, e x 
c e p t a s o th e rw is e p ro v id e d b y s ta tu te , be g o v e rn e d b y th e s e R u le s
o f C iv il P r o c e d u r e a s m o d ifie d b y th is ru le . T h e c o m p la in t a n d
s u m m o n s s h a ll b e s e r v e d u p o n th e a g e n c y a n d all p a r ti e s in a c 
c o rd a n c e w ith t h e p ro v is io n s o f R u le 4 . T h e c o m p la in t s h a ll in 
c lu d e a co n c ise s t a t e m e n t o f th e g ro u n d s u p o n w h ic h t h e p la in 
t i f f c o n te n d s h e is e n title d to re lie f, a n d s h a ll d e m a n d t h e re lie f
to w h ic h h e b e lie v e s h im s e lf e n title d . N o re s p o n siv e p le a d in g
n e e d b e file d u n le s s r e q u ir e d b y s t a t u t e o r b y o r d e r o f t h e c o u rt,
b u t in a n y e v e n t a n y p a r t y n a m e d a s a d e f e n d a n t s h a ll file a
w r i t t e n a p p e a r a n c e w ith in t h e tim e f o r s e r v in g a n a n s w e r u n d e r
R u le 1 2 ( a ) . A m e n d e d eff. A p ril 15, 1 9 7 5 .
( b ) T im e L im its ; S ta y . T h e tim e w ith in w h ic h re v ie w m a y b e
s o u g h t s h a ll b e a s p ro v id e d b y s ta tu te , e x c e p t t h a t if n o tim e lim it
is sp e c ifie d b y s t a t u t e , t h e c o m p la in t s h a ll b e filed w ith in 30 d a y s
a f t e r n o tic e o f a n y a c tio n o r re fu s a l to a c t o f w h ic h re v ie w is
s o u g h t u n le s s t h e c o u r t e n la r g e s th e tim e in a c c o rd a n c e w ith
R u le 6 ( b ) , a n d , in th e e v e n t of a fa ilu re to a c t, w ith in s ix m o n th s
a f t e r e x p ir a tio n o f th e tim e in w h ic h a c tio n s h o u ld re a s o n a b ly
h a v e o c c u rre d . E x c e p t a s o th e rw is e p ro v id e d b y s t a tu te , th e f il
in g o f t h e c o m p la in t d o es n o t s t a y a n y a c tio n o f w h ic h re v ie w is
s o u g h t, b u t th e c o u r t m a y o r d e r a s ta y u p o n s u c h te r m s a s i t
d e e m s p ro p e r.
( c ) T r ia l o r H e a r in g ; J u d g m e n t. A n y tr ia l o f th e f a c ts w h e re
p ro v id e d b y s t a t u t e o r o th e rw is e s h a ll be w ith o u t j u r y u n le s s th e
C o n s titu tio n o f th e S t a t e o f M a in e o r a s ta tu te g iv e s t h e r i g h t to
t r i a l b y ju r y . T h e ju d g m e n t o f th e c o u rt m a y a f f ir m , re v e rs e ,
o r m o d ify t h e d e c is io n u n d e r re v ie w o r m a y re m a n d t h e c a s e to
th e g o v e r n m e n ta l a g e n c y f o r f u r t h e r p ro c e e d in g s. A m e n d e d eff.
A p ril 1 5 , 1 9 7 5.

(d) R e v ie w b y t h e L a w C o u rt. U n less b y s t a t u t e o r o th e rw is e
th e d e c isio n o f th e S u p e r io r C o u r t is fin a l, re v ie w b y t h e L a w .
C o u r t s h a ll b e b y a p p e a l o r r e p o r t in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e s e R u le s
o f C iv il P ro c e d u re , a n d n o o th e r m e th o d o f a p p e lla te re v ie w s h a ll
be p e r m itte d .
E n t i r e r u le a m e n d e d eff. D ec. 3 1 , 19 6 7 .
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Maine State Planning O ffic e
189 State Street
Augusta, Maine 04330

A p ril 11, 1974

TO :

Regional Planning Commissions, Extension Agents

FRO M :

Rich Rothe

RE:

Phippsburg Decision

•irV

The enclosed Superior Court decision, which has relevance for planning boards throughout
the State, was sent to us by Brian Chernack for distribution to the other RPC 's. According
to Hank Sturm, SMCRPC, this decision resolves one of two suits brought against the
Phippsburg Planning Board by Freeman Linsc o tt. Th is one sought damages from the Town
and from two of the Board members for "unduly influencing the other members." The other
s u it, which is s till pending, seeks to overturn the decision of the Planning Board denying
the p la in tiff subdivision approval. O ur interpretation of the highlights of the decision,
which deals favorably w ith the issue of planning board lia b ility , are as follows:
1.

"The (Planning) Board members individually are not liable to individual suits
even i f they exercise the ir functions . . . in bad faith . . . To permit such
suits would bring the matters of government in this state to an absolute halt.
If people can only accept government office involving Judgemental functions
in some aspects at the peril of their goods and estates, and the lia b ility to be
(fined) in damages for every real or fancied error in judgement, the govern
ment would be brought to its knees. Under these circumstances, public policy
dictates that C iv il remedies of suit are not available" (extracts, page 8).
The remedy for dealing w ith a Board member who acts in bad faith is to remove him
from his o ffic e . The Justification for such a broad immunity is that it would be
impossible to determine "bad fa ith " without submitting all accused o ffic ia ls to
the burden of a tria l and the danger of its outcome. Such prospects would discourage
most people from serving (see discussion of Richard V . E llis , page 9).

2.

In discharging its responsibilities under the Subdivision A c t, a planning board is
acting in a ju d ic ia l, or quasi-judicial capacity, not merely an administrative or
m inisterial capacity. Such a capacity requires that human judgement, reason,
and subjective evaluation be employed in evaluating the environmental and other
impacts of a proposal, and in prescribing specific means to accomplish the necessary
ends. Environmental matters are simply too complex to be reduced in sim ple, rig id ,
guidelines and criteria which can be followed by the subdivider or developer without
some intrepretation by the reviewing autho rity. (Interpretation of discussion on
pages 5 - 7).
sc - 2
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3.

The burden of proof lies on the one who would economically benefit from the proposal
( i . e . , the subdivider or developer). (Taken from page 6 , and T itle 30, § 4956, 1 2 .)

4.

Planning Boards have a consumer protection responsibility under the Subdivision Act
which compels the Board to consider the effects of the proposal on the potential
purchasers of that property (see page 7 , and State Planning O ffic e memo "Subdivision
Review Procedures - Water Supp ly," 4 - 2 - 7 4 , for more on this).

5.

"These functions (subdivision review) are not discretionary. They are mandatory
upon the town and as such are a delegated governmental function and (sic) in
the performance of which obviously the town cannot be lia b le ." (page?9 - 10).
W hile this language applies to the administration of the Subdivision A c t, a parallel
could be drawn to the Mandatory Shore land Zoning and Subdivision Control A c t,
which is also mandatory. We are s till awaiting a reply from the Attorney General's
O ffic e regarding Planning Board lia b ility . However, this decision should be of
immediate interest and some comfort to planning boards concerned with this particular
issue.

6.

Th is case is dismissed w ith prejudice, which means that the P la in tiff cannot bring
suit again, even i f additional facts come to lig h t.
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STATE OF MAINE
YORK, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. 535/73

FREEMAN C. LINSCOTT, ET ALS.
PLAINTIFFS
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT, RULINGS
OF LAW AND DECREE OF COURT
ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE
A CLAIM ON WHICH RELIEF MAY
BE GRANTED

TOWN OF PHIPPSBURGH, ET ALS.
DEFENDANTS

This is an oppressive in terrorem action of tort by a wouldbe developer against the Town of Phippsburg and the members of its
Planning Board individually for the recovery of damages as for
negligence in their failure to approve a plan of land development
proposed by the plaintiff, and in which he seeks to recover as
compensatory damages the five hundred-odd per cent profit of
$586,000 expected to be recovered from his development, together
with punitive damages of $20,000 against two of the members of
said Planning Board for mala fide in arriving at their judgment
in refusing approval of his scheme for the development of said
land.
The gravamen of the action is an alleged captious failure
to comply with the provisions of Section 4956 of Title 30, M.R.S.A.,
and particularly Subsection 3 of said section and more definitively
sc - 2
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the failure on the part of the Planning Board to specifically
adjudicate on each of the Subsections A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, J,
K, and L of said Subsection 3.

This particular statute provides,

in essence, that before a tract of land may be subdivided into
three or more lots, the plan of the developer or subdivider shall
be first approved by nthe municipal planning board, agency, or
office, or if none, by the municipal officers” . . . therein called
a municipal reviewing authority.
Said reviewing authority, subject to satisfying the burden
of proof by the developer, shall determine that the development
will not result in undue water or air pollution; that there is
sufficient water available for reasonable foreseeable needs of
it
the subdivision;that/wiii not cause an unreasonable burden on an
existing public water supply if one is to be utilized; that it
will not cause unreasonable soil erosion or reduce the capacity
of the land to hold water so that a dangerous or unhealthy condi
tion may result; that it will not cause unreasonable highway or
public road congestion or unsafe conditions with respect to the
use of highways or public roads existing or proposed; will provide
for adequate sewerage waste

disposal; will not cause an unreason

able burden on the ability of the municipality to dispose of solid
waste and sewerage if municipal services must be utilized; will
not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty
of the area, aest.hetics, historic sites or rare and irreplaceable
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natural areas; is in conformance with duly adopted subdivision
regulations or ordinances, comprehensive plans, development plans
or land use plan, if any; the subdivider has adequate financial
and technical capacity to meet the above stated standards and, if
situated in whole or in part within 250 feet of any pond, lake,
river, or tidal waters will not adversely affect the quality of
such body of water or unreasonably affect the shoreline of such
body of water.
This particular piece of legislation shows the same philo
sophic approach as is found in M.R.S.A. Title 38, Subsections 482,
483, and 484 in which the Environmental Improvement Commission is
required to concern itself with developments of twenty acres or more
in extent.

These sections were the subject of recent litigation in

the Courts of this state and were found constitutionally viable
in the matter of In Re Spring Valley Development By Lakesites, Inc.,
300 A. 2d. 736.

This law again withstood constitutional attack

in the matter of In Re Maine Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A. 2d. 736.
The defendants are at that grinding interface where the colli
sions of will and interest between aggressive land developers and
those who would protect the quality of life in the state of Maine
are at their bitterest.

The problem is complex.

The plaintiff

claims that the legislation in question is also an unconstitutional
deprivation of property and there is a failure of due process by
the people charged with its enforcement who have not complied with
the mandatory requirements of the statute in their findings.
these failures are willful, they subject the Board members to
sc - 2
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punitive damages.

The plaintiff's theory is that in these determinaan
tions the Planning Board is acting in/administrative or ministerial

capacity as distinguished from a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.
In analyzing the contentions of the litigants, it is neces
sary that we turn to the purposes of the legislation in issue.
What is- intended to be accomplished; indeed what must be accomplished?
Our Court has said in Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Im
provement Commission, et als., 307 A. 2d. 1.
"in the period from about 1960 to 1973
peoples throughout the world have
wakened to the awful truth that if
man continues random destruction of
his natural environment, his natural
environment will ultimately destroy
h im.
This destruction of the environment
is not confined to the land alone,
or the sea alone or the air alone.
Inspired by this sudden conscious
ness of the perils of pollution,
legislative bodies everywhere have
passed legislation designed to dimin
ish pollution of our environment.
Our Maine Legislature has been in the
forefront of those seeking to control,
and where necessary abate, threats of
environment destruction."
It is clearly within the realm of common knowledge that Maine
does not want to get into the same situation as the unfortunate in
habitants of Long Island, New York, who find themselves pumping from
their water wells the non-biodegradabLe constituents of the effluent
of their own septic tanks and those of their neighbors, and more
unfortunately, will continue to do so for an indefinite period in
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the future.

This extreme example of the consequences of a degraded

subterranean environment is not so farfetched when one considers
the geology of this state.

Shaped in surface configuration and the

composition mixture aid texture of its soils by the grinding blades
of prehistoric glaciation, the chemistry, physical characteristics,
and depth of the soil covering the basal ledge in the state of
Maine not only varies from mile to mile but often from rod to rod
or even in some instances from yard to yard.
Those who would develop land in the state of Maine are con
fronted continually with this rapid transition in oven short dis
tances from one type of soil to another, from one soil percolation
rate to another, and with wide variations in depth of soil cover
over the basic rock.

Given this physical fact, the formulation of

definitive guide lines to accomplish the absolute expedient protec
tion of a particular environment encounters so many independent
variables as to virtually defy simplistic solutions.

The means in

each case must be adapted to the ends to be accomplished, and the
formulation of rigid guidelines or rigid criteria for installations
to cope or deal with these variable factors either requires too
much or not enough, and the intervention of human judgment and
reason must be employed to accomplish the legislative mandate
within the limits of economic feasibility.

In some instances

the ends required by the legislature to be accomplished simply
cannot be met, and the land is simply unsuitable for residential
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development and sometimes even for industrial development.

The

tolerance of our ecology for change is a factor which requires
individual evaluation in each case, and the legislature has seen
fit to place the burden of persuasion that these ends can and
will be accomplished upon the would-be developer.

The means

required to accomplish these ends and persuade the licensing
authorities is cast upon the one who would be economically benefitted by the development proposed.

In fine, it is public policy

that the cost of development shall include those measures necessary
to the protection of the environment of this state and this has
already been determined by our Courts to be within the proper
limits of the police power.
The question then becomes "is the function of a Planning
Board operating under this section purely ministerial or does it
involve discretions and a weighing and balancing of interests and
thus more a judicial than a mere ministerial function?"

In many

situations of zoning and planning encountered by the Courts of
this state, definitive areas of land use have been assigned, and
zoning boards have been charged with seeing that the uses defined
have been confined to the areas chosen and this, of course, being
specific uses, permits more or less mechanical application of
regulation to the proposed use.

In this there is little occasion

for the exercise of either judgment or discretion for the weighing
of facts and so forth.

On the other hand the objectives of this

statute are so broad as to require subjective evaluation of the
sc - 2
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means chosen to accomplish the required ends and to in fact chcfie
perhaps between alternative means of accomplishing those require
ments to see that they will be satisfactorily met not only in the
first instance but for the long haul.

The intent of the legislature

is obviously to protect our state from permitting the development
of housing accommodations which have degenerated in some of our
cities to the revolting expedient of mere survival shelter, and
which are chosen only by those whose socio-economic condition
gives them no choice at all.

The legislature of this state has

decided, and wisely, that the developer is not permitted to sell
his dreams and leave his purchasers as "participants in--as well
as victims of--a local environmental disaster."
supra.

Spring Valley,

Under these circumstances the Planning Board must evaluate

and strike down unreasonable incursions.

Since no encroachment

upon the environment can be accomplished without degradation to
some degree, they must determine whether the unavoidable part of
that degradation is unreasonable and whether other means will
better avoid it.

Man's development of his land areas and his uses

of energy have come to the point now where a balancing of competing
interests is a sine qua non of survival.

What man must pay for

what he gets has become a judgmental choice.

To hold that the

Board charged with the discharge of such responsibility is merely
administrative or ministerial is to belittle the problem, and the
resolution of questions such as those delegated to it by this
section of the statute is judicial or quasi-judicial.
sc - 2

- 8 -

The Board members individually are not liable to individual
suits even if they exercise their functions captiously or in bad
faith under the decided cases,and the remedy is either through
criminal action or impeachment or removal.

To permit such suits

would bring the matters of government in this state to an absolute
halt.

If people can only accept government office involving judg

mental functions in some aspects at the peril of their goods and
estates, and the liability to be mulcted in damages for every real
or fancied error in judgment, the government would be brought to
its knees.

Under these circumstances, public policy dictates that

civil remedies of suit are not available.
The Court noted in Richards v. Ellis, 233 A. 2d. 37:

"Every informed citizen is constantly
aware of the expanding use of boards
and commissions with judicial or near
judicial powers in the administration
of government at all levels.
The licensing board and the school
committee as we know have long his
tories. The Zoning Board is rela
tively a newcomer. Commissions such
as the Industrial Accident, Public
Utilities, Employment and Water Im
provement come readily to mind.
These examples could be multiplied."

And in the same case at page 38:

"The law has long recognized that the
public good is best served by freeing
the judge from the possibility of
threat of civil liability for an er
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roneous decision however evil, the
motives of the judge may have been.
The judge who violates the trust
placed in him by the State is answerable at the criminal dock and is sub
ject to impeachment or other removal
process."
And in Rodway v. Wiswall, 267 A. 2d., 375:
"Richards was clearly a decision based
upon public policy and which admittedly
overruled prior case law which had ap
plied the "good faith" test. It was
deemed to be in the public interest
to permit public officials and members
of boards and commissions "with judicial
or near judicial powers" to operate in
an atmosphere immunized from the re
straint and possible intimidation which
might flow from the threat of vexatious
personal suits. We see no occasion to
depart from this position and therefore
decline to overrule Richards.
The justification for extending so broad an immunity is:
"That it is impossible to know whether the
claim is well founded until, the case has
been tried, and that to submit all offi
cials, the innocent as well as the guilty
to the burden of a trial and to the in
evitable danger of its outcome, would
damper the ardor of all but the most reso
lute, or the most irresponsible, in the
unflinching discharge of their duties."
Judge Learned Hand in Oregoire v. Biddle
(CA 2) 177 F. 2d. 579, 581, quoted with
approval in Richards v. Ellis, supra, at
39.
The duties under this particular section are mandated not
only of this Planning Board but are mandated of all towns and.failing
possession of a Planning Board, the municipal officers or selectmen
themselves must undertake these judgmental functions.

sc - 2

These functions

- 1 0 -

are not discretionary.

They are mandatory upon the town and as

such are a delegated governmental function and in the performance
of which obviously the town cannot be liable.
In fine, the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted both as to the individual defendants, the
members of the Planning Board, and as to the Town of Phippsburg
itself.
Case dismissed with prejudice.

April 2 , 1974
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The Subdivision Law and copies o f recent
amendments to it in reverse chronological
order

Subdivision Law
T itle 30
i 4956.

Land subdivisions

1.
Defined. A subdivision is the division of a tract or parcel o f land into 3 or more
lots w ith in any 5-year period, which period begins after September 2 2 , 1971, whether
accomplished by sale, lease, development, buildings or otherwise, provided that a division
accomplished by devise, condemnation, order o f court, g ift to a person related to the donor
by blood, marriage or adoption, unless the intent o f such g ift is to avoid the objectives of
this section, or by transfer o f any interest in land to the owner of land abutting thereon,
shall not be considered to create a lo t or lots for the purposes of this section.
In determining whether a tract or parcel o f land is divided into 3 or more lo ts, the firs t d ivid 
ing of such tract or parcel, unless otherwise exempted herein, shall be considered to create
the firs t 2 lots and the next dividing o f either o f said firs t 2 lots, by whomever accomplished,
unless otherwise exempted herein, shall be considered to create a 3rd lo t, unless both such
dividings are accomplished by a subdivider who shall have retained one o f such lots for his
own use as a single family residence for a period of at least 5 years prior to such 2nd d ividing.
Lots o f 40 or more acres shall not be counted as lots.
For the purposes o f this section, a tract or parcel o f land is defined as all contiguous land in
the same ownership, provided that lands located on opposite sides o f a public or private road
shall be considered each a separate tract or parcel of land unless such road was established
by the owner o f land on both sides thereof.
2.

Municipal review and regulation

A . Reviewing authority. A ll requests for subdivision approval shall be reviewed by the
municipal planning board, agency or o ffic e , or i f none, by the municipal o ffic e rs, herein
after called the municipal reviewing authority.
B.
Regulations. The municipal reviewing authority may, after a public hearing, adopt
additional reasonable regulations governing subdivisions which shall control u n til amended,
repealed or replaced by regulations adopted by the municipal legislative body. The municipal
reviewing authority shall give at least 7 days' notice of such hearing.
C . Record. On all matters concerning subdivision review, the municipal reviewing
authority shall maintain a permanent record o f all its meetings, proceedings and correspondence.
C - l . Upon receiving an application, the municipal reviewing authority shall issue to the
applicant a dated receipt. W ith in 30 days from receipt of an application, the municipal re
viewing authority shall notify the applicant in w riting either that the application is a complete
application o r, i f the application is incomplete, the specific additional material needed to
make a complete application. A fte r the municipal reviewing authority has determined that a
complete application has been file d , it shall notify the applicant and begin its fu ll evaluation
o f the proposed subdivision.

D.
Hearing; order. In the event that the municipal reviewing authority determines to
hold a public hearing on an application for subdivision approval, i t shall hold such hearing
w ith in 30 days o f receipt by it o f a completed application, and shall cause notice o f the
date, time and place o f such hearing to be given to the person making the application and
to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the m unicipality in which the sub
division is proposed to be located, at least 2 times, the date o f the firs t publication to be
at least 7 days prior to the hearing.
The municipal reviewing authority sh a ll, w ith in 30 days of a public hearing or w ith in
60 days o f receiving a completed application, i f no hearing is held, or w ith in such other time
lim it as may be otherwise mutually agreed to , issue an order denying or granting approval
of the proposed subdivision or granting approval upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem advisable to satisfy the criteria listed in subsection 3 and to satisfy any other regulations
adopted by the reviewing authority, and to protect and preserve the public's health, safety
and general w e lfa re . In all instances, the burden of proof shall be upon the persons propos
ing the subdivision. In issuing its decision, the reviewing authority shall make findings of fact
establishing that the proposed subdivision does or does not meet the foregoing c rite ria .
3.
G uid e line s. When promulgating any subdivision regulations and when reviewing any
subdivision for approval, the planning board, agency or o ffic e , or the municipal o ffic e rs,
shall consider the following criteria and before granting approval shall determine that the
proposed subdivision:
A . W ill not result in undue water o*- air p o llu tio n . In making this determination it shall
at least consider: The elevation o f land above sea level and its relation to the floodplains,
the nature of soils and subsoils and their a b ility to adequately support waste disposal; the
slope o f the land and its effect on effluents; the a va ila b ility of streams for disposal of effluents;
and the applicable state and local health and water resources regulations;
B.

Has su ffic ie n t water available for the reasonably foreseeable needs o f the subdivision;

C. W ill not cause an unreasonable burden on an existing water supply, i f one is to be
u tilize d ;
D . W ill not cause unreasonable soil erosion or reduction in the capacity o f the land to
hold water so that a dangerous or unhealthy condition may result;
E . W ill not cause unreasonable highway or public road congestion or unsafe conditions
w ith respect to use o f the highways or public roads existing or proposed;
F.

W ill provide for adequate sewage waste disposal;

G.
W ill not cause an unreasonable burden on the a b ility o f a m unicipality to dispose
of solid waste and sewage i f municipal services are to be u tilize d ; I.
I.
W ill not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty o f the area,
aesthetics, historic sites or rare and irreplaceable natural areas;

J.
Is in conformance w ith a duly adopted subdivision regulation or ordinance, compre
hensive plan, development plan, or land use plan, i f any; and
K . The subdivider has adequate financial and technical capacity to meet the above stated
standards.
L.
Whenever situated in whole or in part, w ith in 250 feet of any pond, lake, rive r or
tidal waters, w ill not adversely affect the quality of such body o f wafer or unreasonably affect
the shoreline o f such body of water.
4.
Enforcement. No person, firm , corporation or other legal entity may s e ll, lease,
develop, build upon or convey for consideration, o ffe r or agree to s e ll, lease, develop, build
upon or convey for consideration any land in a subdivision which has not been approved by the
municipal reviewing authority of the municipality where the subdivision is located and recorded
in the proper registry of deeds, nor shall such person, firm , corporation or other legal e n tity
sell or convey any land in such approved subdivision unless at least one permanent marker is
set at one lot corner o f the lot sold or conveyed. The term "permanent marker" includes but
is not limited to the fo llo w ing : A granite monument, a concrete monument, an iron pin or a
d rill hole in ledge. No subdivision plat or plan shall be recorded by any register of deeds which
has not been approved as required. Approval for the purpose o f recording shall appear in w r it
ing on the plat or plan. No public u tility , water d is tric t, sanitary d istric t or any u tility com
pany of any kind shall insta ll services to any lot in a subdivision for which a plan has not been
approved.
Any person, firm , corporation or other legal e ntity who se lls, leases, develops, builds
upon, or conveys for consideration, offers or agrees to s e ll, lease, develop, build upon or con
vey for consideration any land in a subdivision which has not been approved as required by
this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $ 1 ,0 0 0 for each such occurrence.
The Attorney G eneral, the m unicipality, the planning board o f any municipality or the appro
priate municipal officers may institute proceedings to enjoin the violations of this section and
i f a violation is found by the court, the m unicipality, municipal planning board or the appro
priate municipal officers may be allowed attorney fees.
5.
Exemptions. This section shall not apply to proposed subdivisions approved by the
planning board or the municipal o ffic ia ls prior to September 2 3 , 1971 in accordance w ith laws
then in effect nor shall it apply to subdivisions as defined by this section in actual existence
on September 23 , 1971 that did not require approval under prior law or to a subdivision as
defined by this section, a plan of which had been legally recorded in the proper registry o f
deeds prior to September 2 3 , 1971. The division of a tract or parcel as defined by this section
into 3 or more lots and upon all of which lots permanent dwellings structures legally existed
prior to September 23 , 1971 is not a subdivision.
The dividing o f a tract or parcel o f land and the lot or lots so made, which dividing or
lots when made are not subject to this section, shall not become subject to this section by the
subsequent dividing of said tract or parcel of land or any portion thereof, however, the municipal
reviewing authority shall consider the existence o f such previously created lot or lots in review
ing a proposed subdivision created by such subsequent d ivid ing .

P U B LIC LAWS, 1971

C hap ter 454
A N A C T R e la tin g to M u n icip al R e g u la tio n of L a n d S u b d iv isio n s.
B e i t e n a c te d b y th e P e o p le o f th e S ta te o f M a in e , a s fo llo w s:
R . S., T . 30, § 4956, re p e a le d a n d rep laced . S ectio n 4956 of T itle 30 of the
R ev ised S ta tu te s , as a m e n d e d , is re p ealed an d th e fo llo w in g e n a cted in place
th e r e o f :
§ 4956.

L a n d su b d iv isio n s

1. D efined. A su b d iv isio n sh a ll b e th e d iv isio n of a tr a c t o r p arcel of land
in to 3 o r m o re lo ts fo r th e p u rp o s e of sale, d e v e lo p m e n t o r b u ild in g .
2. L o c a l re g u la tio n . W h e n a m u n ic ip a lity h a s e s ta b lis h e d a planning
b o ard , a g e n cy o r office, su c h b o ard , a g e n cy o r office m a y a d o p t regulations
g o v e rn in g su b d iv isio n s w h ic h sh all c o n tro l u n til su p e rse d e d b y provisions
a d o p te d b y th e le g isla tiv e b o d y of th e m u n ic ip a lity . W h e re a m u n icip ality has
n o t e sta b lish e d a p la n n in g b o a rd , a g e n cy or office, th e m u n ic ip a l officers may
a d o p t su b d iv isio n re g u la tio n s w h ich sh all c o n tro l u n til su p e rse d e d by pr0*
v isio n s a d o p te d b y th e le g isla tiv e b o d y of th e m u n ic ip a lity .
3. G uidelines. W h e n p ro m u lg a tin g a n y su b d iv isio n re g u la tio n s a n d w h en
re v ie w in g a n y s u b d iv isio n fo r a p p ro v al, th e p la n n in g b o ard , a g e n c y o r office,
o r th e m u n icip al officers, sh a ll co n sid e r th e follo w in g c rite ria a n d b efo re g r a n t
in g a p p ro v a l sh all d e te rm in e th a t th e p ro p o sed su b d iv isio n :
A. W ill n o t re s u lt in u n d u e w a te r or a ir p o llu tio n . I n m a k in g th is d e te r
m in a tio n it sh all a t le a s t c o n s id e r: T h e elev atio n of la n d ab o v e sea lev el an d
its re la tio n to th e flood p lain s, th e n a tu re of soils an d su b so ils a n d th e ir
a b ility to a d e q u a te ly s u p p o rt w a ste d isp o sa l; th e slo p e of th e la n d a n d
its effect o n e fflu e n ts; th e a v a ila b ility of stre a m s fo r d isp o sal of efflu en ts;
a n d th e ap p lica b le s ta te a n d local h e a lth an d w a te r re s o u rc e s r e g u la tio n s ;
B. H a s sufficient w a te r a v a ila b le for th e re a so n a b ly fo reseea b le n ee d s of
th e s u b d iv isio n ;
C. W ill n o t ca u se a n u n re a so n a b le b u rd e n on a n e x is tin g w a te r su p p ly , if
o n e is to be u tiliz e d ;
D . W ill n o t ca u se u n re a s o n a b le soil ero sio n o r re d u c tio n in th e c a p a c ity
of th e la n d to h o ld w a te r so th a t a d a n g e ro u s o r u n h e a lth y c o n d itio n m a y
re s u lt;
E . W ill n o t c a u se u n re a s o n a b le h ig h w a y or pub lic ro a d c o n g e stio n o r u n 
safe c o n d itio n s w ith re s p e c t to u se of th e h ig h w a y s o r p u b lic ro a d s e x is tin g
o r p ro p o s e d ;
F.

W ill p ro v id e fo r a d e q u a te so lid an d sew ag e w a s te d is p o s a l;

G. W ill n o t c a u se a n u n re a s o n a b le b u rd e n on th e a b ility of a m u n ic ip a lity
to d isp o se of solid w a s te a n d sew a g e if m u n icip al serv ic es a re to be u tiliz e d ;
H . W ill n o t p lace a n u n re a s o n a b le b u rd e n on th e a b ility of th e lo cal g o v 
e rn m e n ts to p ro v id e m u n ic ip a l o r g o v e rn m e n ta l s e rv ic e s ; I.
I. W ill n o t h a v e a n u n d u e a d v e rse effect on th e scenic o r n a tu r a l b e a u ty
of th e area, a e s th e tic s , h is to ric s ite s or ra re an d irre p la c e a b le n a tu r a l a r e a s ;

J. Is in c o n fo rm a n c e w ith a d u ly a d o p te d su b d iv isio n re g u la tio n o r o rd i
n an c e, co m p re h e n siv e p lan , d e v e lo p m e n t p lan , o r la n d use plan , if a n y ; an d
K . T h e su b d iv id e r h a s a d e q u a te financial a n d tech n ic al ca p acity to m e e t
th e ab o v e s ta te d s ta n d a rd s .
L . W h e n e v e r s itu a te d , in w h o le o r in *)art, w ith in 250 feet of an y pon d ,
lak e, riv e r o r tid a l w a te rs , w ill n o t a d v e rse ly affect th e q u a lity of su ch b o d y
of w a te r o r u n re a s o n a b ly affect th e sh o re lin e of su ch body of w a te r.
T h e p la n n in g b o a rd a g e n c y o r office, o r if n one, th e m u nicipal officers, sh a ll
issu e an o rd e r d e n y in g o r g ra n tin g ap p ro v a l of th e p roposed su b d iv isio n or
g ra n tin g a p p ro v a l u p o n su ch te rm s an d c o n d itio n s as it m ay deem a d v isa b le
to s a tis fy th e c rite ria liste d in th is su b se c tio n , an d to p ro te c t an d p re s e rv e
th e p u b lic ’s h e a lth , sa fe ty an d g en e ral w elfare. In all in stan ce s th e b u rd e n
of p ro o f sh all be u p o n th e p erso n p ro p o sin g th e su b d iv isio n s.
4.
E n fo rc e m e n t. N o p erso n , firm , c o rp o ra tio n or o th e r leg al e n tity m a y
co n v ey , o ffer o r a g re e to co n v ey a n y la n d in a su b d iv isio n w h ich h as n o t b ee n
a p p ro v e d b y th e p la n n in g b o ard , a g e n c y o r office, o r if n o n e ex ists, b y th e m u 
n icip al officers in th e m u n ic ip a lity w h e re th e su b d iv isio n is lo cated , a n d r e 
c o rd e d in th e p ro p e r r e g is try of d eed s. N o su b d iv isio n p la t o r p la n s h a ll be
re c o rd e d b y a n y re g is te r of d eed s w h ic h h a s n o t b ee n ap p ro v ed as re q u ire d .
A p p ro v a l fo r th e p u rp o se of re c o rd in g s h a ll a p p e a r in w ritin g on th e p la t
o r p lan . N o p u b lic u tility , w a te r d is tric t, s a n ita ry d is tric t o r an y u tility c o m 
p a n y of a n y k in d sh a ll serv e a n y lo t in a s u b d iv isio n fo r w h ich a p la n h a s n o t
b ee n ap p ro v ed .
A n y p erso n , firm , c o rp o ra tio n o r o th e r le g a l e n tity w h o con v ey s, o ffe rs o r
a g re e s to c o n v e y a n y lan d in a s u b d iv isio n w h ic h h a s n o t b een a p p ro v e d as
re q u ire d b y th is s e c tio n sh all be p u n ish e d b y a fine of n o t m o re th a n $1,000
fo r e a ch s u c h co n v e y an ce , o fferin g o r a g re e m e n t. T h e A tto rn e y G e n eral, th e
m u n ic ip a lity o r th e a p p ro p ria te m u n ic ip a l officers m a y in s titu te p ro c e e d in g s
to e n jo in th e v io la tio n of th is sec tio n .

PUBLIC LAW S, 1973

CHAPTER 465
A N A C T to A m e n d M u n icip al R e g u la tio n of L a n d S u b d iv isio n L aw .
B e i t e n a c te d b y th e P e o p le o f th e S ta te o f M a in e , a s fo llo w s:
Sec. i . R . S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§§ 1 a n d 2, re p e a le d a n d re p la ced . S ub
se c tio n s 1 a n d 2 of sectio n 4956 of T itle 30 of th e R ev ised S ta tu te s , as repealed
a n d re p la c e d b y c h a p te r 454 of th e p u b lic law s of 1971, are rep ealed an d the
fo llo w in g e n a c te d in p lace th e r e o f :
1. D efin ed . A su b d iv isio n is th e d iv isio n of a tr a c t o r p a rcel of lan d into
3 o r m o re lo ts w ith in a n y 5-year p erio d , w h e th e r ac co m p lish e d b y sale, lease,
d e v e lo p m e n t, b u ild in g o r o th e rw ise , e x c e p t w h e n th e d iv isio n is accom 
p lish e d b y in h e rita n c e , o rd e r of c o u rt o r g ift to a re la tiv e , u n le ss th e in ten t
of su c h g ift is to av o id th e o b jectiv es of th is sec tio n .
I n d e te rm in in g w h e th e r a p arcel of la n d is d iv id ed in to 3 o r m o re lo ts, land
re ta in e d b y th e su b d iv id e r fo r h is ow n u se as a sin g le fa m ily resid en ce for a
p e rio d o f a t le a s t 5 y e a rs sh all n o t be inclu d ed .
N o sale o r le a se of a n y lo t o r p arcel sh all be c o n sid e re d as b e in g a p a r t of a
s u b d iv isio n if su c h a lo t o r p arcel is 40 ac res o r m o re in size, ex c e p t w h e re the
in te n t of su c h sale or le a se is to avo id th e o b jectiv es of th is s ta tu te .
2.

M u n ic ip a l re v ie w a n d re g u la tio n .

A . R e v ie w in g a u th o rity . A ll re q u e sts fo r su b d iv isio n a p p ro v a l sh all be
re v ie w e d b y th e m u n icip al p la n n in g b o ard , a g e n c y o r office, o r if none, by
th e m u n ic ip a l officers, h e re in a fte r called th e m u n ic ip a l re v ie w in g au th o rity .
B . R e g u la tio n s . T h e m u n icip al re v ie w in g a u th o rity m ay , a fte r a public
h e a rin g , a d o p t a d d itio n a l re a so n a b le re g u la tio n s g o v e rn in g subdivisions
w h ic h s h a ll c o n tro l u n til am en d ed , re p ealed o r re p la c e d b y reg u latio n s
a d o p te d b y th e m u n ic ip a l le g islativ e body. T h e m u n ic ip a l re v ie w in g au 
th o r ity sh a ll g iv e a t le a s t 7 d a y s ’ n o tice of su ch h e a rin g .
C. R eco rd . O n all m a tte rs co n c ern in g su b d iv isio n re v ie w , th e m unicipal
re v ie w in g a u th o r ity sh a ll m a in ta in a p e rm a n e n t re c o rd of all its m eetings,
p ro c e e d in g s a n d c o rre sp o n d en c e.
D . H e a r in g ; o rd e r. I n th e e v e n t th a t th e m u n ic ip a l re v ie w in g au th o rity
d e te rm in e s to h o ld a p u b lic h e a rin g on a n a p p lic a tio n fo r su b d iv isio n ap
p ro v a l, it sh a ll h o ld su ch h e a rin g w ith in 30 d a y s of re c e ip t b y it of a com 
p le te d a p p lic a tio n , an d sh a ll cau se n o tice of th e d a te , tim e a n d p lace of such
h e a rin g to b e g iv e n to th e p erso n m ak in g th e a p p lic a tio n a n d to be pub
lish e d in a n e w sp a p e r of g e n e ra l c irc u la tio n in t h e m u n ic ip a lity in w hich
th e su b d iv isio n is p ro p o se d to b e lo cated , a t le a s t 2 tim e s, th e d a te of th e
first p u b lic a tio n to be a t le a s t 7 d ay s p rio r to th e h e a rin g .
The m u n ic ip a l re v ie w in g a u th o rity sh all, w ith in 30 d ay s of a pub lic h ea rin g
or w ith in 60 d a y s of re c e iv in g a co m p leted a p p lica tio n , if no h e a rin g is held,
or w ith in su c h o th e r tim e lim it as m a y be o th e rw ise m u tu a lly ag reed to, issue
an o rd e r d e n y in g o r g ra n tin g ap p ro v al of th e p ro p o se d su b d iv isio n o r g ra n tin g
approval u p o n s u c h te rm s a n d c o n d itio n s as it m a y d ee m ad v isab le to sa tisfy
the c r ite ria lis te d in su b se c tio n 3 an d to s a tis fy a n y o th e r re g u la tio n s ad o p ted
by th e re v ie w in g a u th o rity , an d to p ro te c t a n d p re se rv e th e p u b lic ’s h ea lth ,
safety a n d g e n e ra l w e lfa re . I n all in sta n c e s th e b u rd e n of p ro o f sh all b e u p o n
the p e rso n s p ro p o s in g th e su b d iv isio n s. I n issu in g its d ecision, th e re v ie w in g
a u th o rity sh a ll m a k e fin d in g s of fa c t e s ta b lis h in g th a t th e p ro p o se d su b d iv i-

sion does or does n ot m eet the foregoing criteria.

Sec. 2 . R. S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 3 , F , am ended. P ara g rap h F of sub
section 3 of section 4956 of T itle 30 of the R evised S ta tu te s, as repealed and
replaced by ch ap ter 454 of the public law s of 1971 , is am ended to read as
follow s:
F.

W ill provide for adequate soltd

sew age w aste d isp o sal;

Sec. 3 . R. S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 3 , ft H , repealed. P ara g rap h H of sub
section 3 of section 4956 of T itle 30 of the R evised S tatu tes, as repealed and
replaced by ch ap ter 454 of the public law s of 1971 , is repealed.
Sec. 4. R. S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 3, am ended. T he last p aragraph of su b 
section 3 of section 4956 of T itle 30 of the Revised S tatu tes, as repealed and
replaced by ch a p te r 454 of the public law s of 1971 , is repealed.
Sec. 5 . R . S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 4, am en d ed . Subsection 4 of section 4956
of T itle 30 of the R evised S tatutes, as repealed and replaced by ch ap ter 454
of the public law s of 19 71 , is am ended to read as follow s:
4. E n fo rc e m e n t. N o person, firm, corporation o r o th er legal en tity m ay
sell, lease, o r convey fo r c o n sid e ra tio n , offer or agree to sell, lease o r convey
for c o n sid e ra tio n any land in a subdivision which has not been approved b y
the p la n n in g b o ard , ag e t rey of office, of irt no ne exk-t-j. by
m u n icip al
officers in m u n ic ip a l re v ie w in g a u th o rity of the m unicipality w here th e sub

division is located, and recorded in the proper re g istry of deeds. N o sub
division plat or plan shall be recorded by any reg ister of deeds w hich has not
been approved as required. A pproval for the purpose of recording sh all
appear in w ritin g on the plat or plan. No public utility, w a te r d istrict, sani
tary district or any u tility com pany of any kind shall se r ■re in sta ll serv ic es to
any lot in a subdivision for w hich a plan has not been approved.
Sec. 6. R. S., T . 30, § 4956, am ended. T he last p arag rap h of section 4956
of T itle 30 of the R evised S tatu tes, as repealed and replaced by ch ap ter 454
of the public law s of 1971 , is am ended to read as follow s:
Any person, firm, corporation or other legal en tity who sells, leases, or
conveys fo r c o n s id e ra tio n , offers or agrees to sell, lease or convey fo r co n 
sid e ra tio n any land in a subdivision which has not been approved as required
by this section shall be punished by a fine of not m ore than $ 1,000 for each
such sale, lease o r conveyance for consideration, offering or agreem ent. T he
A tto rn ey General, th e m unicipality or the appropriate m unicipal officers may
institute proceedings to enjoin the violation of this section.
Sec. 7. R. S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 5, additional. Section 4956 of T itle 30
of the Revised S tatu tes, as repealed and replaced by ch ap ter 454 of the public
law s of 1971 , is am ended by adding a new subsection 5 , to read as follow s:
5. E x e m p tio n s. T h is s e c tio n sh all n o t ap p ly to p ro p o se d su b d iv isio n s
ap p ro v e d b y th e p la n n in g b o a rd or th e m u n icip al officials p rio r to S ep tem b er
23, 1971 in a c c o rd a n c e w ith law s th e n in effect n o r sh a ll th e y a p p ly to su b 
d iv isio n s as defined b y th is se c tio n in a c tu a l ex isten c e on S e p te m b e r 23, 1971
t h a t d id n o t re q u ire a p p ro v a l u n d e r p rio r law . T h e d iv isio n of a tr a c t or
p a rc e l b y sale, g ift, in h e rita n c e , lease o r o rd e r of c o u rt in to 3 o r m o re lo ts and
u p o n w h ic h lo ts p e r m a n e n t d w e llin g s tru c tu re s le g a lly e x iste d p rio r to Sep
te m b e r 23, 1971 is n o t a su b d iv isio n .
Effective October 3, 1973

PUBLIC LAW S, 1973

CHAPTER 700
A N A C T to C la rify th e R eal E s ta te S u b d iv isio n L aw .

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine, as follows:
Sec. i . R . S., T . 30, § 4956, sub-§ 1, am ended. T h e first paragraph of su b 
section 1 of section 4956 of T itle 30 of th e R evised S tatu tes, as last repealed
and replaced by section 1 of ch ap ter 465 of the public law s of 1973, is am ended
by adding a t the end a new sentence to read as fo llo w s:
F o r th e p u rp o s e s of th is se c tio n , a lo t sh a ll n o t in clu d e a tra n s f e r of an in te r 
est in la n d to a n a b u ttin g la n d o w n e r, h o w e v e r acco m p lish ed .

Sec. 2 . R . S., T . 30, § 4956, su b -§ 5 , am ended. Subsection 5 of section 4956
of T itle 30 of th e R evised S ta tu te s, as enacted by section 7 of chapter 465 of
the public law s of 1973 , is am ended by ad ding a t the end a new p arag rap h to
read as follow s :
T h e o w n e r o f a lo t w h ich , a t th e tim e of its c re a tio n , w as n o t p a r t of a su b 
division, s h a ll n o t be re q u ire d to se c u re th e ap p ro v a l of th e m u n icip al re v ie w 
ing a u th o r ity fo r su ch lo t in th e e v e n t t h a t th e su b se q u e n t ac tio n s of a p rio r
ow ner, o r h is su c c e sso r in in te re s t, o f th e lo t c re a te s a su b d iv isio n of w h ic h
the lo t is a p a r t, h o w e v er, th e m u n ic ip a l re v ie w in g a u th o rity sh all c o n sid e r
the e x iste n c e of su c h a p re v io u sly c re a te d lo t in p a ssin g u p o n th e a p p lic a tio n
of an y p rio r o w n e r, o r h is su cc esso r in in te re st, of th e lo t fo r ap p ro v a l of a
proposed su b d iv isio n .
Effective June 28, 1974

PUBLIC LAW S, 1975

CHAPTER 468
A N A C T to A m e n d th e S u b d iv isio n L a w to P ro v id e fo r M o re H o u sin g
in th e S ta te .

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine, as follows:
Sec. i . 12 M R S A § 4813, first ft, as la s t re p e a le d an d re p la ced b y P L 1973,
c. 564, § 5, is am e n d e d b y a d d in g a n ew se n te n c e a t th e en d to r e a d :

T h e D e p a rtm e n t o f E n v iro n m e n ta l P ro te c tio n a n d th e M a in e L a n d U se R eg 
u la tio n C o m m issio n s h a ll w ith re s p e c t to th e s e s h o re la n d a re a s a d o p t said
s u ita b le o rd in a n c e b y J a n u a ry 1, 1976.
Sec. 2.

30 M R S A § 4956, sub-§ 2, ft C -i is e n a c te d to re a d :

C -i. U p o n re c e iv in g an ap p lica tio n , th e m u n ic ip a l re v ie w in g a u th o rity
s h a ll issu e to th e a p p lic a n t a d a te d re c e ip t. W ith in 30 d ay s fro m re ceip t of
a n a p p lic a tio n , th e m u n icip al re v ie w in g a u th o r ity sh a ll n o tify th e ap p lican t
in w ritin g e ith e r th a t th e ap p lica tio n is a co m p le te a p p lic a tio n or, if the
a p p lic a tio n is in co m p lete, th e specific a d d itio n a l m a te ria l n eed ed to m ake a
c o m p le te a p p lic a tio n . A fte r th e m u n ic ip a l re v ie w in g a u th o rity h a s d eter
m in e d t h a t a c o m p lete a p p lica tio n h a s b e e n filed, it sh all n o tify th e applicant
a n d b e g in its fu ll e v a lu a tio n of th e p ro p o se d su b d iv isio n .
Effective October 1, 1975

P U B LIC LAW S, 1975

CHAPTER 475
A N A C T to C la rify th e M u n icip al R e g u la tio n of L a n d S u b d iv isio n L a w .

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine, as follows:
Sec. i . 30 M R S A § 4956, sub-§ 1, as last am en d ed by P L 1973 , c. 700. § 1,
is re p ealed an d th e fo llo w in g e n a cted in place th e re o f:
1. D efin ed . A su b d iv isio n is th e d iv ision of a tr a c t o r p a rc e l of la n d in to
3 o r m o re lo ts w ith in a n y 5 -y ear p erio d , w h ich p erio d b e g in s a f te r S e p te m b e r
22, 1971, w h e th e r ac co m p lish e d b y sale, lease, d ev elo p m en t, b u ild in g s o r o th e r
w ise, p ro v id e d t h a t a d iv isio n acco m p lish ed b y devise, c o n d e m n a tio n , o rd e r
o f c o u rt, g ift to a p e rs o n re la te d to th e d o n o r b y blood, m a rria g e o r ad o p tio n ,
u n le s s th e in te n t o f su c h g ift is to avo id th e o b jectiv es of th is sec tio n , o r b y
tr a n s f e r of a n y in te re s t in la n d to th e o w n e r of la n d a b u ttin g th e re o n , sh a ll
n o t be c o n sid e re d to c re a te a lo t o r lo ts fo r th e p u rp o se s of th is sectio n .
I n d e te rm in in g w h e th e r a tr a c t o r p arcel of la n d is d iv id ed in to 3 o r m o re
lo ts , th e firs t d iv id in g of s u c h tr a c t o r parcel, u n less o th e rw is e e x e m p te d
h e re in , sh all be c o n sid ered to c re a te th e first 2 lo ts an d th e n e x t d iv id in g of
e ith e r o f said first 2 lo ts , b y w h o m e v e r accom plished, u n le ss o th e rw is e ex 
e m p te d h erein , sh all be c o n sid ered to c re a te a 3rd lot, u n le ss b o th su ch div id in g s a re a c co m p lish e d b y a su b d iv id e r w ho sh all h av e re ta in e d o n e of su c h
lo ts fo r h is o w n u se as a sin g le fa m ily re sid e n ce for a p erio d of a t le a s t 5 y e a rs
p rio r to su ch 2nd d iv id in g . L o ts of 40 o r m o re acres sh all n o t b e c o u n te d as
lo ts.
F o r th e p u rp o se s of th is sec tio n , a tr a c t or p arcel of la n d is defined as all
c o n tig u o u s la n d in th e sam e o w n e rsh ip , p ro v id ed th a t la n d s lo c a te d o n o p 
p o s ite sid es of a p u b lic o r p riv a te ro a d shall be co n sid ered e a ch a s e p a ra te
tr a c t o r p a rc e l of la n d u n le ss su ch ro a d w a s estab lish ed b y th e o w n e r of la n d
b n b o th sid es th ere o f.
Sec. 2.

30 M R S A § 4956, sub-§ 4, first sen ten ce, as la s t am e n d e d b y P L

1973 , c- 4^5» § 5. is f u r th e r am e n d e d to re ad :
N o p erso n , firm , c o rp o ra tio n o r o th e r legal e n tity m ay sell, lease o r co n v ey
fo r c o n sid e ra tio n , offer o r a g re e to sell, lease o r convey for c o n sid e ra tio n a n y
la n d in a su b d iv isio n w h ioh u n le ss th e su b d iv isio n h as
b een a p p ro v e d b y
th e m u n icip al re v ie w in g a u th o rity of th e m u n icip ality w h e re th e su b d iv isio n
is lo cate d , a n d u n le ss a s u rv e y p lan th e re o f sh o w in g p e rm a n e n t m a rk e rs s e t
a t all lo t c o rn e rs h a s b ee n re c o rd e d in th e p ro p e r re g is try of deeds. T h e te rm
“ p e rm a n e n t m a rk e r” in c lu d e s b u t is n o t lim ited to th e fo llo w in g : A g ra n ite
m o n u m e n t, a c o n c re te m o n u m e n t, an iro n p in o r a drill h o le in led g e.
Sec. 3. 30 M R S A § 4956, sub-§ 5, first p a ra g ra p h , as e n a cted b y P L 1973,
c. 465, § 7, is am en d e d to re a d :
T h is sec tio n shall n o t a p p ly to p ro p o se d su b d iv isio n s a p p ro v ed by th e p la n 
n in g b o a rd o r th e m u n icip al officials p rio r to S ep tem b er 23, 1971 in ac co rd a n ce
w ith law s th e n in effect n o r shall 4-bey it ap p ly to su b d iv isio n s as defined by
th is sec tio n in a c tu a l e x iste n c e on S ep te m b e r 23, 1971 th a t did n o t re q u ire
a p p ro v a l u n d e r p rio r law o r to a su b d iv isio n as defined b y th is sec tio n , a p lan

PUBLIC LAW S, 1975
o f w h ich h ad b een le g a lly re co rd e d in th e p ro p e r re g is try of d eed s p rio r to
S e p te m b e r 23, 1971. T h e d i vi•:■■■»■«: -4 e
b y se+e,
in h e rita n c e,
^ o o u rt in to ^

dwe-ling st-rnet-nfeo tegaUv r eined prior 4# S ep^cmbce 53. +974- is

« stth-

dw ioion T h e d iv isio n of a tr a c t o r p arcel as defined b y th is sec tio n in to 3 or
m o re lo ts a n d u p o n all of w h ich lo ts p e rm a n e n t d w e llin g s tru c tu re s le g a lly
e x is te d p rio r to S e p te m b e r 23, 1971 is n o t a su b d iv isio n .
Sec. 4. 30 M R S A § 4956, su b -§ 5, sec o n d p a ra g ra p h , as en a cted b y P L
1973. c. 700, § 2, is re p ealed a n d the follow ing e n a c te d in place th e r e o f :
T h e d iv id in g o f a tr a c t o r p arcel of la n d a n d th e lo t o r lo ts so m ad e, w h ic h
d iv id in g o r lo ts w h e n m ad e a re n o t s u b je c t to th is sectio n , sh all n o t b eco m e
s u b je c t to th is se c tio n b y th e s u b s e q u e n t d iv id in g o f said tra c t o r p a rc e l of
la n d o r a n y p o rtio n th ere o f, h o w e v er, th e m u n icip al re v ie w in g a u th o rity s h a ll
c o n s ic e r th e e x iste n c e of su c h p re v io u sly c re a te d lo t o r lo ts in re v ie w in g a
p ro p o se d su b d iv isio n c re a te d b y su c h su b s e q u e n t d iv id in g .
Effective October 1, 1975

1976 F IR S T S PE C IA L S E S S IO N

Ch. 703

SUBDIVISIONS—PERMANENT MARKERS—
ATTORNEY FEES
C H A PT E R 703
S.P. 717— L.D. 2268
An Act to Revise Requirements for Permanent Markers under the Land Sub*
division Law.
B e i t en acted by the People of the S ta te o f M aine, as follow s:
Sec. I. 30 M RSA § 4956, sub-§ 4, first sentence, a s la st amended by P L
1975, c. 475, § 2, is repealed and the follow in g enacted in place thereof:
No person, firm, corporation or other legal en tity m ay sell, lease or convey
fo r consideration, offer or agree to sell, lease or convey for consideration any
land in a subdivision which has not been approved by th e municipal reviewing
authority o f the m unicipality where the subdivision is located and recorded in
the proper registry o f deeds.
Sec. 2. 30 M RSA § 4956, sub-§ 5, 3rd fl, last sentence, is amended to read:
The A ttorney General, the m unicipality, the planning board of any munici
p ality or the appropriate m unicipal officers may in stitu te proceedings to en
join the violations of this gection and if a violation is found by the court, th e
municipality, municipal planning board or th e appropriate m unicipal officers
may be allowed attorney fees.
Approved Apr. 1, 1976.
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EFFECTIVE DATE

Oct. 24, 1977
IN

THE YEAR OF OUR LORD NINETEEN HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SEVEN

H.

P . 832 — L. D. 1005

A N A C T R e q u irin g P e rm a n e n t M ark ers P rio r to th e Sale or
C o n v ey an c e of L an d in an A p p ro v ed S ubdivision.

B e i t e n a c te d b y t h e P e o p le o f th e S t a t e o f M a in e , as follows:

30 M R S A § 4956, sub-§ 4, 1st sen ten ce, as repealed and replaced by P L
1975. c- 7°3, § 1, is amended to read :
N o person, firm , corporation or other legal entity may sell, lease or convey
for consideration, ofler or agree to sell, lease or convey for consideration any
land in a subdivision which has not been approved by the municipal reviewing
authority of the municipality where the subdivision is located and recorded in
the proper registry of deeds, nor shall such person, firm , c o rp o ra tio n or o th e r
leg al e n tity sell o r co n v ey an y lan d in su ch ap p ro v ed su b d iv isio n u n less a t
least one p e rm a n e n t m a rk e r is set a t one lo t co rn er of th e lo t sold or conveyed.

In H

o u se of

R

e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , ................................................................... 1977

Read twice and passed to be enacted.
Speaker

I n S e n a t e , ................................... , ............................. 1977

Read twice and passed to be enacted.
P r e sid e n t

Approved

19 7 7
G o v ern o r

^nature.

STATE OF MAINE

oH
bP:I„

^ iU C tAVIT.
IN

THE YEAR OF OUR LORD NINETEEN HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SEVEN

S. P. 590 — L. D. 1896
A N A C T to Make Additional Corrections of Errors and Inconsistencies in

the L aw s of Maine.

Em ergency preamble. Whereas, Acts of the Legislature do not become
effective until 9 0 days after adjournment unless enacted as emergencies; and

Whereas, Acts of this and previous Legislatures have resulted in certain
technical errors and inconsistencies in the laws of Maine; and
Whereas, these errors and inconsistencies have created uncertainties and
confusion in interpreting legislative intent;and
Whereas, itisvitally necessary to resolve such uncertainties and confusion
to prevent anv injustice or hardship on the people of Maine; and
Whereas, in the judgment of the Legislature, these facts create an emer
gency within the meaning of the Constitution of Maine and require the
following legislation as immediately necessary for the preservation of the
public peace, health and safety; now, therefore.
Be it evaded by th e
Sec. i.

1 M RSA

P e o p le

§ 12,

of th e

last sentence,

S l a t e o f M a in e , as follows:

is amended to read :

If compensation for land is not agreed upon, the estate may be taken for the
intended purpose by payment of a fair compensation, to be ascertained and
determined in the same manner as and by proceedings similar to those pro
vided for ascertaining damages in locating highways, in Title 2 3 ,chapters
201 to «©9 207.
Sec. 2. 3 M RSA § 2, as repealed and replaced by PL 1975,
amended by adding a new paragraph at the end to read :

c. 750, § t, is

T h e ex p en ses of m embers of the Legislature traveling outside the State
sh all be reimbursed for their actual expenses provided th at the expense
v o u ch e rs are approved by the P resident of the Senate or the Speaker of the
H o u se of Representatives.
Sec. 3.

3 M RSA

§ 3, as last amended by PL

1973

,c. 5 9 0 ,§ 2 ,is repealed.

Sec. 4. 3 M RSA § 22, 1st jj, last sentence, as repealed and replaced by P L
1975, c. 604, § t. is repealed and the following enacted in its place:
H e shall receive a salary of $400 per week for all official services performed
b y him during a regular or special session of the Legislature.

Sec. 5.

Effective date.

Section 4 of this Act shall be retroactive to Janu

ary 5 ,1977819-1

EFFE C TIV E DA TE
O c t. 24 , 1977

Lands shall enter into new leasehold agreem ents with such persons, .and shall
thereafter renew such leases on w hat may from time to time be reasonable
terms and conditions, so long as the lessee complies with the terms and
conditions of such leases and with all applicable laws and regulations of the
State.
Sec. 116-A. 30 M R S A § 4552, sub-§ 18, 1st sen ten ce, as enacted by P L
1975, c. 625, § 4. is amended to r e a d :

“ M ortgage loan’’ shall mean an interest-bearing obligation secured by a
m ortgage or note constituting a first lien on land and improvements in the
State constituting mve-fam k y eH= m u lf i-frtm ily horns i-n-g tm k o,
e hotiom g
p re fec t , um f re sid e n tia l h o u sin g or a h o u sin g p ro ject, inclu d in g , b u t n o t
lim ite d to, su ch improvements located on an Indian reservation in this State.
Sec. 117.

30 M R S A § 4602, sub-§ 2, f[ C, n e x t to la s t sentence, as en acted

by P L 1969, c. 470, § 8, is amended to r e a d :
The rate and am ount of compensation of the director shall be established by
the Governor w k -h th e ad v ice tmk conaef»t e f fk e -La ec u t ive Co uncil.
Sec. 118.

30 M R S A § 4602, sub-§ 2,

D, 1st

n e x t to la s t sentence, as

repealed and replaced by P L 1975, c. 770, § 175, is amended to read:
Each advisory board member and commissioner shall continue to hold office
after the expiration of his term until his successor shall have been appointed
k*
e aoe of eo m mlosicmeeo, eofkl-rme d b y -tko hbtee-ufivc Co unek .
Sec. 118-A.

30 M R S A § 4756, 1st sen ten ce, as amended by P L 1973, c.

625, § 205, is further amended to r e a d :
The state authority shall have the power to purchase or to make com m it
ments to purchase from banks, life insurance companies, savings and loan
associations, the Federal Government and other financial institutions law
fully doing business in the State of Maine, the interest bearing obligations
secured by m ortgages and notes which are .a first lien on land and improve
ments in Maine constituting ofto
w* m ik ti-famlly tm k o re sid e n tia l
h o u sin g o r a h o u sin g pro ject, except that an obligation shall not be eligible
for purchase by the state housing authority if the date of said obligation is
prior to October 1, 1969.
Sec. 118-B. 30 M R S A § 4756, la s t % 1st sen ten ce, as enacted by P L 1975,
c. 625, § 19, is amended to read :

Im provem ents constituting erne fa m ily
m u l ti-fam ily u n its re sid e n tia l
h o u sin g o r a h o u sin g p ro jec t shall include but not be limited to h o u sin g
p ro je c ts
improvements located on an Indian reservation in this State.
Sec. 118-C.

30 M R S A § 4760, 1st sen ten ce, as amended by P L 1973. c.

517, § 3, is further amended to r e a d :
The state authority may authorize the issuance of revenue bonds of the
authority in the manner and as provided in section 475 r for any of its au
thorized purposes including the purchase of first m ortgage loans or evidences
thereof, for residential housing or a h o u sin g p ro je c t in the State of Maine
from the financial institutions and other agencies specified in section 4756.
Sec. 118-D. 30 M R S A § 4956, sub-§ 4, 1st sen ten ce, as amended by P L
1977, c. 315, is further amended to read :

No person, firm, corporation or cither legal entity may sell, lease, develop,
b u ild u p o n or convey for consideration, offer or agree to sell, lease, develop,
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build upon or convey for consideration any land in a subdivision which has
not been approved by the municipal reviewing' authority of the municipality
where the subdivision is located and recorded in the proper registry of deeds,
nor shall such person, firm, corporation or other legal entity sell or convey
any land in such approved subdivision unless at least one permanent marker
is set at one lot corner of the lot sold or conveyed.
Sec. 118-E. 3 0 M RSA § 4 9 5 6 ,last f[, 1st sentence, as
P L 1973, e. 465, § (>, is repealed and the following enacted

last amended by
in its place:

Any person, firm, corporation or other legal entity who sells, leases, de
velops, builds upon, or conveys for consideration, offers or agrees to sell,
lease, develop, build upon or convey for consideration any land in a sub
division which has not been approved as required by this section shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 for each such occurrence.
Sec. 118-F. 32 M R SA § 202, sub-§ 2, as repealed and replaced by ML 1977,
c. 404, is repealed.
Sec. 118-G. 32 M R SA § 211, 2nd ff, 3rd sentence, as enacted by PL 1977,
c. 463. § 3. is amended to read :
Landscape architect members shall initially he appointed, one for a 2-year
term and one for a 3-year term ; the initially appointed members shall be
eligible to be qualified for admission to the examination to practice landscape
architecture and the Governor shall make a written finding to that effect.
Sec. n 8-H . 7 2 M RSA § 2 1 5 ,as enacted
pealed and the foil wing enacted in itsplace:
§ 215.

by PL

1977.

c. 4 6 3 ,§ 3 .is re

Removal of m em ber; vacancies

The Governor may by due process of law remove any member of the board
for misconduct, incompetency, neglect of duty or for any malfeasance in
office. Any vacancy in the board caused by death, resignation or for any
other cause, except completion of a fu1! term of service, shall be filled in a
like manner as an original appointment for a full term but with the new
member to hold office only during the unexpired term of a member whose
place he fills.
Sec. 118-I. 32 M R SA § 220, sub-§ 1, ff B, sub-f[ (2), as enacted by P L 1977.
c. 463, § 3, is repealed and the following enacted in its place:
(2) No corporation as such shall be registered to practice architecture
in this State, but it shall be lawful for a corporation to practice archi
tecture providing at least /l$ of the directors, if a corporation, or
of
the partners, if a partnership, are licensed under the law s of any state to
practice architecture and the person having the practice of architecture
in his charge is himself a director, if a corporation, or a partner, if a
partnership, and licensed to practice architecture under this chapter and
all drawings, plans, specifications and administration of construction or
alterations of buildings or projects by such corporation are under the
personal direction of such registered architect. One-third of the directors
or partners shall be licensed under the laws of any state to practice engi
neering, architecture, landscape architecture or planning. In cases where
the number of directors or partners is not divisible by 3 the number of
directors or partners shall be the number that results from rounding up
or rounding down to the nearest number.
Sec. 118-J. 32 M R SA § 220, sub-§ 2, B, sub-jf (2), as enacted by P L 1977,
c. 463, § 3 ,is repealed and the following enacted in its place :
(2) No corporation as such shall be registered to practice landscape
architecture in this State, but it shall be lawful for a corporation to prac819-20

